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Abstract:
Enforcement of financial reporting has gained new momentum in the European Union (EU) due 
to the so-called ‘IAS Regulation‘ (Regulation (EC) No. 1606/2002), with recital 16 requiring EU 
member states to take appropriate actions to ensure compliance with international accounting 
standards. Accordingly, several EU member states took concurrent or subsequent measures to 
increase the level of accounting enforcement, either by establishing new enforcement institu-
tions, or by reforming existing ones. While these actions are designed to enhance accounting 
compliance by unfolding a preventive and sanctioning function of enforcement, a thorough 
literature review reveals that there is only scarce empirical evidence on whether this aim has 
been indeed achieved. Striving to shed light on the impact of recent enforcement reforms, this 
dissertation examines the sanctioning function in the German enforcement system by investiga-
ting shareholder reactions to error announcements. Moreover, a cross-country analysis of 20 EU 
member states provides novel insights on the postulated preventive function in the aftermath of 
enforcement reforms. In summary, this dissertation aims to improve the understanding of the 
economic impact of accounting enforcement in Germany and the EU. 
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1 Introduction to the Research Context 
Financial reporting serves as an important information system by providing decision-
useful information to a company’s stakeholders (Böckem, 2000). However, research 
emphasizes that high-quality accounting standards alone might not be sufficient to guar-
antee high-quality financial reporting, hinting at the fact that incentives to comply with 
the given accounting standards matter, too (Soderstrom and Sun, 2007; Holthausen, 
2009). One central concept in shaping these incentives is enforcement of financial re-
porting (Brown and Tarca, 2005), which is expected to yield a twofold function (Berger, 
2010): First, it shall prevent companies from conducting accounting malfeasance; sec-
ond and related thereto, it shall impose sanctions in case of detected erroneous account-
ing. Still, it is noteworthy that enforcement does not work on a stand-alone basis, but 
gains power with its embedding in and interaction with a company’s corporate govern-
ance mechanisms. These in turn require accurate financial information to work properly 
(Armstrong et al., 2010), which shall be ensured by enforcement. 
Enforcement of accounting standards1 does not constitute a new phenomenon, as the 
oldest enforcement institution United States Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) being established already in 1934. However, in the European Union (EU) the 
topic gained new momentum in the course of the so-called ‘IAS Regulation’ (Regula-
tion (EC) No 1606/2002). According to this piece of European legislation, all firms that 
are listed on a regulated market in the EU are required to prepare their consolidated fi-
                                                          
1  The term ‘enforcement’ comprises all procedures, mechanisms and consequences that are designed to 
ensure the proper application of legal provisions. In the context of financial reporting, enforcement has 
the task to ensure compliance with accounting standards; it can be carried out on several levels, i.e. the 
financial statement preparer, the supervisory board, the external auditor, or an independent enforce-
ment institution which conducts regular reviews of companies’ financial reports. In the course of this 
dissertation, we focus on the last definition.  
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nancial statements in accordance with International Financial Reporting Standards 
(IFRS). Moreover and driven by the intention to ensure a consistent and proper level of 
IFRS application, recital 16 of the ‘IAS Regulation’ states that all EU member states 
shall take ‘appropriate measures to ensure compliance with international accounting 
standards’.2 
In line with these regulatory requirements, several EU member states established new 
enforcement institutions or reformed already existing ones (Christensen et al., 2013). 
However, and despite several harmonization measures and implementation guidelines 
coordinated by the European Securities and Market Authority (ESMA),3 both research-
ers and practitioners detect EU-wide differences in accounting enforcement which are 
likely to remain (Berger, 2010; Brown et al., 2014). This striking fact suggests that the 
efficacy4 of the installed enforcement mechanisms might differ among the EU member 
states. Consequently, the question arises whether the intention behind passing the ‘IAS 
Regulation’ eventually came true; this holds especially for the intended improvement of 
accounting quality. Despite of some evidence for the case of Germany (Ernstberger et 
al., 2012; Samarasekera et al., 2012), there is no generalizable answer to this question 
yet. 
Among the actions which the EU member states imposed in order to comply with the 
‘IAS Regulation’, the case of Germany is certainly the most interesting. Apart from the 
                                                          
2  The standards published on behalf of the International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC) are 
called International Accounting Standards (IAS). The IASC was restructured in the International Ac-
counting Standards Committee Foundation (IASCF) in 2001, which in turn delegated the standard-
setting process to the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB); the standards published on 
behalf of the IASB are labeled International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). 
3  The Committee of European Securities Regulators (CESR) performed this task until 2011, when it was 
replaced by ESMA. 
4  Efficacy is defined as the ratio of enforcement’s effects and its goals in terms of the postulated preven-
tive and sanctioning function. 
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importance of ensuring high-quality financial reporting for Europe’s largest economy, 
the German legislator did not follow previous role models of strictly private or public 
enforcement institutions. In contrast, the German enforcement system combines both 
aspects by comprising a private review panel (Financial Reporting Enforcement Panel, 
FREP) and the federal securities authority (Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungs-
aufsicht, BaFin), thereby striving to combine the benefits of each approach (Schmidt-
Versteyl, 2008; Bockmann, 2012). It is noteworthy that the German enforcement system 
solely relies on adverse publicity via error announcements (FREP, 2009), but does not 
foresee any monetary or criminal sanctions, in contrast to the SEC in the United States 
(Engel et al., 2004; Karpoff et al., 2008; Hitz et al., 2012). 
Although research on the unique German enforcement system has been constantly 
growing since a few years, there is still only limited evidence on its impact to date. Giv-
en the prominent role of error announcements, their interaction with and perception by 
other corporate governance mechanisms seems of particular importance. This holds for 
both capital-market based and personal consequences, which could hint at information 
processing of error announcements resulting in sanctions for the responsible manage-
ment or auditor. Moreover and referring to the preventive function of enforcement, error 
announcements and their consequences might also yield deterrence from future financial 
misreporting, thereby improving accounting quality. 
Summing up, the institutional environment of financial reporting has changed substan-
tially within the last decade, both in the EU in general and in Germany in particular. 
Driven by the goal of improving accounting compliance, enforcement mechanisms were 
set up or reformed that shall generate a preventive and sanctioning function. This pivot-
al change in the institutional setting demarks the field of research that is covered by this 
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dissertation with the title Does Enforcement of Financial Reporting Matter? Empirical 
Evidence from Germany and Europe. 
The dissertation comprises four manuscripts that aim to enhance the knowledge on en-
forcement within the EU and Germany, especially with regard to the postulated preven-
tive and sanctioning function (see Figure 1). Apart from manuscript A (Chapter II.) 
which is a review of extant literature of enforcement of financial reporting, the remain-
ing manuscripts B, C, and D (Chapters III.-V.) comprise three empirical studies; they 
can be further partitioned in studies investigating either the sanctioning or the preven-
tive function, with manuscript C covering both aspects. 
 
Figure 1: Structure of the dissertation 
 
Overview of the Dissertation
“Does Enforcement of Financial Reporting Matter? 
Empirical Evidence from Germany and Europe”
I.
Institutional Embedding of Enforcement in Corporate 
Governance and Evidence from Prior ResearchII.
Objectives of Enforcement: Preventive and Sanctioning Function
Evaluation of Sanctioning Function: Evaluation of Preventive Function:
III. Investor Reactions due to Error Announcements V.
Changes in Accounting 
Quality due to Enforcement 
Reforms
IV. Personal Consequences due to Error Announcements and their Impact on Accounting Quality
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Forming the basis of this dissertation, Manuscript A ‘Enforcement of Financial Re-
porting – A Corporate Governance Perspective’ provides the reader with a thorough 
introduction in the streams of literature that cover accounting enforcement. It explains 
the interrelation between enforcement and corporate governance, and highlights how the 
functioning of the latter is enhanced by enforcement. Graded according to each internal 
and external corporate governance mechanism, Manuscript A displays the empirical 
findings of previous research on enforcement; moreover, it identifies fields of research 
with scarce and non-generalizable results, thereby hinting at potential avenues of future 
research. Furthermore, the manuscript highlights existing deficiencies in evaluating the 
efficacy and efficiency of existing enforcement mechanisms, encouraging researchers to 
put additional emphasis on this issue. This holds for several aspects of the enforcement 
set-ups in the EU, and Germany in particular – not least for the postulated preventive 
and sanctioning function of enforcement. That said, the article contributes to the under-
standing of the role of enforcement in corporate governance by providing a comprehen-
sive review of existing literature. 
Manuscript B ‘Determinants of Investor Reactions to Error Announcements – Ex-
tended Evidence from Germany’ investigates shareholder reactions in the aftermath 
of error announcements, thereby tackling an essential channel of action for adverse pub-
licity. In contrast to myriads of comparable US studies, investor reactions in the German 
setting have only been investigated to date by Hitz et al. (2012). While the authors find 
less pronounced capital-market effects in Germany, their results solely provide first evi-
dence on this pivotal topic, furthermore being subject to methodological shortcomings 
due to the short sample period investigated. Consequently, Manuscript B aims to shed 
additional light on this issue by investigating a sample period twice as long as the one of 
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Hitz et al. (2012), with a corresponding effect on sample size and thus statistical power 
of the tests conducted. In addition, the drivers of investor reactions are deemed to be 
worthy of further investigation; therefore, the manuscript examines additional qualita-
tive characteristics of the error announcements in question and their impact on stock 
trading decisions, besides an evaluation of changed investor perception over time. 
Nonetheless, it is worth remarking that capital market reactions are only one of several 
possible actions that shareholders might take in response to an error announcement, thus 
leaving other potential evidence of sanctioning mechanisms out of consideration. A 
suitable extension to investor actions in form of stock-purchasing decisions would be 
the shareholders’ right to choose another auditor after detected non-compliance with 
accounting standards. Pursuing this stream of research, Manuscript C ‘Error An-
nouncements, Auditor Turnover, and Earnings Management – Evidence from 
Germany’ extends prior knowledge on this topic, which is clearly dominated by US-
based evidence; however, in the light of institutional differences the results are obvious-
ly not transferable to European countries, hinting at a yawning gap in enforcement re-
search. To date, Brocard et al. (2015) are the only ones who disclose empirical evidence 
on this aspect in the German setting; notwithstanding, they focus on auditor changes 
around erroneous financial statements, i.e. before the error is publically announced and 
thereby made available to shareholders. Building on the above-mentioned interrelation 
between enforcement and corporate governance, additional research on auditor turnover 
in the aftermath of error announcements is certainly needed. Moreover, bridging the gap 
between the sanctioning and preventive function of enforcement, the question remains 
whether amendments in corporate governance by changing the auditor indeed yield a 
positive effect on future accounting quality of the respective companies. 
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It is notable that the preventive function of enforcement, i.e. deterrence of future ac-
counting malfeasance, does not need to unfold its effects solely for those companies 
with detected accounting errors. In contrast, reforms of the enforcement setting might 
also represent events that affect reporting incentives of all financial statement preparers 
and auditors concerned. This is probably even more so since the goal of the reforms in 
question is to improve accounting compliance. However, hitherto evidence is missing 
that conveys that reforms, which strengthen enforcement of financial reporting, actually 
yield increased accounting quality. All of which in turn could be an indicator hinting at 
improved accounting compliance. Related studies either suffer from a lack of generali-
zability or concurrent changes of accounting standards (Ernstberger et al., 2012; Sama-
rasekera et al., 2012), or they do not examine the impact on financial reporting itself, 
but the information processing of financial analysts and their earnings forecasts in de-
pendence of cross-country enforcement proxies (Hope, 2003; Preiato et al., 2013). Giv-
en this evident research gap, Manuscript D ‘Does Enforcement Change Earnings 
Management Behavior? Evidence from the EU after Mandatory IFRS Adoption’ 
investigates the impact of recent enforcement reforms in the EU on accounting quality, 
hence shedding additional light on the existence of a preventive function of enforce-
ment. Specifically, the study exploits the fact that only some EU countries implemented 
enforcement reforms after mandatory IFRS adoption in 2005, thereby providing an ideal 
control group that is not affected by enforcement reforms. By aiming to isolate the ef-
fect of enforcement, Manuscript D contributes to the understanding of enforcement in 
shaping financial statement preparers’ and auditors’ incentives to comply with legal 
provisions, thereby evaluating the intended preventive function of enforcement. 
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2 Overview and Findings of the Manuscripts  
Manuscript A ‘Enforcement of Financial Reporting – A Corporate Governance 
Perspective’ illuminates the embedding of accounting enforcement in corporate gov-
ernance and the interaction of both terms. By doing so, the literature review responds to 
the increasing number of studies that examine economic drivers and consequences of 
enforcement. Thus, the channeling of prior research’s findings and limitations, and the 
identification of avenues for future research are the main contributions of this article. 
In a first step, we provide thorough definitions of enforcement and corporate govern-
ance, and emphasize the dependence of each term on the other: Corporate governance 
mechanisms require faithful financial presentation in order to properly perform their 
task, and enforcement relies on other corporate governance mechanisms in order to fully 
unfold its impact and to achieve its goals. 
In a second step, we systemize 161 studies according to their methodological assess-
ment of enforcement (i.e. enforcement reforms, enforcement strength, restatements, and 
enforcement actions). The studies in question provide mostly unambiguous evidence 
that reforms which tighten enforcement yield positive capital-market impacts and higher 
accounting quality, while the latter findings are obtained from single-country settings 
only. In connection with these findings, research detects that countries with stricter en-
forcement exhibit an improved perception of financial reporting by information inter-
mediaries, resulting in less forecast errors and dispersion. Turning to firm-specific re-
statements and enforcement actions, we find mostly US-based evidence of negative in-
vestor reactions. These can be assessed by both capital-market metrics and personal 
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consequences of the responsible financial statement preparers, the supervisory bodies, 
and the external auditor. 
Despite the vast number of studies which we comprise in our literature review, we de-
note several important facets that have not been answered so far: To begin with, we call 
attention that as of now there is no evidence on the efficiency of accounting enforce-
ment regimes, both on a national and international level. Keeping in mind the limited 
resources of enforcement institutions, we argue that research could play a pivotal role in 
identifying ‘best practices’ in terms of output/input relations, thereby potentially im-
proving enforcers’ efficiency. However, the reliable measurement of all relevant output 
and input factors, without doubt, poses a non-trivial challenge. 
Moreover and related with the concept of efficiency, we encourage to evaluate the effi-
cacy of enforcement regimes, which is defined as the degree to which the targets can be 
regarded as achieved. While the concrete degree of target achievement, without doubt, 
is not beyond dispute, evidence of significant enforcement impacts might serve as a first 
step. In this regard, evidence on the preventive and sanctioning function of enforcement 
is still incomplete to date, especially with regard to the European institutional setting. 
We complement the suggestions from above by encouraging researchers to delve into 
all relevant aspects of enforcement impacts – also besides the capital-market perspective 
–, and to improve our understanding of the drivers of enforcement consequences.  
After having received a ‘revise and resubmit’ decision by the Management Review 
Quarterly (ISSN: 2198-1620) (VHB-Jourqual 3: ‘C’), we are currently amending and 
improving significant parts of the paper based upon the positive feedback of two anon-
ymous reviewers. We plan to resubmit the revised version in the course of January 
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2016. An earlier version of this article has been published as HHL Working Paper No. 
142. Moreover, those findings of the manuscript which hold for the assessment of the 
German enforcement system have been summarized in the article ’10 Jahre DPR – Ist 
das deutsche Enforcement-System effektiv?’, which was published in the peer-reviewed 
German journal Die Wirtschaftsprüfung (ISSN: 0340-9031) (VHB-Jourqual 3: ‘C’) in 
July 2015 (see Zülch et al., 2015).  
The manuscript is co-authored with Matthias Höltken. The author of this dissertation is 
responsible for the depicted theoretical foundation of corporate governance, as well as 
the identification strategy of the articles to be considered. This also holds for the de-
scription of literature covering enforcement reforms and enforcement strength, the criti-
cal discussion of accounting enforcement as external corporate governance mechanism, 
and its effects on other external corporate governance mechanisms. The avenues for 
further research have been derived equally by Matthias Höltken and the author of this 
dissertation. The remainder of the paper has been developed by Matthias Höltken. 
Manuscript B ‘Determinants of Investor Reactions to Error Announcements – Ex-
tended Evidence from Germany’ investigates capital market effects in the German 
enforcement system and the drivers of stock price changes. Based on the notion that the 
German enforcement system aims to unfold its postulated sanctioning function by ad-
verse publicity only, a thorough understanding of how investors perceive error an-
nouncements might provide precious insights concerning the evaluation of the German 
enforcement system. This applies all the more so since the vast majority of relevant 
studies cover the US enforcement system, with Hitz et al. (2012) being a notable excep-
tion for the German setting. 
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Starting from 200 error announcements published in the period 2006-2013, we obtain a 
sample of 88 (79, 73) observations for the [0] ([-1;1], [-2;2]) event window in relation to 
the error announcement. Building on this, we investigate short-term investor reactions 
in terms of changes of stock price, trading volume, and bid-ask spread. In contrast to 
prior research by Hitz et al. (2012), we cannot find unambiguous evidence of significant 
capital market reactions. However, by partitioning the sample in two subsamples for the 
periods 2006-2009 and 2010-2013, our results hint at the fact that investor reactions 
have become less pronounced in later years. 
Moreover, the study investigates the determinants of the three-day cumulative abnormal 
return [-1;1] in a multivariate analysis, hinting at the fact that the impact of error an-
nouncements on profitability and financial leverage are the main drivers of investor re-
action. In contrast to prior research (Hitz et al., 2012), the findings strongly suggest at-
tenuated investor reactions for those error announcements that comprise a higher num-
ber of single errors. Going beyond the analyses of Hitz et al. (2012), the regression also 
entails qualitative error characteristics as the impact on core earnings, use of manage-
ment’s professional judgment in interpreting the violated accounting standards, and the 
timing of the error announcement. While professional judgment does not exhibit any 
impact on investor reactions, we can only find slight evidence of decreased investor 
perception of error announcements over time, going in line with our univariate results. 
Finally and contrasting prior US research (Anderson and Yohn, 2002; Palmrose et al., 
2004), error announcements that affect core items yield less severe investor reactions in 
the German setting. 
The manuscript has been submitted for publication to the International Business & 
Economics Research Journal (ISSN: 1535-0754) (VHB-Jourqual 3: ‘C’). An earlier 
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version of this article has been presented at the 6th Doctoral Seminar on Accounting at 
HHL in October 2014, providing us with valuable feedback from the participants, espe-
cially Teri Yohn, Paul Pronobis and Sebastian Hoffmann. In addition, the author of this 
dissertation has presented the paper at the 38th Annual Congress of the European Ac-
counting Association (EAA) in Glasgow in May 2015. Additionally, the paper has been 
accepted to the conference Accounting and Finance in Singapore in June 2015. This 
article has been published online as HHL Working Paper No. 141 and on the Social 
Science Research Network (www.ssrn.com).  
The paper is co-authored with Matthias Höltken and Henning Zülch. The development 
of the research question and the design of the study have been conducted equally by 
Matthias Höltken and the author of this dissertation. While Matthias Höltken has pre-
pared the qualitative and quantitative assessment of the error announcements in ques-
tion, the author of this dissertation has gathered the relevant data and conducted the sta-
tistical analyses. Accordingly, the author of this dissertation is responsible for the meth-
odological and results section in the paper, whereas Matthias Höltken has prepared the 
sections on the institutional setting, prior research and hypotheses development. Hen-
ning Zülch was constantly supervising and mentoring throughout the research process. 
Manuscript C ‘Error Announcements, Auditor Turnover, and Earnings Manage-
ment – Evidence from Germany’ examines personal consequences due to error an-
nouncements, thereby complementing prior empirical evidence that mainly focused on 
capital-market consequences. Moreover, the role of auditor turnover in improving ac-
counting quality after detected erroneous financial reporting is investigated. The find-
ings dispatch both the sanctioning and preventive role of enforcement via its interaction 
with other corporate governance mechanisms. 
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Extensive US research suggests increased turnover of managers, board members and 
auditors subsequent to detected accounting errors, while corresponding evidence for the 
German setting is very scarce up to now. Motivated by the study of Brocard et al. 
(2015) who cannot detect increased auditor turnover due to error announcements (but 
already after the publication of erroneous financial statements), we conduct an extended 
analysis for a sample of 99 error announcements, published within the sample period 
2006-2012.  
In line with the study of Brocard et al. (2015) and running counter to the results from 
comparable US studies, we cannot detect increased audit firm changes subsequent to 
error announcements, with the findings rather hinting at the opposite. Going beyond 
previous works in this field, we also examine the impact of error announcements on 
changes of the employed audit teams, which might constitute a compromise between the 
two poles of keeping and switching the audit firm. While not being clearly significant, 
the results hint at increased audit team turnover due to adverse publicity. Moreover, we 
examine whether auditor changes subsequent to error announcements result in enhanced 
accounting quality, proxied by earnings management measures. Though we find some 
evidence of improved accounting quality subsequent to error announcements, the results 
suggest that this effect already takes place prior to auditor changes. Therefore, we argue 
that auditor changes solely serve as signal of improved corporate governance to corpo-
rate outsiders. 
The article has been published online on the Social Science Research Network 
(www.ssrn.com) and moreover has been submitted for presentation at the 39th Annual 
Congress of the EAA in 2016. The paper is co-authored with Johannes Hottmann and 
Henning Zülch. The author of this dissertation has developed the research idea and the 
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corresponding gathering of related literature and required data. While Johannes 
Hottmann has performed the statistical analyses, the author of this dissertation is re-
sponsible for the manuscript. Henning Zülch provided constant supervising and mentor-
ing throughout the research process. 
Manuscript D ‘Does Enforcement Change Earnings Management Behavior? Evi-
dence from the EU after Mandatory IFRS Adoption’ investigates the effect of recent 
enforcement reforms in EU member states on accounting quality. The study thereby 
contributes to our understanding of the postulated preventive function of enforcement 
and clearly goes beyond prior cross-country studies that comprise either non-accounting 
related enforcement proxies (Cai et al., 2008) or do not investigate the immediate im-
pact on accounting quality, but rather its perception by information intermediaries 
(Hope, 2003; Preiato et al., 2013) and capital market participants (Christensen et al., 
2013). 
Motivated by the depicted research gap and non-generalizable single-country evidence 
from Germany (Ernstberger et al., 2012; Samarasekera et al., 2012), we use cross-
country differences in the timing of enforcement reforms within the EU to investigate 
the impact of the named reforms on accounting quality. By constructing a sample of 
seven countries that tightened their enforcement of financial reporting in the years 2007 
and 2008, and two control groups of countries without corresponding enforcement 
change, we aim to identify the impact of the latter on accounting quality. 
In contrast to prior research we cannot provide unambiguous evidence of higher ac-
counting quality in the aftermath of the named enforcement reforms. However, when 
further disentangling the employed proxies, the results hint at less upward and increased 
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downward earnings management, arguably as an overcautious reaction of the respective 
financial statement preparers. 
The author of this dissertation discussed an earlier version of the manuscript at the 5th 
Doctoral Summer Program in Accounting Research (SPAR) in July 2015 in Munich in 
one-on-one sessions with Thorsten Sellhorn and Daniel Collins, respectively. Addition-
ally, the paper has been presented at the international conference ‘Corporate Govern-
ance, Accounting and Audit: Crisis Challenges’ in November 2015 in Lüneburg. More-
over, the manuscript has been submitted for presentation at the 39th Annual Congress of 
the EAA in 2016. 
The paper is co-authored with Johannes Hottmann, Torben Teuteberg and Henning Zü-
lch. The development of the research question, the coding of substantive changes in 
enforcement and data gathering has been conducted by Torben Teuteberg and the author 
or this dissertation, while Johannes Hottmann is responsible for the statistical analyses 
of the data. Furthermore, Torben Teuteberg has developed the section on measuring 
earnings management, while the remainder of this paper originates from the pen of the 
author of this dissertation. Henning Zülch was constantly supervising and mentoring 
throughout the research process, especially with regard to the coding of the variable 
‘substantive changes in enforcement’. 
Summing up, the dissertation provides important and novel insights on the effects of 
accounting enforcement in the German and European setting. The comprised manu-
scripts further extant knowledge on the expected preventive and sanctioning function of 
enforcement (see Figure 2), but at the same time clearly reveal remaining gaps in 
knowledge, waiting to be filled by future research generations.  
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Figure 2: Findings of the dissertation  
Overview of the Dissertation
‘Does Enforcement of Financial Reporting Matter? 
Empirical Evidence from Germany and Europe’
I.
II.
Evaluation of Sanctioning Function: Evaluation of Preventive Function:
III. Investor Reactions due to Error Announcements V.
Changes in Accounting Quality 
due to Enforcement Reforms
IV. Personal Consequences due to Error Announcements and their Impact on Accounting Quality
Institutional Embedding of Enforcement in Corporate 
Governance and Evidence from Prior Research
Manuscript A ‘Enforcement of Financial Reporting – A Corporate Governance 
Perspective’
• Methodology: Literature review
• Findings: 
• Enforcement constitutes an external corporate governance mechanism, but hinges upon the
remaining corporate governance mechanisms to fully unfold its impact, while corporate
governance depends on enforcement in order to properly perform its task. 
• Previous research provides evidence of beneficial aspects of accounting enforcement, both
for the preventive and sanctioning function of enforcement. Nonetheless, the findings mainly
represent the US enforcement setting, while the studies covering enforcement in Europe and
particularly in Germany are underrepresented yet. 
• Additional evidence in this field might provide a suitable starting point to evaluate both 
efficacy and efficiency of different enforcement mechanisms.
Objectives of Enforcement: Preventive and Sanctioning Function
Manuscript B ‘Determinants of Investor 
Reactions to Error Announcements –
Extended Evidence from Germany’ 
• Methodology: Empirical-archival
• Findings: Only weak investor reactions, 
driven by error announcements in the period
2010-2013. Investor reactions are
determined by financial impact of error
announcements, while errors that affect core
earnings yield less severe stock price
declines.
Manuscript C ‘Error Announcements, Auditor Turnover, and Earnings Management –
Evidence from Germany’
• Methodology: Empirical-archival
• Findings: Firms with error announcements do not exhibit increased audit firm turnover, but rather 
increased changes of the audit team. Firms with auditor changes yield enhanced accounting 
quality after error announcements, but already before the auditor is in charge (‘labeling effect‘).
Manuscript D ‘Does Enforcement Change 
Earnings Management Behavior? 
Evidence from the EU after Mandatory 
IFRS Adoption’
• Methodology: Empirical-archival
• Findings: No unambiguous evidence of 
improved accounting quality in the aftermath 
of enforcement reforms, but some evidence 
of less upwards and more downwards 
earnings management, arguably as an 
overcautious reaction of financial statement 
preparers.
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Abstract  
The main objective of financial reporting is to provide useful information to a firm’s 
stakeholders. However, it is questionable whether this goal can be fully realized without 
effective enforcement, which ensures faithful and consistent application of the relevant 
accounting standards. Within the multiplicity of studies investigating enforcement 
mechanisms and consequences to enforcement actions, this paper provides an overview 
on the current state of research on enforcement from a corporate governance perspec-
tive. We therefore analyze enforcement literature from both internal and external corpo-
rate governance perspectives in order to show interactions between enforcement and 
other mechanisms of financial reporting oversight. In addition, it becomes evident that 
most preceding research addresses neither efficiency nor efficacy of enforcement sys-
tems due to missing effect variables or data accessibility. Furthermore, we deduce fur-
ther research opportunities with respect to enforcement consequences and their determi-
nants. 
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1 Introduction 
A recent and rapidly growing trend in financial reporting research analyzes the effect of 
enforcement on capital market and governance properties. For the purpose of our re-
view, the term ‘enforcement’ refers to all procedures, mechanisms and consequences 
concerning the faithful and consistent application of the relevant accounting standards. 
This may also formally cover aspects of legal enforcement. However, unless explicitly 
stated, the term ‘enforcement’ relates to aspects of ‘enforcement of accounting stand-
ards’. Enforcement research relies on the notion that faithful and consistent financial 
reporting facilitates efficient capital markets by mitigating information asymmetries. 
Hence, enforcement is designed to create, maintain, and restore investor confidence in 
capital markets, which can be also found in the SEC’s mission and vision statement. To 
the current day, SEC enforcement is the most frequently investigated financial reporting 
enforcement regime.  
A - at least partially - comparable enforcement regime1 has been introduced to the Eu-
ropean capital market in the course of the so-called ‘IAS Regulation’ (EC/2002/1606), 
which requires listed firms on a European regulated market to apply International Fi-
nancial Reporting Standards (IFRS). Additionally, backed by the ‘Transparency Di-
rective’ (2004/109/EC) all member states were required to install effective enforcement 
mechanisms in order to ensure consistent and faithful application of IFRS. Considering 
the requirements formulated in the ‘IAS Regulation’ and ESMA guideline, an efficient 
                                                          
1  Despite several activities that aim at harmonizing enforcement on financial reporting within the EU 
(see e.g. ESMA, 2014), the fact that it is carried out on a national level inevitably leads to a non-
uniform implementation among the member states. That is, there are both private (e.g. UK), authorita-
tive (e.g. France), and hybrid (e.g. Germany) enforcement systems across EU member states. There-
fore, we label the EU member states’ enforcement activities as only partially comparable. 
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and effective financial information system should be developed and harmonized on the 
basis of clear and enforceable financial reporting standards, transparent corporate gov-
ernance systems, auditing regulation, and independent institutional oversight. A harmo-
nized enforcement system is thus regarded to be an effective tool to shape an efficient 
capital market within the European Union. To that effect, the task of enforcement re-
search is to investigate both efficacy and efficiency of enforcement regimes. We con-
sider enforcement to be effective if its goals can be achieved in practice, first and fore-
most the superior target of improved accounting quality. Correspondingly, we label en-
forcement efficient if it yields a positive cost benefit ratio and, therefore, justifies regu-
latory intervention. Consequently, research needs to additionally examine enforcement’s 
interactions with other governance mechanisms to better understand the economic im-
pact of enforcement actions.  
In the current literature, various approaches have been taken to explore the premises and 
consequences of enforcement. To begin with, research regarding enforcement has exam-
ined institutional premises of different enforcement regimes. Using mostly cross-
country settings, studies provide evidence for different levels of enforcement strength, 
its beneficial impact on financial statement preparers and addressees, and positive ef-
fects of enforcement reforms. Furthermore, research has investigated the operational 
level of enforcement, thereby assessing the preventive and sanctioning function of en-
forcement. Prior research has also shown the presence of a deterrence effect with regard 
to accounting behavior, arguably driven by significant firm-level and personal sanctions 
following the disclosure of financial misreporting. Nonetheless, it should be noted that 
the applied research designs, with few exemptions, permit only limited inferences re-
garding the efficiency or efficacy of enforcement mechanisms or systems. This is be-
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cause it is not easy to properly define either the accounting quality target to be reached 
by enforcement or the degree to which enforcement is labeled as beneficial. As a conse-
quence, there has only been little research on the efficacy or efficiency of enforcement 
systems so far. Additionally, only a small but growing number of studies address the 
European financial reporting enforcement at all.  
Recent reviews by Brüggemann et al. (2013) or Singleton-Green (2015) also incorpo-
rate enforcement research literature, however mainly focus on the economic impact of 
IFRS implementation, which is accompanied by enforcement reforms in certain coun-
tries. Accordingly, those reviews take into account the economic consequences of en-
forcement but do not incorporate institutional premises or operational features. The 
same holds true for connecting factors with other governance mechanisms. Hence, 
based on the theoretically sound embedding of enforcement in corporate governance, 
the aim of our review is to provide a comprehensive picture of the current state of re-
search on enforcement and its interactions with other corporate governance mecha-
nisms. More importantly, by additionally addressing European financial reporting en-
forcement, we indicate avenues for further research in a different institutional setting 
compared to the most investigated field of SEC enforcement.  
We follow the standard procedure (Cooper and Hedges, 1994; Webster and Watson, 
2002; Tranfield et al., 2003) for conducting a literature review (problem formulation, 
identification and evaluation of relevant literature, analysis, interpretation and discus-
sion of relevant literature, and public presentation) in order to identify research gaps 
which ought to be addressed in future research. The remainder of this literature review 
is outlined as follows: In Section 2 we provide well-founded theoretical definitions of 
the terms corporate governance and enforcement, and their corresponding interactions. 
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Being the basis of the subsequent analyses, we identify existing financial reporting liter-
ature that has been focused on enforcement in Section 3. Thereafter, in Section 4, we 
analyze, interpret and discuss prior literature’s key findings from a corporate govern-
ance perspective. Consequently, Section 5 illustrates the avenues for further research 
based upon prior research’s findings. Table A provides a comprehensive overview on 
the linkage between key findings and avenues for further research. Finally, we briefly 
summarize the main findings of our review in Section 6.  
2 Theoretical Background 
2.1 Corporate Governance 
The need for corporate governance is rooted in the agency problem, which can be re-
garded as pivotal part of the contractual view of the firm (Coase, 1937; Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976; Fama and Jensen, 1983a and 1983b). Broadly speaking, the agency 
problem describes undesirable effects that might arise from the separation of ownership 
and control. These include management actions which do not comply with investors’ a 
priori expectations, as e.g. expropriation, waste, or investments in unattractive projects 
of the capital provided by the financiers. This is a relevant issue, since a firm’s initial 
investors – unlike highly skilled managers – normally do not provide any benefits to the 
company after they have paid up their capital contribution (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). 
The fact that external finance can be observed even in economies without pronounced 
investor protection indicates that basic mechanisms as reputation building and investor 
optimism can facilitate the occurrence of manager-owner relationships (Eaton and Ger-
sovitz, 1981; Bulow and Rogoff, 1989; Diamond, 1989 and 1991). Yet, research has 
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shown that other mechanisms are more suitable to solve the latent potential for conflict 
between managers and investors. This is where corporate governance comes into play. 
According to Shleifer and Vishny (1997, p. 737), corporate governance ‘deals with the 
ways in which suppliers of finance to corporations assure themselves of getting a return 
on their investment’. Since this definition obviously only takes the interests of investors 
into account, it can be regarded as a shareholder-oriented corporate governance ap-
proach. Other researchers have argued in favor of a broader definition of corporate gov-
ernance, since corporations can be regarded as socially significant institutions which do 
not only serve shareholders, but also multiple stakeholders (Freeman and Reed, 1983; 
Carney and Gedajlovic, 2001). While we acknowledge legitimate objections against a 
shareholder perspective of corporate governance, we follow this definition throughout 
this paper since it appears most suitable to us for embedding enforcement in the con-
struct of corporate governance. The latter comprises different mechanisms that aim at 
aligning the interests of owners and managers; they can be partitioned in internal and 
external mechanisms of corporate governance. Internal corporate governance mecha-
nisms, which are embedded in the company’s organizational structure, concern interac-
tions among firm insiders and thus incorporate aspects as performance-based remunera-
tion, board monitoring, and the internal managerial labor market. External corporate 
governance mechanisms are constituted by the company’s environment, in particular 
through direct shareholder and debtholder oversight (encompassing the market for cor-
porate control), external managerial labor market,2 and the national legal and judicial 
                                                          
2  While the internal managerial labor market as corporate governance mechanism basically comprises 
personnel turnover and thus sanctioning during employment (Arthaud-Day et al., 2006; Agrawal and 
Cooper, 2016), the external managerial labor market includes aspects which relate to post-employment 
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system (Bushman and Smith, 2001; Baber et al., 2012). The latter, without doubt, also 
comprises auditors’ and enforcers’ activities, which are nowadays an essential part of 
statutory corporate supervision. In contrast to early voices, which proclaimed that com-
petition would lead to a proper level of corporate governance (Alchian, 1950; Stigler, 
1958), the multitude of more recent analytical and empirical studies dealing with this 
issue suggest contradicting evidence (for comprehensive cross-country evidence see La 
Porta et al., 1997, 1998, and 2006). Consequently, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) highlight 
the necessity of governmental intervention for the sake of investor protection. 
2.2 Enforcement 
There is no single definition of enforcement and, thus, the definition depends on the 
dimension or topical area observed. Citing a current example, Ernstberger et al. (2012a) 
refer to a rather broad definition of enforcement ‘as comprising the procedures and me-
chanics that ensure the observance of, or obedience to, security laws or investor protec-
tion laws’ before turning to financial reporting enforcement as a specific area of en-
forcement. Building on this, we identify two dimensions and two topical areas of en-
forcement. 
First, with reference to the dimensions of enforcement, recent studies distinguish be-
tween private and public enforcement mechanisms (La Porta et al., 2006; Djankov et al., 
2008; Jackson and Roe, 2009). Public enforcement mechanisms, which involve public 
institutions, comprise detecting insider trading or market manipulation, enforcing dis-
closure requirements and consistent application of accounting rules, or examining bro-
                                                                                                                                                                          
issues as e.g. stiffer labor market penalties by not promptly finding alternative employment (Desai et 
al., 2006a; Collins et al., 2009). 
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ker-dealers and taking appropriate actions. Hence we label investigations by the SEC or 
PCAOB, the German FREP or BaFin, or the FRRP as public enforcement mechanisms. 
Conversely, private enforcement mechanisms, which concern private shareholders, 
comprise all procedures and mechanisms that relate to securities laws and investor pro-
tection laws. Class action suits against both preparers and auditors of financial state-
ments can be named as relevant examples (Kellog, 1984). According to recent research, 
both public and private enforcement mechanisms are important to ensure effective en-
forcement (Jackson and Roe, 2009). 
Second, in line with Bremser et al. (1991), we distinguish between two types of topical 
areas of enforcement. Firstly, audit enforcement relates to all procedures and mecha-
nisms that ensure auditor independence and statutory audit oversight. Such enforcement 
actions target the financial statements as a compromise between the preferences of audi-
tor and management (DeFond and Subramanyam, 1998) and thus investigate the man-
ner in which audits of publicly held companies are conducted. If the enforcer detects 
insufficient audit quality, it may directly impose sanctions on individual auditors or au-
dit firms (see Bremser et al., 1991, or Bannister and Wiest, 2001, for SEC enforcement 
actions) or refer its findings to the relevant audit supervisory authority (see Ernstberger 
et al., 2012a, p. 220, for a short description of the German Auditor Oversight Commis-
sion). Secondly, enforcement of accounting standards relates to all procedures, mecha-
nisms and enforcement actions that ensure financial reporting compliance, as defined by 
ESMA’s guidelines on enforcement of financial information (ESMA, 2014, p. 38):  
‘Examining the compliance of financial information with the relevant 
financial reporting framework, taking appropriate measures where in-
fringements are discovered during the enforcement process, in ac-
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cordance with the rules applicable under the Transparency Directive 
and taking other measures relevant for the purpose of enforcement.’ 
Hence, enforcement of accounting standards focuses on the compliance of financial 
statements with the respective accounting framework. In this context, we can identify 
enforcement mechanisms that cannot be publically observed and publically observable 
enforcement mechanisms. In the following, we concentrate on the latter, since publical-
ly observable enforcement mechanisms are prerequisites of the empirical studies to be 
discussed below. If the enforcer establishes an accounting misstatement and the error is 
made publicly available, this facilitates the adverse disclosure effect (Bremser et al., 
1991; Fearnley et al., 2002; Hitz et al., 2012). Besides this a posteriori sanctioning 
mechanism, adverse publicity is intended to deter other firms a priori from misstating 
financial reporting and, thus, to ensure accounting compliance preventively. 
2.3 Corporate Governance – The Role of Enforcement 
Based on the aforementioned notion that corporate governance aligns both principals’ 
and agents’ interests within a structure of relationships, corporate governance also con-
tributes to maintaining investor confidence by ensuring compliant financial statements. 
In turn, enforcement adds to the effectiveness of corporate governance by ensuring 
compliance with a certain set of standards or a code of behavior that is defined by the 
underlying corporate governance system. However, enforcement – by identifying erro-
neous or fraudulent financial statements – cannot separately provide accounting compli-
ance, but needs to interact with other both external and internal corporate governance 
mechanisms. Hence, we subsume enforcement under the corporate governance system. 
  34  
Enforcement of financial reporting affects internal corporate governance mechanisms, 
for example supervisory oversight. The unitary board system (e.g. USA and UK) com-
prises both inside directors and outside directors whereas the two-tiered supervisory 
system, as in Germany, distinguishes between a company’s executive management and 
the supervisory board. Still, it is common to both systems that executive management is 
in charge of financial reporting and therefore needs to take responsibility for the selec-
tion of accounting policies and the implementation of sufficient internal control mecha-
nisms in order to ensure accounting compliance. Emphasizing this issue, the establish-
ment of errors within the enforcement process is regularly associated with a failure in 
internal corporate governance (Aier et al., 2005; Srinivasan, 2005; Arthaud-Day et al., 
2006; Desai et al., 2006a; Hennes et al., 2008; Collins et al., 2009; Feldmann et al., 
2009; Land, 2010; Wang and Chou, 2011; Agrawal and Cooper, 2016).  
External corporate governance mechanisms, for example regulatory or auditor over-
sight, ensure financial reporting compliance by providing and enforcing accounting 
standards. However, application of accounting standards often requires professional 
judgment or allows management to choose between different treatments. Exemplary for 
the European enforcement setting, consistent and faithful application of IFRS demands 
external enforcement through regulatory oversight as required by recital 16 of the IAS 
Regulation (enforcement bodies, henceforth referred to as enforcers) and statutory au-
dits. The latter focus on the legal and contractual compliance of (non-)consolidated fi-
nancial statements, together with the management report, the bookkeeping system and 
the company’s internal control mechanisms. Consequently, the scope of statutory audits 
is narrower than board-level examinations as those do not mainly focus on legal or con-
tractual compliance but on the assessment of accounting policies. Analogous to board 
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level failure, the establishment of errors within the enforcement process or the necessity 
to restate financial statements is regularly associated with a failure in auditor oversight 
(DeFond and Smith, 1991; Bonner et al., 1998; Fearnley et al., 2002; Weber et al., 
2008; Mande and Son, 2013; Gietzmann and Petticchino, 2014; Hennes et al., 2014; 
Kläs and Werner, 2014°). 
Similar to supervisory oversight and statutory audits, enforcers focus on the faithful and 
consistent application of particular accounting treatments. Thus, investigations per-
formed by enforcers also constitute an external but more focused audit of financial re-
porting3 and contribute to ensuring the provision of reliable and relevant information to 
current or potential investors. Referring to this objective, several studies provide evi-
dence that enforcement can beneficially affect capital market properties and, thus, en-
hances capital market efficiency (Beneish, 1999; Bhattacharya and Daouk, 2002; Hope, 
2003; Hribar and Jenkins, 2004; Barniv et al., 2005; Schipper, 2005; Barth et al., 2008; 
Daske et al., 2008; Li, 2010; Byard et al., 2011; Samarasekera et al., 2012°; Baber et al., 
2013; Christensen et al., 2013; Preiato et al., 2013°). Besides its institutional effects, the 
objective of enforcement is to proactively improve accounting compliance and, at least 
partially, builds on adverse disclosure as a deterrent (inter alia Feroz et al., 1991; 
Nourayi, 1994; Dechow et al., 1996; Beneish, 1999; Karpoff et al., 2008; Hitz et al., 
                                                          
3  The enforcer who takes into consideration the prevailing circumstances determines the scope of an 
enforcement investigation. The scope of FREP’s investigations, for example, depends on the form of 
investigation: FREP conducts ‘Examinations with cause’ if there are concrete indications by a third 
party or on request by the German securities authority BaFin. In addition, randomly selected firms are 
investigated in a proactive manner. However, FREP only addresses selected issues to assess the com-
pliance with relevant accounting standards (Hitz et al., 2012). The SEC acts comparably by obtaining 
leads from different sources, for example public complaints, tips, referrals from other law enforcement 
agencies, financial press, and by reviewing financial statements (Bremser et al., 1991). SEC enforce-
ment starts with an informal investigation that is turned into a formal investigation if a lead requires 
further scrutiny and pursues disclosure requirements and emerging accounting problems (Feroz et al., 
1991). 
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2012). Altogether, we define enforcement as a complementary stand-alone external cor-
porate governance mechanism that additionally interacts with other both internal and 
external corporate governance mechanisms. Thereby, it contributes to relevant and reli-
able external financial reporting by both proactive and reactive investigations of (non-) 
consolidated financial statements.  
We use the aforesaid distinctions between corporate governance mechanisms and as-
pects of financial reporting enforcement to structure the subsequent chapters 3.2 (de-
scription of relevant literature) and 4 (critical discussion). Based on the dimensions and 
topical areas of enforcement defined in Section 2.2, we divide Section 3.2 into four sub-
sections. The first pair elaborates on the two dimensions of enforcement by addressing 
both enforcement strength and enforcement reforms. In this context, prior research regu-
larly investigates public and private enforcement mechanisms in order to conclude on 
the benefits of different implementations. The second pair describes prior research in 
accounting and auditing enforcement and, thus, addresses the operational level of re-
statements and error announcements. In turn, we structure chapter 4 for our critical dis-
cussion of current literature’s contribution around enforcement’s interactions with other 
governance mechanisms.  
3 Identification and Description of Relevant Literature 
3.1 Identification 
We conduct a comprehensive web-based search in the Business Source Complete (BSC) 
database, supplemented with Google Scholar by looking for articles that match our 
search terms ‘enforcement’ or ‘restatement’, coupled with ‘financial reporting’ or ‘ac-
counting standards’ or ‘IFRS’. We supplement the term ‘enforcement’ with ‘restate-
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ment’, since the latter can be regarded as operationalization of the first. Since a search 
with the sole terms ‘enforcement’ or ‘restatement’ yields 42,569 results in BSC, which 
is basically driven by a huge number of unrelated articles dealing with enforcement of 
drug policy or speed limits, to name but a few, we add the search terms ‘financial re-
porting’ or ‘accounting standards’ or ‘IFRS’ in order to narrow down the scope of stud-
ies. Based on this approach, we obtain 413 findings, of which 274 are labeled as being 
sourced from academic journals, in contrast to trade publications, magazines, or news-
papers, which are less relevant for our purpose. Moreover, a less refined search in 
Google Scholar for the search terms ‘enforcement’ and ‘accounting standards’ (both in 
text) without the terms ‘legal’ or ‘law’ yields 1,820 findings. Sorted by relevance, we 
review the first 500 suggestions; despite of several redundancies with BSC or irrelevant 
articles, this approach turns out to be of particular importance for working paper publi-
cations.4 In addition, we conduct forward and backward reference search in order to 
ensure a sufficient level of literature coverage. Nevertheless we emphasize that our 
study does not raise the claim to be fully comprehensive, yet we hope to present at least 
the most relevant findings.5  
                                                          
4  Due to the fact that the enforcement setting – and thereby the availability of relevant datasets – is a 
quite young phenomenon, at least for several EU member states, it appears reasonable to us that sever-
al pieces of work did not yet finish the time-consuming review process of scientific journals. There-
fore, we do not limit the scope of our analysis on articles already published in scientific journals, but 
also take into account studies that currently exhibit only working paper status (flagged by °-symbol). 
We ensure working paper quality by checking number of citations as stated on Google Scholar, author 
reputation (number of other publications in leading academic journals) and the uniqueness of the idea 
presented (e.g. first paper on a certain phenomenon). 
5  Although we use a corporate governance perspective to critically discuss prior research in section 4, 
we abstain from searching for corporate governance terms in order to restrict our findings to the ac-
counting literature. Based upon our explanatory notes in section 2.3, we argue that enforcement is an 
integral part of corporate governance and enforcement literature can be therefore regarded as a section 
of corporate governance literature.   
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All results with a recognizable reference to legal enforcement in general and enforce-
ment of financial reporting in particular remain part of our collection, which comprises 
– apart from the vast majority of archival studies – also analytical, conceptual, experi-
mental and interview-based pieces of work. We delete all articles that solely focus on 
IFRS adoption or that compare accounting properties of IFRS or US GAAP without 
being linked to enforcement matters. Furthermore, we do not pay attention to issues of 
legal, tax, or credit enforcement, teaching cases, or studies published in ‘practitioner 
journals’. The majority of the studies in question are published in mostly accounting, 
auditing or finance related scientific journals, the remaining ones did not (yet) exceed 
working paper status. Furthermore, our search is restricted to articles in English (with 
only one exception (Böckem, 2000) due to the scarce coverage of UK enforcement in 
our sample) and to studies published prior to 10/31/2015. Our final collection comprises 
161 enforcement-related studies. 
3.2 Description of Relevant Literature 
3.2.1 Enforcement Reforms 
Several studies aim to capture the construct ‘enforcement’ by referring to events which 
have arguably changed the institutional setting of enforcement of accounting standards.6 
Based on the notion stated above that financial reporting is a function of both account-
                                                          
6  While it can be argued that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) without doubt strengthened enforcement of 
accounting standards by establishment of the PCAOB and additional resources and competences of the 
SEC (Rashkover and Winter, 2005 and 2006), it also comprises several sections without clear link to 
enforcement of accounting standards (Coates, 2007), with the evaluation and disclosure of internal 
control effectiveness in Section 404 being certainly the most controversial one (Lehn, 2008°). Hence 
and similar to US cross-listings, it is not evident whether effects are driven by increased enforcement, 
rather than by other aspects of SOX. Consequently, we do not consider studies on SOX in this litera-
ture review, except for those which deal with other aspects of enforcement as e.g. restatements. For a 
thorough literature review on the effects of SOX see Lehn (2008)°. 
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ing standards and reporting incentives, reforms that yield a change in enforcement are 
expected to have an impact on financial reporting practice and its perception by corpo-
rate outsiders. Due to the fact that many countries – especially those located in Europe – 
have made efforts to improve enforcement of accounting standards simultaneously with 
IFRS adoption, the influence of both accounting standard and enforcement reforms can-
not be easily disentangled in many cases. Barth et al. (2008) illustrate this issue by ad-
mitting that they cannot state whether the increase in accounting quality after IFRS 
adoption is effectively driven by the change from national to international accounting 
standards, or rather by simultaneous changes in the institutional environment. Marton 
and Runesson (2014)° apply a similar reasoning by controlling for changes in enforce-
ment with a post-2005 dummy variable among others. They find an increase in account-
ing quality for accounting standards being subject to a high degree of professional 
judgment, but the opposite for low-judgment standards. 
Christensen et al. (2013) tackle this issue by identifying temporal differences between 
IFRS adoption and substantive changes in enforcement like e.g. the set-up of new en-
forcement institutions or the strengthening of existing enforcement institutions’ compe-
tences. Since they observe increased liquidity only in those countries with concurrent 
changes in financial reporting enforcement, but rather independent of IFRS adoption, 
they conclude that the effects are arguably driven by enforcement reforms. Putting this 
into perspective, Barth and Israeli (2013) highlight the importance of both IFRS and 
enforcement reforms to facilitate capital market benefits. In this context, Neel (2013)° 
traces increased firm valuation and decreased forecast errors and dispersion back to 
IFRS adopters that exhibit increased comparability in terms of the association between 
earnings and return, price and earnings, and cash flow and earnings. While his results 
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prove to be robust to alternative explanations as e.g. the beginning of proactive en-
forcement reviews in 2005, he provides evidence that the latter are the driving factor for 
increased liquidity, irrespective of the level of comparability. This result goes in line 
with the findings of Christensen et al. (2013) since the beginning of proactive reviews is 
a pivotal characteristic of their coding of ‘substantive changes’ in enforcement.  
Focusing on the German setting, Ernstberger et al. (2012a) exploit the fact that several 
firms without listing in the regulated market, i.e. without being subject to enforcement 
reforms, have voluntarily adopted IFRS, thereby providing a possibility to disentangle 
effects of IFRS adoption and enforcement. They find some evidence of decreased earn-
ings management and increased stock liquidity as a result of regulatory reforms, namely 
the establishment of the Financial Reporting Enforcement Panel (FREP), the Auditor 
Oversight Commission, and more restrictive rules of auditor independence. Given the 
possibility of alternative explanations, the authors yet warn to blindly interpret their 
findings. Samarasekera et al. (2012)° present a different approach by examining UK 
listed firms which were all subject to IFRS adoption in 2005, however only a subsample 
of firms with cross-listings in Germany was affected by the German enforcement re-
forms and thus subject to the launch of FREP’s review activities. While the authors find 
increased value relevance and less managing towards earnings targets for the whole 
sample, only the cross-listed subsample exhibits a decrease in earnings smoothing and 
timely loss recognition, hinting at favorable effects of enforcement. This is not self-
evident, given the fact that UK firms have already been subject to financial reporting 
enforcement since the set-up of FRRP in 1991. Notwithstanding Samarasekera 
(2012)°’s findings which suggest further improvements in accounting quality for com-
panies that are subject to enforcement of numerous enforcement institutions, Fearnley et 
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al. (2002) gain evidence from fifteen semi-structured interviews with finance directors 
and audit firm partners that FRRP’s activities have increased auditor independence and 
changed attitudes toward accounting compliance and hence positively affected audit 
quality, too. In summary, research on enforcement reforms yields strong evidence of 
positive capital market effects and, to some extent, improved accounting quality. Yet, 
the latter results are to date uniquely gained from single-country studies (F1). 
3.2.2 Enforcement Strength 
The focus of studies that examine the impact of enforcement strength has been subject 
to change over time. As shown in the following, the measures to capture the construct 
‘enforcement’ became more sophisticated over time, changing from rather noisy indi-
rect metrics to more direct ones. The articles of La Porta et al. (1997 and 1998) mark the 
beginning of this research stream since they are among the first that systematically 
aimed to assess the strength and impact of legal environments. While we admit that the 
studies in question do not explicitly aim to measure enforcement of financial reporting, 
the following two reasons speak in favor of their presentation: First, they are the meth-
odological basis of subsequent studies which aim to measure enforcement of financial 
reporting (see e.g. Leuz et al., 2003; Callao and Jarne, 2010; Li, 2010); second, the con-
struct of financial reporting enforcement cannot be viewed in isolation, since the under-
lying incentive structure of companies that prepare financial statements can be regarded 
as function of both legal and financial reporting enforcement (Holthausen, 2009). Two 
ways to approximate the strength of legal environments have evolved, namely the con-
struction of legal indices based on qualitative and quantitative input factors, and the 
partitioning according to legal origin and tradition. While the first approach appears 
straightforward, the reasoning of the second approach is as follows: By partitioning 
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countries in clusters of common law and code law origin, researchers attempt to capture 
institutional cross-country differences in shareholder protection. The relevant studies 
argue that countries with a common law tradition exhibit a higher degree of investor 
protection due to less governmental influence on economic activities, probably as a re-
sult of the superior status of courts as counterpart to the government (La Porta et al., 
2000).  
Based on a sample of 49 countries, the study of La Porta et al. (1997) provides empiri-
cal evidence that common law countries exhibit larger and deeper capital markets than 
code law countries, arguably driven by superior investor protection. The authors con-
firm their findings by conducting additional analyses with indicators that assumingly 
capture aspects of legal enforcement as e.g. the ‘rule of law’, which measures the law 
and order tradition of a country and the existence of anti-director rights. In a similar 
study, La Porta et al. (1998) approximate the strength of a legal setting via legal origin, 
existence of diverse shareholder and creditor rights, and enforcement measures as e.g. 
judicial efficiency, ‘rule of law’ and corruption. They find that these indicators are 
negatively associated with ownership concentration in an economy, arguably as a result 
of weak protection of small and diversified shareholders. While the studies named 
above do not explicitly assess the impact of enforcement institutions, La Porta et al. 
(2006) try to disentangle the effects of public and private enforcement on stock market 
development. They assess the strength of public enforcement via a summary index of 
supervisory characteristics, rule-making and investigative power, and sanction compe-
tences of the main governance agency, which is in charge of stock market supervision. 
In contrast, private enforcement is measured via a disclosure and liability standards in-
dex, further controlling for anti-director rights, judicial efficiency and legal origin. The 
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authors reach the conclusion that private enforcement measures exhibit a more pro-
nounced link to stock market development than those of public enforcement.  
Referring to critical voices, such as Coffee (2007) and Jackson (2008), Jackson and Roe 
(2009) conduct a similar analysis as La Porta et al. (2006). Unlike their predecessors, 
they use a resource-based public enforcement proxy, capturing the budget and staffing 
levels of public enforcers instead of solely relying on their formal competences. They 
find that the resource-based enforcement measure yields superior results compared to 
the one of La Porta et al. (2006). Lohse et al. (2013) conduct a similar analysis and de-
tect a positive association between the SEC’s budget levels and firms’ legal compliance, 
approximated by the number of injunctions, in the medium and long run. While the 
studies above are not explicitly linked to enforcement of accounting standards, they 
provide strong evidence that the legal institutional setting has an impact on capital mar-
ket properties.  
Turning the view from a macro to a micro level and thus to company-specific behavior, 
a vast number of studies puts emphasis on the fact that legal enforcement in general and 
enforcement of financial reporting in particular are important determinants in shaping 
managerial incentives, e.g. with regard to preparing financial statements (Healy and 
Palepu, 2001; Ball et al., 2003; Holthausen, 2003; Brown and Tarca, 2005; Ball, 2006; 
Brown and Tarca, 2007; Coffee, 2007; Soderstrom and Sun, 2007; Holthausen, 2009; 
Hail et al., 2010; Kleinman et al., 2014). Consequently, enforcement is likely to have an 
effect on accounting quality and its perception by addressees. Leuz et al. (2003) provide 
strong evidence that both the legal origin and the presence of outside investor rights and 
legal enforcement, approximated by measures of La Porta et al. (1998), is negatively 
associated with earnings management. Applying identical measures, Burgstahler et al. 
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(2006) and Haw et al. (2004) confirm these results. Going in line with these findings, 
other studies detect a greater timeliness of earnings, i.e. a lower degree of income con-
servatism (Ball et al., 2000); however, André et al. (2015) who employ a more sophisti-
cated enforcement proxy by using the Brown et al. (2014) audit and enforcement index 
provide contradicting evidence. Furthermore, preceding research finds a higher value 
relevance of earnings (Hung, 2001), and – arguably associated with the prior studies’ 
results – superior forecast accuracy of financial analysts (Barniv et al., 2005) in com-
mon law countries. 
Given the evident impact of enforcement, there are a considerable number of studies 
that control for the effect of enforcement in the course of IFRS adoption. However, it is 
noteworthy that many countries have made substantial efforts to improve or establish 
financial reporting enforcement in the course of IFRS adoption (for a systematic over-
view see Christensen et al., 2013), which is not properly reflected in the legal enforce-
ment proxies. Consequently, the studies’ findings should be interpreted with caution.  
Several of those studies basically support the findings stated above: Cai et al. (2008)° 
employ indicators of insider trading laws, judicial efficiency, ‘rule of law’ and share-
holder protection in order to assess enforcement strength. They show that countries with 
stronger enforcement exhibit lower degrees of earnings management. Callao and Jarne 
(2010), who control for investor protection and legal enforcement by taking the proxies 
used by Leuz et al. (2003), provide evidence of a negative association of these measures 
with the level of discretionary accruals both before and after IFRS adoption. While 
Ahmed et al. (2013) confirm Callao and Jarne (2010)’s finding of decreased accounting 
quality after IFRS adoption in terms of income smoothing, accrual aggressiveness and 
timely loss recognition, they provide counterintuitive evidence that these effects are 
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basically driven by the subsample of countries with strong legal enforcement, approxi-
mated by the ‘rule of law’. Applying the same methodology in measuring enforcement, 
Byard et al. (2011) find a significant decrease in forecast errors and dispersion of finan-
cial analysts after IFRS adoption, however only for those countries with strong legal 
enforcement and high differences between domestic accounting standards and IFRS. 
While Neel (2013)° cautions that these effects are only observable for those firms which 
concurrently exhibited increases in their accounting comparability and financial report-
ing quality, Cascino and Gassen (2015) highlight that comparability of accounting in-
formation is itself positively affected by enforcement, thereby corresponding with the 
other studies’ findings. 
Adopting a capital market perspective, Landsman et al. (2012) examine the effect of 
IFRS adoption on the information content of earnings announcements, approximated via 
abnormal return volatility and abnormal trading volume. The authors find that firms in 
countries with strong legal enforcement exhibit more pronounced information content 
measures after IFRS adoption, compared to countries with a low level of enforcement. 
Daske et al. (2008) detect that those countries with large differences between domestic 
and international accounting standards and a high level of legal enforcement yield the 
most pronounced capital market effects in terms of liquidity, cost of capital and market 
valuation after the change to IFRS. This finding is confirmed by Li (2010) who provides 
evidence that IFRS adoption reduces the cost of equity by 47 basis points, however only 
in countries with strong legal enforcement. These results give a hint to the fact that the 
interaction of IFRS adoption and strong enforcement positively affects capital market 
properties, thereby confirming prior believes articulated in Section 3.2.1. Zaidi and 
Huerta (2014) argue that this in turn should have a positive impact on the economic 
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growth of adopting countries: Although they find that IFRS adoption results in a de-
crease of GDP growth rates, enforcement has a positive moderating effect, reinforcing 
prior belief and evidence that the benefits of IFRS adoption depend on an appropriate 
level of enforcement. 
Despite the fact that the presented results mostly confirm the previously stated expecta-
tion of positive impacts of enforcement, it must be kept in mind that the proxies used do 
not explicitly capture enforcement of financial reporting. The following studies tackle 
this issue in both analytical and empirical manner by examining the effects of financial 
reporting enforcement.7 Liang (2004) examines a setting in which earnings management 
is modeled as a consequence of interaction among managers, shareholders, and regula-
tors. Based on various economic trade-offs giving rise to earnings management, he de-
livers practical policy recommendations in the sense that selecting and enforcing ac-
counting standards without leaving managers the possibility of earnings management is 
not universally desirable. The optimal strength of enforcement of financial reporting is 
also subject of Königsgruber (2012)’s analysis. He finds that financial reporting quality 
strictly increases with more severe enforcement, whereas its effect on capital allocation 
is non-monotonic since it might lead to overdeterrence of potentially profitable projects. 
By extending this analysis to the interaction of accounting standards and their enforce-
ment, Laux and Stocken (2013)° highlight the conditions under which accounting 
                                                          
7  Several empirical studies suggest that a US cross-listing can be regarded as an enforcement proxy 
since cross-listed companies are also subject to SEC enforcement (see e.g. Hope, 2003; Barth et al., 
2008). The following arguments speak against this proposition: First, research provides evidence that 
the enforcement intensity is mitigated for cross-listed foreign firms, compared to domestic US firms 
(Siegel, 2005; Shnitser, 2010); second, it is not that trivial to disentangle financial reporting enforce-
ment from other effects of a cross-listing (Leuz, 2003a). In an attempt to tackle this issue, Leuz 
(2003b) suggests that observable cross-listing effects are rather driven by ‘attention effects’ instead of 
stricter enforcement. 
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standards and enforcement are substitutes or complements in order to guarantee optimal 
resource allocation. 
Turning to the empirical counterparts, the study of Hope (2003) is the first of its kind 
that indicates the aim to create a measure that captures enforcement of accounting 
standards. By adding the indicator ‘audit spending’, defined as the total fees of a coun-
try’s ten largest audit firms over GDP, to already previously used insider trading laws, 
judicial efficiency, ‘rule of law’ and shareholder protection, he derives an enforcement 
measure which is positively related to financial analysts’ forecast accuracy. Brown et al. 
(2014) go one step further and derive both an audit and an enforcement proxy which are 
designed to capture cross-country institutional differences in public company auditors’ 
working environment and the level of enforcement which is performed by independent 
enforcement institutions. The enforcement proxy is formed by six indicators which as-
sess the following characteristics: monitoring of financial reporting, standard-setting 
power, reviewing of financial statements, reporting about review activities, taking en-
forcement actions, and the level of resourcing. The audit proxy measures aspects as e.g. 
auditor licenses, auditor oversight and possible sanctions, and the level of audit fees.  
Preiato et al. (2013)° conduct a similar analysis as Hope (2003), but employ several 
enforcement measures besides the audit and enforcement proxies from Brown et al. 
(2014) to assess the relationship with financial analysts’ forecast accuracy and disper-
sion. While they can confirm the results of Hope (2003), they show that the audit and 
enforcement proxy of Brown et al. (2014) and to some extent the ‘rule of law’ measure 
yield the strongest association with the employed forecast properties and thereby clearly 
outperform measures used in prior literature. Rounding off these findings, Meser et al. 
(2015) provide evidence of beneficial capital market impacts in terms of liquidity and 
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stock valuation, arguably as a result of enforcement reforms in Germany. The enforce-
ment proxy of their longitudinal analysis is similar to the one of Preiato et al. (2013)°, 
however yearly updated. In conclusion, research on the impact of enforcement pro-
vides mostly unambiguous evidence of positive effects on financial reporting and cap-
ital market properties, which holds for both legal and accounting enforcement prox-
ies, getting additionally backed by scarce analytical evidence (F2). 
3.2.3 Restatements 
We present ‘restatements’ and ‘enforcement actions’ as separate sections for two rea-
sons. First, restatements are not exclusively initiated by authoritative enforcers, but also 
on voluntary basis by firms or auditors. Second, several European enforcement regimes 
do not require error corrections on behalf of the enforcement institution. Instead, firms 
are required to correct their financial statements in accordance with IAS 8 following an 
error announcement. In consequence, both restatements end error announcements are 
indicators of either internal or external governance failure. Therefore, we will present 
both of them separately in order to discuss potential connecting factors of enforcement 
with other governance mechanisms in Section 4. For the purpose of our review, we la-
bel the revision of previously reported financial statements as a restatement.8  
From a formal point of view, restatements are ex post corrections of previous account-
ing misstatements and, therefore, are commonly regarded as providing new information 
to the capital market. Firms can either voluntarily restate or are prompted to restate by 
auditors, enforcers or regulators. Announcements of restatements are made public via 
                                                          
8  The term ‘restatement’ refers to misstated financial statements and does not include other financial 
statement changes, for example the adoption of new standards, which might also be subject to compa-
rable filings (see also Scholz, 2008).  
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press releases or regulatory filings. However, with reference to the code of practice with 
restatements in the US, Palmrose et al. (2004) note that reporting specificity – defined 
as information on accounting issues involved, circumstances, and impact – varies signif-
icantly. Corrections to financial statements have thus the ability to change investors’ 
perceptions of financial statements that play a major role in the monitoring of manageri-
al action (Healy and Palepu, 2001). Likewise, the restatement firm’s financial reporting 
credibility is disrupted (Karpoff et al., 2008; Amel-Zadeh and Zhang, 2015). According-
ly, restatements often serve as an indicator for corporate governance failure or internal 
control failure that otherwise cannot be detected by outsiders (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 
2007). It has to be noted that restatement research is almost completely focused on the 
US, exhibiting an increasing number of restatements over time (GAO, 2002 and 2006; 
Scholz, 2008).9  
By providing new information to capital market participants, restatement announce-
ments can affect a company’s market value. Prior research, investigating market returns, 
has shown that restatement firms experience negative stock market reactions for short 
windows (Anderson and Yohn, 2002°; GAO, 2002; Wu, 2002°; Hribar and Jenkins, 
2004; Palmrose et al., 2004; Callen et al., 2006; Desai et al., 2006a; GAO, 2006; Files et 
al., 2009; Plumlee and Yohn, 2010; Gordon et al., 2013; Files et al., 2014) and long 
windows (Anderson and Yohn, 2002°; Richardson et al., 2002°; Wu, 2002°; Hribar and 
Jenkins, 2004; Desai et al., 2006b). In order to further investigate increases in both in-
formation asymmetry and firm risk, additional effects have been examined, including 
the presence of takeover bids (Amel-Zadeh and Zhang, 2015), analyst forecasts revision 
                                                          
9  The study by Sue, Chin and Chan (2013) who investigate the causes of family firm restatements in 
Taiwan is the only study in our sample which deals with non-US restatements.  
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and dispersion (Hribar and Jenkins, 2004; Palmrose et al., 2004; Barniv and Cao, 2009), 
bid-ask spreads (Dechow et al., 1996; Anderson and Yohn, 2002°; Palmrose et al., 
2004), trading volume (Plumlee and Yohn, 2008°; Burks, 2011), cost of capital 
(Dechow et al., 1996; Hribar and Jenkins, 2004; Liu et al., 2012; Baber et al., 2013), 
and presence of securities litigations (Palmrose et al., 2004; Karpoff et al., 2008). Re-
gardless of the proxies applied, results unambiguously show the penalizing outcome of 
restatements.  
Building on this, research finds investor reactions to be more pronounced for restate-
ments involving fraud (Palmrose et al., 2004; Files et al., 2009), affecting more ac-
counts (Palmrose et al., 2004), affecting reported income (Anderson and Yohn, 2002°; 
Palmrose et al., 2004; Palmrose and Scholz, 2004; Thompson and McCoy, 2008; Wil-
son, 2008; Files et al., 2009), prominently presenting press release information (Acito et 
al., 2009; Files et al., 2009; Gordon et al., 2013), and being induced by executive man-
agement or the auditor (Dechow et al., 1996; Palmrose et al., 2004; Wilson, 2008; Lobo 
and Zhao, 2013; Sue et al., 2013; Blankley et al., 2014; Files et al., 2014). Although 
research on financial restatements has grown over the last decade, current research in-
vestigates restatements differently by focusing on the underlying causes of restatements. 
Various reasons are addressed, including company performance (Dechow et al., 1996; 
Beneish, 1999), accounting complexity (Plumlee and Yohn, 2010), second-guessing of 
management judgment and intention (Anderson and Yohn, 2002°; Hennes et al., 2008; 
Plumlee and Yohn, 2010), proliferation of accounting rules (Plumlee and Yohn, 2010), 
internal errors (Plumlee and Yohn, 2010), level of both non-audit services fees and total 
fees (Markelevich and Rosner, 2013), application of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (Burks, 
2011), SEC enforcement activities (Kedia and Rajgopal, 2011), home-country charac-
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teristics of cross-listed firms (Srinivasan et al., 2015), underwriter or venture capitalist 
reputation (Agrawal and Cooper, 2010), and transaction complexity (Plumlee and Yohn, 
2010). In addition, reasons include both internal governance failure and audit failure, 
which are discussed in more detail further below. Summed up, research related to re-
statements becomes more elaborated over time and highlights the importance of dis-
tinguishing between the underlying causes of financial restatements with regard to 
understanding investor reactions (F3). 
There is slight evidence that firms also respond to restatements by conservatively 
changing their accounting behavior (Alam and Petruska, 2012; Ettredge et al., 2013; 
Chen et al., 2014b), increasing the number of outside directors (Farber, 2005), changing 
executive remuneration structures (Burks, 2011), turning over executives, audit commit-
tee members or auditors, or even facing general economic consequences, as e.g. reduc-
tion in investments (Kedia and Philippon, 2009). Concerning executives, being account-
able for the accuracy and completeness of financial reports, research suggests that cer-
tain characteristics of executives are associated with the likelihood of restatements, in-
cluding the presence of opportunistic motives (regularly equated with fraud in US re-
search), presence of female board members (Abbott et al., 2012), or the level of reli-
gious adherence (Dyreng et al., 2012). Studies regularly hypothesize that termination of 
executives may be partly to punish the respective manager for the loss in shareholder 
value and, thus, to contribute in restoring financial reporting credibility (Farber, 2005; 
Hennes et al., 2008; Collins et al., 2009; Burks, 2010).10 However, research provides 
                                                          
10  Some studies emphasize the importance to distinguish between the turnover of CEOs and CFOs. Burks 
(2010) finds that the strength of disciplinary penalties has only increased for CFOs. Feldmann et al. 
(2009) can only find a moderating effect with regard to restatement-initiated audit fee increase for 
firms with CFO turnover.  
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rather mixed results for restatement-related executive turnover. Although several studies 
generally report a positive association between restatements and subsequent executive 
turnover (Arthaud-Day et al., 2006; Desai et al., 2006a; Collins et al., 2009; Feldmann 
et al., 2009; Land, 2010; Wiedman and Hendricks, 2013; Agrawal and Cooper, 2016), 
some of their counterparts do not find consistent evidence (Beneish, 1999; Collins et al., 
2008). Building on this, other studies attribute the lack of evidence in the second stream 
of literature to the missing distinction between errors and irregularities (Hennes et al., 
2008) or fraudulent and non-fraudulent restatements (Burks, 2010). Since terminating 
an executive’s employment nonetheless entails the risk of inferior replacement, firms 
tend to switch from termination towards remuneration penalties (Cheng and Farber, 
2008; Collins et al., 2008; Burks, 2011).  
In addition, research also investigates the role of audit committee members, being re-
sponsible for internal financial reporting oversight, with regard to restatements. Inde-
pendence, activity level and financial expertise of the audit committee decrease the like-
lihood of financial restatements (Abbott et al., 2004; Carcello et al., 2011), and account-
ing expertise on the audit committee improves the timeliness of restatement disclosure 
(Schmidt and Wilkins, 2013). However, results conversely indicate that restatements as 
a threat to organizational legitimacy also affect audit committee members turnover 
(Srinivasan, 2005; Arthaud-Day et al., 2006). Using both internal and external corporate 
governance indices, Baber et al. (2012) emphasize the relevance of taking into account 
the interactions between internal (board level characteristics) and external mechanisms 
(shareholder oversight characteristics) when investigating the influence of corporate 
governance on financial accounting restatements.  
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Restatements, at least in part, can be attributed to audit failure which often results in a 
termination of the auditor-client relationship (Srinivasan, 2005; Thompson and McCoy, 
2008; Liu et al., 2009; Mande and Son, 2013; Wiedman and Hendricks, 2013; Hennes et 
al., 2014).11 Alternatively, restatements can affect the auditor-client relationship as the 
auditor might severe ties to preserve the audit firm’s reputation or reduce its litigation 
exposure (Feldmann et al., 2009; Barua and Smith, 2013; Scott and Gist, 2014). Ulti-
mately, auditors can resign from the mandate (Huang and Scholz, 2012). Likewise, 
shareholders’ trust in auditor credibility regularly gets disrupted, thereby negatively 
affecting shareholders’ vote for auditor ratification (Liu et al., 2009). Research also 
shows that auditor turnover is positively associated with restatement severity and 
strength of firm-level corporate governance (Mande and Son, 2013), and negatively 
associated with switching costs and auditor replacement opportunities (Hennes et al., 
2014). In addition, both studies find positive market reactions to restatement-related 
auditor turnover and, thus, contribute to the literature by showing that firms improve 
their corporate governance mechanisms following restatements. In turn, auditors experi-
ence a decrease in reputation. Weber et al. (2008), investigating the case of ComROAD 
and KPMG Germany, show that this loss of reputation with regard to audit quality spills 
over to the overall client portfolio and, thus, affects the overall market position of the 
respective auditor. Finally, restating firms experience less severe SEC enforcement ac-
                                                          
11  Conversely, Agrawal and Cooper (2016) cannot provide consistent evidence that restatement firms are 
more likely to change their auditors. Several studies show that restatements can also be the result of 
auditor changes (see Hennes et al., 2014, p.1054, for an overview on studies (inter alia Lazer et al., 
2004°, and Romanus et al., 2008) that provide evidence for this association) and that auditor industry 
specialization and audit fees are negatively related to restatement likelihood (Stanley and DeZoort, 
2007). Finally, Schmidt and Wilkins (2013) show that the length between financial misstatement dis-
covery and financial misstatement announcement is negatively associated with auditor quality and au-
dit committee quality.  
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tions and penalties when they dismiss their incumbent auditor (Leone and Liu, 2010) 
and are less likely to be subject of repeat restatements (Files et al., 2014). 
Using an experimental case, Almer et al. (2008) show that among non-professional in-
vestors, perception of management’s financial reporting credibility depends on both 
restatement nature and post-restatement actions taken (inter alia changes to the board of 
directors, internal audit functions, or external auditors). Finally, research provides evi-
dence for positive economic consequences to improved financial reporting oversight 
mechanisms (Wilson, 2008; Wiedman and Hendricks, 2013; Chakravarthy et al., 2014; 
Chen et al., 2014a; Hennes et al., 2014). Overall, restatement-related research indi-
cates that firms and leadership members are penalized for failure in internal controls 
or audit oversight which eventually results in financial misstatements. Conversely, 
investors acknowledge firms’ efforts to enhance the firm level of corporate govern-
ance (F4).  
3.2.4 Enforcement Actions  
In line with our preceding analysis, we define ‘enforcement actions’ as all appropriate 
measures that can be taken by the enforcer in the course of the enforcement procedure. 
As the investigation process is not publically observable, research focuses on the results 
of enforcement, such as the announcement of the begin of formal investigations, the 
SEC’s Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases (AAERs) or the public an-
nouncement of misstated financial reporting through press releases, financial press cov-
erage or federal gazette entries. It has to be noted that AAERs occur significantly less 
frequently than do restatements and litigations (Armstrong et al., 2010), which could be 
reasoned by the SEC’s preference for selecting cases that might be more likely to win, 
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given the authority’s resource constraints (Farber, 2005). In addition, AAERs are regu-
larly used as an indicator of fraud or intentional misstatements when being jointly inves-
tigated with restatements (Beasley, 1996; Bonner et al., 1998; Palmrose et al., 2004; 
Farber, 2005; Hennes et al., 2008; Ettredge et al., 2010; Burks, 2011; Gordon et al., 
2013). Receiving an AAER or an error announcement could thus have several negative 
effects, such as direct (non-)monetary SEC sanctions or reputational losses (Bremser et 
al., 1991). To date, research on error announcements is limited to the US, Germany, the 
UK and China.12  
Similar to restatements, the announcement of financial misreporting is an unexpected 
informational event about a firm’s actual financial reporting quality or credibility. 
Hence, the market is likely to incorporate the economic implications of such new in-
formation either immediately or over some time. Research provides evidence for both 
ways, including negative short-term reactions (DeFond and Smith, 1991; Feroz et al., 
1991; Dechow et al., 1996; Beneish, 1999; Karpoff et al., 2008; Hitz et al., 2012; Kläs 
and Werner, 2014°; Ebner et al., 2015°; Häfele and Rieger, 2015°) and long-term ef-
fects (Farber, 2005; Leng et al., 2011; Hitz et al., 2012). In line with restatement re-
search, different measures of investor reactions, including stock market returns, bid-ask 
spreads or trading volume, validate these negative investor reactions. In contrast to these 
                                                          
12  We argue that this is due to the fact that most other enforcement regimes are limited to direct sanctions 
imposed by the respective oversight authority and do not (solely) build on the ‘name and shame’ 
mechanism. Therefore, the US, Germany, the UK and China are the only enforcement regimes where 
enforcement actions are directly observable. Austria, having implemented a comparable enforcement 
regime as Germany in 2014, will also provide observable enforcement actions in the future. Besides 
the examination of drivers and impact of enforcement actions, there is some research on other en-
forcement regimes on a conceptual level: Brown and Tarca (2005) review ongoing and proposed en-
forcement regimes in France, Germany, the Netherlands plus the UK, Brown and Tarca (2007) analyze 
enforcement bodies in the UK and Australia, and Dao (2005) describes and comments on the French 
regulatory system. 
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unambiguous results for SEC and FREP enforcement, Böckem (2000) does not find 
consistent evidence for the public censure by the FRRP. 
Prior research has also investigated factors determining the likelihood of AAERs and 
error announcements, including company size (Bremser et al., 1991; Beasley et al., 
2010), company performance or failure (Beneish, 1999; Peasnell et al., 2001; Beasley et 
al., 2010; Dechow et al., 2011; Leng et al., 2011; Strohmenger, 2014), interaction of 
financial and non-financial information (Feroz et al., 1991; Kim et al., 2012), govern-
ment preferences (Heese, 2015°), occurrence of qualified audit opinions (Bremser et al., 
1991), audit risk (Correia, 2014), presence of previous litigations or restatements (Col-
lins et al., 2008 and 2009), management motives (GAO, 2006; Beasley et al., 2010; 
Dechow et al., 2011), management turnover (Collins et al., 2009; Leone and Liu, 2010), 
management’s religious adherence (Dyreng et al., 2012), corporate governance quality 
(Beasley, 1996; Beasley et al., 2000; Peasnell et al., 2001; Farber, 2005; Beasley et al., 
2010; Ernstberger et al., 2012b°) and types of errors made (Bremser et al., 1991; De-
Fond and Smith, 1991; Dechow et al., 1996; Bonner et al., 1998; GAO, 2002; Karpoff 
et al., 2008; Leng et al., 2011; Ernstberger et al., 2012b°; Hitz et al., 2012; Kläs and 
Werner, 2014°; Strohmenger, 2014). In particular, studies investigating error types indi-
cate that the majority of errors relates to income changing items as being the main driv-
er of investor reactions. All in all, research that investigates the causes and conse-
quences of error announcements indicates the presence of the ‘name and shame’ 
mechanism, which is mainly determined by profitability impact and weak financial 
reporting oversight (F5). 
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Firms may also respond to error announcements by conservatively changing their ac-
counting behavior (Bannister and Wiest, 2001; Jennings et al., 2011°)13 or delisting 
from the regulated market in order to avoid enforcement-related costs (Leuz et al., 2008; 
Hitz and Müller-Bloch, 2014°). Some studies use AAERs to identify cases of fraud and 
find a negative effect on executive level remuneration (Erickson et al., 2006; Johnson et 
al., 2009). Prior research also suggests that the presence of equity incentives is positive-
ly associated with the incidence of accounting irregularities stated in an AAER (Arm-
strong et al., 2010). In turn, research provides evidence that the likelihood of enforce-
ment actions is negatively associated with outside director ownership, tenure, and num-
ber of outside directorships (Beasley, 1996), which represent indicators for the level of 
corporate governance quality. Investigating the role of intentional and unintentional 
factors that determine the likelihood of error announcements, Ernstberger et al. (2012b)° 
find consistent evidence for the German enforcement setting. They conclude that, be-
sides the presence of opportunistic motives, governance quality decreases the likelihood 
of error announcements. The occurrence of an AAER can also result in firms investigat-
ing internal control deficiencies, which have to be reported to restore financial reporting 
credibility (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2007). Conversely, Peasnell et al. (2001) do not find 
any evidence that public censure by the FRRP results in consecutive management turn-
over. However, the study by Farber (2005) indicates that fraud firms take actions to im-
prove their governance and financial reporting oversight mechanisms. Contemporane-
                                                          
13  It has to be noted that Böcking et al. (2015) do not provide consistent evidence for the German en-
forcement setting. The authors conclude that the German enforcement regime is effective in detecting 
earnings management, but they do not find any ‘significant educational effects of error findings’ 
(Böcking et al., 2015, p. 44). 
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ously, stock price performance increases but analyst following and institutional holdings 
do not reflect improved financial reporting credibility.  
AAERs also relate to SEC sanctions against auditors, including practice suspensions, 
CPE (continuing professional education) hours, peer reviews and censures or injunc-
tions (Bremser et al., 1991; Bannister and Wiest, 2001). Firth et al. (2005), who analyze 
enforcement actions on auditors in China, provide consistent evidence. In addition, neg-
ative market reactions to SEC investigations or the presence of fraud cases may expose 
auditors to litigation (Feroz et al., 1991; Bonner et al., 1998). The SEC seems to have a 
propensity to punish smaller audit firms more severely than larger firms, which can be 
reasoned by the two facts that larger audit firms tend to have more resources to defend 
their audits and are members of the SEC’s Practice Section (DeFond and Smith, 1991). 
Furthermore, error announcements can change the auditor-client relationship as the au-
ditor might reassess client risk, resulting in an audit fee premium (Barua and Smith, 
2013) or an increase in auditor conservatism (Bannister and Wiest, 2001). Using the 
German enforcement setting, Brocard et al. (2015)° cannot provide evidence of in-
creased likelihood of auditor changes subsequent to error announcements. In contrast, 
they find abnormal fluctuation of the employed audit firms in the aftermath of erroneous 
financial statements, i.e. already before the publication of the detected error. Extending 
this mixed evidence, Kläs and Werner (2014)° suggest that investors impair auditors’ 
reputation following an error announcement. In sum, research on non-capital-market 
consequences to error announcements is rather focused on AAERs so far. However, 
there are first results for firm-level or personal consequences to enforcement actions 
regarding the European setting (F6).  
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4 Critical Discussion  
Taking into account the evidence presented in chapter 3.2, we use a corporate govern-
ance perspective to critically discuss prior research’s contribution to the superordinate 
goal of research. That is, as outlined at the beginning, the question for efficiency and 
efficacy of enforcement systems. Therefore, the analysis in this section focuses on the 
relevance of financial reporting enforcement from a corporate governance perspective 
and elaborates on connecting factors between enforcement and both internal and exter-
nal corporate governance mechanisms. Building on our distinction between internal and 
external governance mechanisms in chapter 2.1, we further disentangle external corpo-
rate governance mechanisms into three topical areas: External institutions, such as en-
forcers, regulators or legislators, other external institutions, focusing on auditors, and 
capital market participants. This allows us to separately discuss the perception of en-
forcement actions by investors, being the main addressees of financial reporting en-
forcement as indicated in Section 2. Moreover, it is noteworthy for this chapter that – 
besides a critical discussion of previous findings for the US – we especially emphasize 
the analysis of IFRS enforcement conducted within the European Union. Enforcement 
actions in Europe can be observed within three countries, namely Germany, UK and 
Austria.14 Due to differences in the overall institutional setting, but also with regard to 
the mechanisms of accounting enforcement, the empirical evidence of US studies does 
not necessarily need to hold for European countries (see e.g. Böckem, 2000; Hitz et al., 
2012). Keeping this in mind, we aim to shed light on controversial or still missing in-
sights on the European enforcement system as a potential basis of future research 
                                                          
14  In 2014, Austria has implemented an enforcement regime that shows comparable characteristics to the 
German two-tiered enforcement system. Hence, it will take some time until first evidence for the Aus-
trian enforcement will be available.  
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streams as set out in Section 5. Without compromising the analyses and results of prior 
research but rather emphasizing the authors’ encouragement to cautiously interpret their 
findings (see e.g. Hope, 2003, p. 265; Ernstberger et al., 2012, p. 246; Christensen et al., 
2013, p. 172), the consideration of subsequently discussed conceptual and methodologi-
cal issues might enhance the explanatory power of future research in enforcement. 
4.1 Internal Corporate Governance Mechanisms 
Both restatements and error announcements, as stated in Sections 3.2.3 and 3.2.4, may 
imply ineffective internal financial reporting oversight mechanisms and serve as indica-
tors of internal corporate governance failure. In this section, we thus elaborate on cur-
rent research in two areas of internal corporate governance: Enforcement consequences 
concerning executive management and internal financial oversight by audit committees. 
As highlighted in Section 3.2.3, prior US research has shown a strong association be-
tween executive turnover and restatements. In addition, US restatement research is regu-
larly examining fraud cases (Hennes et al., 2008; Burks, 2010). However, we cannot 
find comparable studies with reference to error announcements in both the US and Eu-
ropean enforcement regimes yet; although, there is unambiguous US evidence for the 
important role of board level oversight in the financial reporting process. Evidence for 
the European setting is limited to the studies by Peasnell et al. (2001) and Ernstberger et 
al. (2012b)°, both indicating that the presence of an audit committee – amongst others – 
decreases the likelihood of an error announcement.  
Although all of the aforementioned evidence appears to be intuitive, several uncertain-
ties and limitations of our knowledge remain. In the following, we thus further discuss 
the presence of European evidence and possible conclusions on the efficacy of enforce-
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ment consequences. First, there are some limitations with regard to the evidence on Eu-
ropean enforcement regimes. As previously highlighted, evidence for board level turno-
ver following an error announcement is currently not available. Although there is initial 
evidence on the attenuating effect of audit committees on the likelihood of error an-
nouncements, the presence or characteristics of audit committees have not been sepa-
rately investigated yet. Current European research solely explains the occurrence of 
financial misreporting by using binary variables to indicate the presence of an audit 
committee, arguably representing good internal governance quality. Despite the intui-
tive character of this variable, the explanatory power of this approach is limited without 
further differentiating audit committee’s legislative framework, size, composition or 
expertise. All of these characteristics might be important factors in order to better un-
derstand the preventive effect of audit committees on financial misreporting. This might 
also enhance the overall picture of European enforcement regimes since incorporating 
specific national governance and institutional structures provides further insights on the 
interactions of enforcement and corporate governance mechanisms.  
Second, current research does not allow concluding on the efficacy of enforcement 
mechanisms on board level executive’s behavior. In this context, efficacy could be de-
fined either by a desirable deterrence level for executives and audit committee members 
or an increase in accounting quality after detection of accounting misstatements. Despite 
the fact that relevant research on effects of enforcement on board level turnover is still 
unavailable for European enforcement regimes, US enforcement research has hitherto 
only investigated the association between CEO turnover or auditor characteristics and 
the deterrence effect of enforcement (Wiedman and Hendricks, 2013; Chen et al., 
2014b). With reference to the German enforcement setting, Böcking et al. (2015) cannot 
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find evidence for an increase in accounting quality following an error announcement. 
They conclude that an ‘educational effect’ concerning the deterrence effect of enforce-
ment on executives engaging in earnings management is not observable. Audit commit-
tees shall therefore monitor executives in applying accounting standards. They are de-
signed to internally ensure faithful and consistent application of financial reporting 
standards and, thus, are subject to both the deterrence and the sanctioning mechanism of 
enforcement. However, confirmation of this association is limited to the US and still 
does not exist for European enforcement regimes. Overall, research suggests that cer-
tain board characteristics are associated with the occurrence of financial misreport-
ing; in addition, research finds a penalizing effect of detected financial misreporting 
on executives being responsible for financial reporting and financial reporting over-
sight. Nevertheless, studies that explicitly investigate one of the two associations for 
the European setting or allow concluding reasoning on enforcement efficacy do not 
exist yet (F7).   
4.2 External Corporate Governance Mechanisms 
4.2.1 Accounting Enforcement as External Corporate Governance Mechanism 
As stated in Sections 2.1 and 2.3, activities of enforcement institutions represent – be-
sides providing the basis of interaction with other internal and external corporate gov-
ernance mechanisms and thereby ensuring their functioning – stand-alone components 
of external corporate governance by shaping the institutional setting. Based on the no-
tion that financial reporting is the outcome of both accounting standards and reporting 
incentives (Holthausen, 2009), differences with regard to enforcement of financial re-
porting are supposed to affect financial reporting behavior and its impact on addressees 
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(Ball, 2006; Soderstrom and Sun, 2007). Indeed, most studies mentioned in Section 
3.2.2 suggest that legal enforcement proxies are positively associated with accounting 
quality, their reception by addressees, and in turn capital market properties and econom-
ic prosperity (Cai et al., 2008°; Daske et al., 2008; Callao and Jarne, 2010; Byard et al., 
2011; Zaidi and Huerta, 2014). However, empirical evidence for explicit enforcement 
proxies is to date limited to reduced forecast errors and dispersion (Hope, 2003; Preiato 
et al., 2013°). By examining effects of reforms that strengthen enforcement of account-
ing standards, as presented in Section 3.2.1, researchers detect worldwide evidence for 
liquidity increases and ambiguous evidence for a reduction of earnings management, 
mainly based on the case of Germany (Ernstberger et al., 2012a; Samarasekera et al., 
2012°; Christensen et al., 2013; Neel, 2013°). While these findings, without doubt, have 
contributed in shaping our understanding of institutional factors and their influence on 
financial reporting outcomes, several uncertainties and limitations of our knowledge 
remain. In the following, we demonstrate two major limitations of this research stream. 
The first issue affects the validity of the employed enforcement proxies: Do they really 
capture enforcement of accounting standards, or something else? While this question is 
a rather rhetoric one for legal enforcement proxies, it is also justified with regard to the 
more sophisticated enforcement proxy of Preiato et al. (2013)°. The latter is basically 
formed by assessing the formal competences of a country’s primary enforcement insti-
tution, complemented by an ordinal measure which reflects the staffing level in relation 
to the whole population. Despite the quite appealing character of these indicators, they 
suffer from various limitations (see Pope, 2003; Coffee, 2007; Jackson, 2008; Jackson 
and Roe, 2009). Formal competences, which only measure the ‘law on the books’, 
might be a noisy proxy in institutional settings with little enforcement of existing laws. 
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The use of formal competences reasonably assumes that the ‘law on the books’ is in-
deed applied in practice; however, in this case there is no need for enforcement any-
more. Resource-based indicators also suffer from limitations as e.g. uncertainty about 
the efficient use of resources. These objections should be kept in mind when interpret-
ing the named findings. 
The second issue deals with the examined impact of enforcement: Referring to IFRS 
adoption in the European Union and the concurrent changes in enforcement of financial 
reporting to comply with the ‘IAS Regulation’ and ‘Transparency Directive’, to date 
there is still a lack of unambiguous evidence whether the mission of increased account-
ing compliance has been accomplished. Apart from those studies that employ legal en-
forcement proxies and propose this effect, the studies of Ernstberger et al. (2012a) and 
Samarasekera et al. (2012)° are the only ones that tackle this issue. Though their find-
ings suggest some evidence of increased earnings quality due to enforcement reforms, 
which also goes in line with other studies that detect improved forecast accuracy and 
positive capital market effects, their results are restricted to the German enforcement 
setting and thereby cannot be generalized within the European or worldwide context. 
Moreover, the external validity of both studies suffers from the restriction of certain 
analyses to rather special subsamples: Ernstberger et al. (2012a) try to disentangle the 
effects of IFRS adoption and enforcement reforms by focusing on a small subsample of 
companies in the non-regulated German stock market, whereas Samarasekera et al. 
(2012)° focus on a subsample of British firms which are cross-listed in Germany and 
the US, to name but a few countries.  
The bottom line is that the enforcement proxies used in current empirical research on 
enforcement of financial reporting suffer from inherent shortcomings, which might 
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negatively affect the validity of the gained results. Furthermore, it is obvious that to 
date no generalized results covering the impact of enforcement on accounting quality 
have been published (F8). 
4.2.2 Effects of Accounting Enforcement on Other External Corporate Govern-
ance Mechanisms 
As can be seen in Sections 3.2.3 and 3.2.4, research on other external corporate govern-
ance mechanisms that interact with accounting enforcement basically focuses on the 
role of and impacts on external auditors. Auditor characteristics as determinants of en-
forcement outcomes have been extensively studied in the US setting, hinting at the fact 
that Big 4 auditors provide higher quality audits than their non-Big 4 counterparts (see 
Francis et al., 2013, for an overview). While some critical studies provide evidence that 
this effect is rather driven by a superior level of resources than the label ‘Big 4’ (Francis 
et al., 2013), the presented results do not seem to be subject of obvious methodological 
insufficiencies. Additionally, contrasting research that focuses on specific institutional 
issues in the US as e.g. restatement initiation by auditors, the results appear to be trans-
ferable to the European context, given the comparable structure of the auditor market 
(Maijoor and Vanstraelen, 2006). Examining the effects of enforcement on auditors, 
studies for the US suggest negative impact on auditor ratification (Liu et al., 2009) and 
higher auditor turnover for firms with financial restatements, which is significantly 
driven by severity of restatements (Thompson and McCoy, 2008; Mande and Son, 
2013; Hennes et al., 2014). Turning to auditor reputation, Kläs and Werner (2014)° sug-
gest a decrease in the aftermath of error announcements in the German enforcement 
setting, while a change of the audit firm can be observed already before error publica-
tion (Brocard et al., 2015°). 
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While it is noteworthy that the US studies’ methodology has become more elaborated 
over time by additionally addressing the information content of restatements (Thomp-
son and McCoy, 2008; Huang and Scholz, 2012; Mande and Son, 2013; Hennes et al., 
2014) and thereby improving the reliability of conducted analyses, evidence for the Eu-
ropean setting is to date almost completely missing. However, the often-cited institu-
tional differences and deviating results of prior research (Böckem, 2000; Hitz et al., 
2012) cast some doubt on the assumption that US results can be readily transferred to 
the European context. Confirming this suspicion, Brocard et al. (2015)° cannot provide 
evidence of increased auditor fluctuation after error announcements, but already subse-
quent to the publication of the erroneous financial statements. While their findings do 
not suggest a prominent role of shareholders in the context of auditor change, we cau-
tion that Brocard et al. (2015)° can only provide evidence of changes of the audit firm, 
keeping the responsible auditors unobserved who conduct the audit. This distinction 
seems worth investigating to us, since the choice of the audit firm might also be affected 
by other factors as e.g. non-audit services provided by the same audit firm. Moreover, 
the findings of Wiedman and Hendricks (2013) in terms of increased accounting quality 
following adverse publication certainly require a deeper look: Can the enhanced ac-
counting quality be attributed to the auditor change, or is the latter solely a signal of 
improved corporate governance, however without measurable effect? 
Apart from these issues, the proxy for the construct ‘auditor reputation’ as applied by 
Kläs and Werner (2014)° can be questioned: The authors try to capture a loss in auditor 
reputation after an error announcement of an auditor’s client firm by examining nega-
tive excess returns of other client firms in the auditor’s portfolio. Despite the fact that 
prior studies apply a similar approach (see e.g. Beatty et al., 1998), it appears question-
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able whether this metric indeed captures reputational loss of auditors, hinting at a poten-
tially affected construct validity of the used proxy. Furthermore, based on the notion 
that the choice of a 7-day event window is the only measure of Kläs and Werner 
(2014)° to address potential confounding event issues gives rise to doubts of the reliabil-
ity of the results. In summary, research suggests the presence of enforcement’s sanc-
tioning function with regard to auditor turnover and ratification in the US, however 
lacking equivalent European evidence. Findings indicating decreased auditor reputa-
tion suffer from methodological limitations (F9). 
4.2.3 Effects of Accounting Enforcement on the Capital Market 
Enforcement is designed to ensure the faithful and consistent application of financial 
reporting standards in order to maintain and enhance investor confidence in capital mar-
kets. Vice versa, financial misreporting disrupts investor confidence and, thus, decreases 
capital market efficiency. As presented in Sections 3.2.3 and 3.2.4, several US- and EU-
based studies have shown the existence of the adverse disclosure mechanism that pre-
sumably facilitates both the deterrence and sanctioning mechanism of enforcement. 
However, results on European enforcement regimes (Böckem, 2000; Hitz et al., 2012; 
Kläs and Werner, 2014°; Ebner et al., 2015°) cannot provide comparable market reac-
tions as their US predecessors. Besides the well-researched field of financial misreport-
ing disclosure, research on capital market reactions to other enforcement consequences, 
such as executive or auditor turnover, is still mostly limited to US samples. Even though 
the presented associations between the detection of financial misreporting and capital 
market reaction are quite perceptive, there are some limitations to be addressed in the 
following.  
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The first limitation to be addressed concerns the point in time when financial misreport-
ing is disclosed. While prior research has observed dark periods – defined as the number 
of days between the reporting date of the erroneous financial statement and the date of 
the error announcement – of almost two years for the European setting (Hitz et al., 
2012), the dark periods for their US counterparts investigating capital market reactions 
following restatements are significantly shorter. Keeping in mind that the Conceptual 
Framework for Financial Reporting defines timeliness in paragraph QC29 as ‘having 
information available to decision makers in time to be capable of influencing their deci-
sions’, a dark period of almost two years might decrease the likelihood of observable 
market reactions. That is, we suggest that investors are not that interested in errors relat-
ed to financial misreporting some years ago instead of getting timely information, which 
is mostly the case for restatements. Two US studies (Badertscher and Burks, 2011; 
Schmidt and Wilkins, 2013) elaborate on this issue and show that fraud cases, complex 
issues of financial misreporting, auditor characteristics and internal governance charac-
teristics determine the length of the dark period. It is however an open empirical ques-
tion for the European setting if such associations are existent and if the timeliness of 
error announcements enhances investor reactions. 
The second limitation concerns the market participants’ ability to obtain and process 
financial misreporting disclosure. Studies regularly employ an event study approach in 
order to investigate the assumed causality of financial restatement disclosure and ab-
normal capital market returns. However, this implies that market participants are capa-
ble of directly obtaining and processing relevant information. Against the background 
of the aforementioned deviating results between US and European studies, it is an open 
empirical question whether different ways of financial misreporting disclosure as inves-
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tigated by Files et al. (2009) also shape market reactions in the European setting. Addi-
tionally, the level of financial press coverage might also facilitate capital market reac-
tions by disseminating information more broadly (Cohen et al., 2010; Soltani, 2014). 
However, the role of financial press coverage has not been covered by studies on Euro-
pean enforcement, yet. In addition, a change in financial press coverage or financial 
press atmosphere could shed further light on a firm’s reputation following financial mis-
reporting disclosure. Hence, this could supplement studies that solely assess reputation-
al losses through capital market returns.   
The third caveat supplements the former one to a certain extent as the ability of capital 
market participants to process information also depends on the information provided. 
Although the legislative framework of US and German enforcement requires certain 
minimum details within the disclosure of financial misreporting, de facto announce-
ments vary significantly (see Palmrose et al., 2004, for restatements). Hence, it is neces-
sary to investigate the effect of information provided in financial misreporting disclo-
sures on market reactions. As outlined in Section 3.2.3, US research finds a wide range 
of information from these disclosures, including the reasons for restatements. In con-
trast, error announcements in Germany are more standardized but do not provide infor-
mation on the underlying causes of the detected financial misreporting.  
Summed up, evidence on the deterrence and sanctioning function of enforcement for 
European enforcement regimes is rather mixed. Initial evidence, using capital market 
proxies, on the German enforcement system partially suggests the ‘name and shame’ 
mechanism to be existent. Nevertheless, research designs applied so far do not allow 
finally concluding on the efficacy of enforcement systems (F10).   
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4.3 Avenues for Further Research 
The preceding discussion emphasizes the major and increasing role of enforcement in 
shaping both capital markets and corporate governance mechanisms. That said, research 
needs to further elaborate on the various enforcement regimes within the European set-
ting, which have, at least in some countries, a significantly different institutional setting 
compared to the US. Based on the aforementioned findings of enforcement research, we 
identify several research gaps that should be addressed in future research. Table A pro-
vides a comprehensive matrix of the major findings from Section 3 and 4 and hereafter 
stated avenues for further research. The first pair of research opportunities concerns 
efficiency and efficacy and, thus, the possibility to conclude on the successful imple-
mentation and institutional embedding of a certain enforcement regime. However, re-
search on both efficiency and efficacy of enforcement requires a reliable assessment of 
underlying causes and consequences of enforcement actions. Hence, the second pair of 
research opportunities elaborates on possibilities to further assess the effects of en-
forcement mechanisms and their associations with other corporate governance mecha-
nisms. As this operational sphere of enforcement has already been well-researched for 
the US setting, we limit our suggestions in this context to IFRS enforcement in the EU.  
First research opportunity (RO1): Investigate the efficiency of accounting enforce-
ment regimes on a national and international level. Based on our literature review, we 
find that there is a tendency in investigating enforcement mechanisms separately in or-
der to provide descriptive results on the occurrence of sanctioning or deterring effects. 
However, these set-ups have in common that they do not allow concluding on the effi-
ciency of the observed mechanism. In order to reliably measure efficiency, which de-
scribes the trade-off of economic benefits against costs, research needs to construct 
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proxies for both benefits and costs of enforcement. While the latter can be derived from 
input factors, such as enforcement staff budgets (Jackson and Roe, 2009), an overall 
assessment of enforcement’s efficiency also needs to account for indirect costs, e.g. 
company costs and costs borne by other capital market participants. Although input and 
output measures may be regarded as reliable determinants of enforcement, they are not 
to be interpreted as the sole determinants of enforcement strength (Holthausen, 2009) 
and, thus, enforcement efficiency. Benefits of enforcement, however, are even harder to 
observe and are most likely to be approximated by capital market properties, for exam-
ple liquidity (Barth et al., 2008; Christensen et al., 2013), or accounting quality con-
structs, such as earnings management (Ernstberger et al., 2012a). In order to capture the 
overall picture of enforcement efficiency, a cross-country perspective might be a prom-
ising approach to gain further insights on enforcement regimes’ efficiency. However, 
for this purpose research needs to overcome several challenges, as e.g. the identification 
of all relevant regulatory inputs which does not need to be straightforward across differ-
ent institutional settings (Jackson, 2008). 
In order to gain further insights on the efficiency of enforcement regimes, future re-
search should elaborate on measures or indices that capture both benefits and costs of 
enforcement. Moreover, in pursuance of constructing these metrics, future research 
should also take different indicators into consideration, including the timeliness of fi-
nancial misreporting disclosure. First US evidence (Badertscher and Burks, 2011; 
Schmidt and Wilkins, 2013) emphasizes the importance of timely financial misreporting 
disclosure. Future research might also analyze the efficiency of different review cycles 
and finally examine whether private or authoritative enforcement institutions exhibit 
comparative advantages with regard to efficiency.  
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Second research opportunity (RO2): Extend research on enforcement regimes’ effi-
cacy in order to better understand the underlying process. Analogous to the first re-
search opportunity, we find a similar tendency regarding the efficacy of accounting en-
forcement regimes. Efficacy, which measures the degree to which targets are achieved, 
depends on the ‘result’ of enforcement and the underlying ‘target’. Driven by the in-
tended preventive and sanctioning function, the overarching target of enforcement is to 
ensure the faithful and consistent application of financial reporting standards, which – 
going in line with current research – is operationalized by different concepts of account-
ing quality (e.g. abnormal accruals calculated on a Jones-model basis). However, the 
validity of results using the concept of accounting quality is thus dependent on the defi-
nition of accounting quality chosen by the individual scholar.  
It has to be noted that efficacy can be investigated in various areas of accounting en-
forcement, including identifying the ‘right’ firms to be investigated, penalizing manag-
ers for financial misreporting, improving auditors’ independence or internal financial 
reporting oversight, preventing executives from engaging in earnings management, and 
increasing overall accounting quality. In a first step, future research on European en-
forcement should therefore extend the findings by Böckem (2000) and Hitz et al. (2012) 
in order to investigate the efficacy of the ‘name and shame’ mechanism. Böcking et al. 
(2015) provide initial evidence that the German enforcement system is capable of iden-
tifying the right firms to investigate but cannot find a restraining effect of error an-
nouncements on the level of earnings management. Strohmenger (2014), finding evi-
dence for an increase in earnings quality, also labels the German enforcement system to 
be effective.  
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In a second step, future research also needs to address the association between the out-
come of European enforcement mechanisms and national financial reporting oversight 
mechanisms, including auditors and internal financial oversight mechanisms. The study 
by Brocard et al. (2015)°, showing audit-firm turnover preceding error announcements, 
provides a suitable point of departure for further studies that investigate the efficacy of 
German enforcement in effectively influencing the auditor-client relationship. In con-
trast, there is solely one study investigating the ‘name and shame’ mechanism in the UK 
(Böckem, 2000) and none for Austria, yet. Other European countries do not publically 
provide necessary information for comparable studies. Given the EU’s attempt to har-
monize enforcement mechanisms, research needs to overcome this lack of information 
in order to investigate enforcement efficacy in different institutional settings. In this 
context, we put special emphasis on the distinction between data that is non-available 
and those which is only difficult to assess. While data on the investigation process of 
FREP and BaFin is also not publically available in Germany, the study of Böcking et al. 
(2015) encouragingly displays research opportunities being the result of cooperation 
between academia and enforcement institutions, thereby serving as a potential blueprint 
for other countries. Besides the operational level of enforcement, Ernstberger et al. 
(2012a) and Samarasekera et al. (2012)° – using samples of German and UK listed 
firms – provide first evidence for the efficacy of the German enforcement regime with 
regard to its preventive function. Building on this, future research should further elabo-
rate on the impact of regulatory reforms, e.g. in a European cross-country setting. 
Third research opportunity (RO3): Use alternative measures to capture the overall 
picture of enforcement consequences. As stated above, the third research opportunity is 
supposed to tie up with previous suggestions to extend research on both efficiency and 
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efficacy of enforcement regimes. Since both concepts are to a considerable extent driv-
en by the operationalization of enforcement consequences (in the form of ‘enforcement 
output’ over ‘enforcement input’ or ‘enforcement target’, respectively), it appears re-
wardingly to take a closer look at this issue. This inevitably gives rise to the question 
which kind of ‘enforcement output’ is relevant for future analyses. Recalling the objec-
tives of enforcement – namely improving accounting compliance via preventive and 
sanctioning functions (Berger, 2010) – illustrates that metrics which account for ac-
counting quality and sanctioning effects are without doubt an appropriate starting point.  
Although prior enforcement literature employs several accounting quality metrics, the 
question of construct validity is still relevant (for a comprehensive overview see 
Dechow et al., 2011). Given the limitations of frequently used proxies as discretionary 
accruals models or earnings smoothing, the use of methodologically unrelated earnings 
management metrics as e.g. the ATO/PM model (Jansen et al., 2012) – besides other 
approaches of assessing accounting quality – might at least serve as promising robust-
ness check. In addition, further investigations on the impact of enforcement on the insti-
tutional structure of corporate governance, as e.g. auditors’ activities and independence 
that in turn might also affect accounting compliance, might generate precious insights. 
Turning the view to the postulated sanctioning function in the European enforcement 
setting, we emphasize that to date research has almost exclusively focused on capital 
market properties (Böckem, 2000; Hitz et al., 2012; Ebner et al., 2015°). Auspicious 
avenues for further research could be assessments of reputational damages apart from 
stock market declines, as e.g. the impact on earnings response coefficients (Wilson, 
2008), press or analyst coverage (for the latter see Barniv and Cao, 2009), or qualitative 
metrics based on stakeholder or expert surveys, to name but a few. Additional sanction-
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ing mechanisms with lack of evidence for the European setting are executive turnover 
(Srinivasan, 2005; Desai et al., 2006a), changes in the compensation structure in the 
aftermath of error announcements (Cheng and Farber, 2008; Collins et al., 2009; Burks, 
2011), and – in case of management fluctuation – post-employment labor market penal-
ties (Desai et al., 2006a; Collins et al., 2009). With regard to Kläs and Werner (2014)° 
who suggest decreased auditor reputation – approximated by client firms’ negative ex-
cess returns – due to client restatements, the proposition of employing alternative repu-
tation metrics apply by analogy. Shedding some light on these issues would without 
doubt enhance our understanding of enforcement and its interaction with other corporate 
governance mechanism, and moreover broaden the view with regard to the assessment 
of efficiency and efficacy of enforcement regimes. 
Fourth research opportunity (RO4): Examine the determinants of enforcement con-
sequences in a more detailed fashion. In the context and as a consequence of RO3, 
future research also needs to further investigate the underlying causes of enforcement 
consequences, including the characteristics of financial misreporting, executive man-
agement and auditors. In line with Sections 3.2.3 and 3.2.4, prior research with refer-
ence to the US shows a strong association between certain auditor characteristics (e.g. 
size, independence or tenure) and the likelihood of financial misreporting. With refer-
ence to auditor size, studies focusing on European enforcement regularly distinguish 
between Big 4/Big 5 auditors when investigating error announcements (Peasnell et al., 
2001; Hitz et al., 2012; Böcking et al., 2015). However, future research regarding Euro-
pean enforcement regimes also needs to account for more detailed characteristics, in-
cluding the proportion of audit and non-audit sales, independence and audit tenure to 
capture the overall determining effect of auditor characteristics.  
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Analogous to research regarding effects of auditor characteristics, European evidence 
on executive management characteristics affecting enforcement consequences is rather 
scarce. The working paper by Ernstberger et al. (2012b)° and the study by Peasnell et al. 
(2001) provide initial evidence on the positive association of both opportunistic motives 
and a weak level of corporate governance on the likelihood of financial misreporting in 
Germany and the UK. Hence, further research needs to address the association between 
enforcement consequences and executive management’s remuneration, expertise, and 
busyness. Additionally, characteristics of internal financial reporting oversight mecha-
nisms, such as presence or composition of the audit committee, should also be subject 
of further studies. In sum, further research needs to investigate the role of both execu-
tive and auditor characteristics within the European institutional and governmental set-
ting in order to improve our understanding of the observed enforcement consequences.  
Apart from these two principally personalized determinants, prior research has identi-
fied error severity – measured as either number of errors established or changes in in-
come related key performance indicators – as a major determinant of enforcement con-
sequences (Palmrose et al., 2004; Srinivasan, 2005; Burks, 2010; Hitz et al., 2012; 
Mande and Son, 2013; Sue et al., 2013). However, US research identifies other infor-
mation contained in both restatements and error announcements to drive enforcement 
consequences, including the distinction between intentional and unintentional errors 
(Hennes et al., 2008; Plumlee and Yohn, 2010), transaction complexity, and accounting 
standard characteristics (both Plumlee and Yohn, 2010). By comparison, evidence for 
European enforcement regimes is scarce up to now. After all, a study on the German 
enforcement regime by Ernstberger et al. (2012b)° displays the accounting fields cov-
ered by error announcements without further investigating their effects on enforcement 
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consequences. Building on this, future research should elaborate on the effects of error 
announcement information – besides the number of errors and the impact on overall 
profitability – on enforcement consequences. In particular, information on accounting 
behavior of executives might shed further light on the circumstances of financial misre-
porting. This might also be helpful to further understand the effect of executive or audi-
tor characteristics on enforcement consequences or vice versa. 
In addition to investigating information content and personal characteristics, further 
research might also take a look at information intermediaries. Deriving from Cohen et 
al. (2010), Soltani (2014), who investigates European and US accounting scandals, 
highlights that coverage of financial misreporting by academic literature and financial 
press facilitates public discussion. However, the public discussion of financial misre-
porting is larger for US accounting scandals than for European comparative cases 
(Soltani, 2014). Hence, differences in financial press coverage might explain differences 
in enforcement consequences.  
We argue that, although prior research has already dealt with a multitude of enforce-
ment aspects and their association with different corporate governance mechanisms, an 
integrated perspective on enforcement of IFRS in the European setting is still incom-
plete. Therefore, we emphasize that further research needs to fill this research gap by 
overcoming two major challenges. First, it will be necessary to collect data on European 
enforcement regimes other than Austria, Germany and UK to gain further insights on 
the comparative advantages of certain accounting enforcement regimes. We argue that 
this is a problem of data accessibility instead of data availability and, therefore, encour-
age enforcement institutions to cooperate with researchers. The study by Böcking et al. 
(2015) serves as a positive example for our reasoning. Second, although both the afore-
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mentioned European accounting enforcement regimes and the US accounting enforce-
ment regime rely on the ‘name and shame’ mechanism as a deterrent, differences in the 
institutional and governance setting might lead to a mitigated perception of accounting 
misstatement disclosure in the European setting. It is not without reason that Leuz 
(2010) labels US enforcement as a heavy outlier (see also Evans et al., 2015). We there-
fore propose to undertake additional research on European accounting enforcement re-
gimes that also considers non-capital-market-based measures as an alternative. 
== Table A about here == 
5 Conclusion and Limitations 
Enforcement of financial reporting is designed to ensure the proper application of ac-
counting standards, thereby providing valuable information about the underlying eco-
nomic performance to a company’s stakeholders, which in turn might improve the func-
tioning of corporate governance mechanisms. Consequently, theory suggests that stake-
holders in general and shareholders in particular are supposed to benefit from account-
ing enforcement (Brown and Tarca, 2005; Schipper, 2005; Barth et al., 2008; Christen-
sen et al., 2013).  
The ability of enforcement regimes to take appropriate actions to ensure compliance 
with accounting standards has been analyzed in different research approaches over the 
last decades and has clearly been focusing on financial misreporting in the US. Despite 
the broad research on US firms, there is a small but growing stream of literature on en-
forcement in the European setting to date. With the goal of describing the role of ac-
counting enforcement as a corporate governance mechanism, our literature review takes 
into account the different dimensions and areas of enforcement and highlights relevant 
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connecting factors with both internal and external corporate governance mechanisms. 
Hence, by conducting an extensive literature review, we provide a comprehensive pic-
ture on financial reporting enforcement. Furthermore, our approach allows us to identify 
key findings of prior research and to derive avenues for further research. 
There are two perspectives of prior research: The cross-country perspective, which in-
vestigates the impact of enforcement strength or the implementation of enforcement 
mechanisms, and the country-specific perspective, which mostly examines causes and 
consequences of financial misreporting. We find that cross-country studies show posi-
tive effects of enforcement on both capital market and financial reporting properties, 
although there is only limited evidence for the association between the concept of ac-
counting quality and enforcement strength or reforms. For the country-specific perspec-
tive, we find that the majority of literature focuses on describing separate mechanisms 
or procedures of enforcement, for example the existence of the ‘name and shame’ 
mechanism. However, both perspectives do not derive any conclusions about the effica-
cy or efficiency of their research objective. In addition, there are only 16 studies (~10%) 
that investigate causes and consequences of enforcement within the European setting 
whereas the majority (~60%) of our sample studies explicitly investigate financial mis-
reporting in the US.  
Based on the aforementioned key findings of prior research, we identify several avenues 
for further research. Firstly, underlying causes of error announcements have to be fur-
ther evaluated in a more detailed fashion by looking at information provided by error 
announcements and corporate governance characteristics of misstating firms. Secondly, 
further research needs to investigate the consequences of error announcements on both 
internal and external financial reporting oversight mechanisms.  
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Finally, based on the observations of consequences of error announcements, future re-
search needs to evaluate both efficacy and efficiency of enforcement mechanisms. In 
order to assess enforcement regimes’ efficiency, further research needs separate and 
well-defined measures for ‘results’ and ‘effort’ to combine those for a cost-benefit anal-
ysis. While we acknowledge that even the most sophisticated cost-benefit approach will 
not be able to perfectly capture both constructs (Leuz, 2007; Zhang, 2007), the latter can 
be accessed from a resource-based view (Jackson and Roe, 2009; Brown et al., 2014), 
whereas the former cannot be observed easily (Coffee, 2007). In order to solve this 
problem, we suggest research to cooperate with enforcement bodies to gain access to the 
underlying population of firms being under investigation.  
Besides the previously mentioned key findings and avenues for further research, our 
review is subject to various limitations. First, although we conducted an extensive lit-
erature search, it is likely that we did not identify all relevant literature, as corporate 
governance, financial reporting and enforcement are multifaceted constructs. We addi-
tionally caution that the stream of literature on European enforcement is continuously 
growing. Furthermore, our search terms do not provide a complete list of possible 
search terms. Second, we limited our analysis to the areas of enforcement and different 
corporate governance mechanisms and focused our discussion mostly on the implemen-
tations of enforcement in the European setting. Hence, there might be current or future 
literature that connects this particular field of research with other geographical or topical 
areas and thereby extends the streams of relevant literature.  
Despite the aforementioned limitations, our approach provides essential insights into the 
interaction of enforcement and other internal and external financial reporting oversight 
mechanisms. We hope that it provides a preliminary overview and contributes to the 
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understanding of enforcement as an integral determinant of both capital market and cor-
porate governance systems. 
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Appendix 
Table A: Findings and research opportunities 
 Research Opportunities 
Findings RO1 RO2 RO3 RO4 
F1 
Enforcement positively affects both financial reporting and capital market properties. However, further research needs to 
investigate efficacy or efficiency of enforcement systems. In order to do so, additional effects of enforcement need to be 
investigated and enforcement’s targets to be defined more specifically. 
 
F2  
F8  
F10  
Prior research on market reactions to error announcements in the European setting is limited to the UK and Germany and results 
are rather mixed. Future research should therefore further investigate causes and consequences of market reactions to error an-
nouncements. This might also add to the understanding of the efficacy of enforcement systems. 
F3   
Prior research has shown the relevance of underlying causes of financial misstatements for 
understanding consequences of enforcement actions. However, evidence for underlying 
causes of error announcements in the European setting is still limited/does not exist, which 
leaves this open to future research. F5 
  
F4   
There is a multiplicity of prior research that provides evidence of financial misstatement 
consequences on both internal and external financial reporting oversight mechanisms for the 
US setting. In turn, there are only few studies investigating consequences of error an-
nouncements within the European setting. F6 
  
F7   Prior research shows that financial misstatements are associated with characteristic of both 
internal and external financial oversight mechanisms. However, there is currently no evi-
dence on this association in the European setting, which leaves this open to future research. F9   
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Table B: Overview of studies reviewed (studies are assorted alphabetically by author) 
Content Description Context-Related 
References Findings Context of Analysis Research Approach Sample  
Examined 
Focused Area 
of Enforce-
ment 
Focused Area of 
Corporate  
Governance 
Abott, Parker 
and Peters (2004) 
Find that the independence and the activity level of the 
audit committee exhibit a significant and negative 
association with the occurrence of restatement. The 
same holds true if one member is a financial expert. 
company  
characteristics 
single-country setting
archival study 
dependent 
US 
88 restatements  
1991-1999 
restatements internal institu-
tion 
Abott, Parker 
and Presley 
(2012) 
Suggest that female board presence contributes to the 
boards' ability to maintain an attitude of mental inde-
pendence that increases the board's ability to monitor 
financial reporting and thus mitigates the likelihood of 
a financial restatement.  
company  
characteristics 
single-country setting
archival study 
dependent 
US 
465 restatements 
1997-2002 
restatements internal institu-
tion 
Acito, Burks and 
Johnson (2009) 
Find that several quantitative and qualitative material 
considerations explain a large portion of the variation 
of firms' error correction decisions. Results also indi-
cate that accounting error decisions are influenced by 
similar actions of peers.  
information content
company  
characteristics 
single-country setting
archival study 
dependent 
US 
244 restatements 
2004-2006 
restatements external institu-
tion 
Agrawal and 
Cooper (2010) 
Find that restatement probability for an IPO firm is 
positively related to the underwriter reputation and 
negatively related to VC backing, VC reputation, and 
VC maturity. Thus, VC has a positive influence on 
accounting quality. 
company  
characteristics 
single-country setting
archival study 
dependent 
US 
137 restatements 
1997-2002 
restatements external institu-
tion 
capital market 
Agrawal and 
Cooper (2016) 
Provide evidence that CEO, top management and CFO 
turnover is greater for restatement firms compared to 
the control sample and that there is a positive associa-
tion between turnover likelihood and severity of error. 
Do not find consistent evidence of higher auditor turn-
over in restating firms. 
information content single-country setting 
archival study 
explanatory 
US 
518 restatements 
1997-2002 
restatements internal institu-
tion 
external institu-
tion 
Ahmed, Neel and 
Wang (2013) 
Suggest that IFRS adoption - due to the introduction of 
principles-based accounting standards - leads to lower 
accounting quality in strong enforcement countries. 
Thus, they use enforcement to distinguish between 
institutional settings. 
institutional setting cross-country setting 
archival study 
explanatory 
35 countries 
16,310 firm-year 
observations 
2002-2007 
enforcement 
strength 
external institu-
tion 
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Content Description Context-Related 
References Findings Context of Analysis Research Approach Sample  
Examined 
Focused Area 
of Enforce-
ment 
Focused Area of 
Corporate  
Governance 
Aier, Comprix, 
Gunlock and Lee 
(2005) 
Provide evidence that CFO literacy (years of work, 
advanced degrees like CPAs, experience at another 
company etc.) is negatively associated with the likeli-
hood of a restatement. 
company  
characteristics 
single-country setting
archival study  
dependent 
US 
228 restatements 
1997-2002 
restatements internal institu-
tion 
Alam and 
Petruska (2012) 
Document that fraud firms have significantly lower 
levels of accounting conservatism in the pre-fraud 
period. In turn, they find an increase in accounting 
conservatism for fraud firms during the SEC investiga-
tion period. However, after publication of SEC investi-
gation conservatism converges back to lower levels. 
company  
characteristics 
single-country setting
archival study 
explanatory 
US 
390 error an-
nouncements 
1982-2007 
error an-
nouncements 
external institu-
tion 
Almer, Gramling 
and Kaplan 
(2008) 
Demonstrate that among non-professional investors, 
perceptions of management's financial reporting credi-
bility are affected both by the post-restatement action 
taken and the nature of the restatement. 
information content single-country setting
experimental 
explanatory 
US 
16 restatements 
1997-2002 
restatements capital market 
Amel-Zadeh and 
Zhang (2015) 
Show that firms that recently filed financial restate-
ments are significantly less likely to become takeover 
targets or bids are more likely to be withdrawn or take 
longer to complete than a matched sample of non-
restating firms. Thus, they suggest that information risk 
is the main driver of these results. 
information content single-country setting
archival study 
explanatory 
US 
1,963 restate-
ments 
2001-2008 
restatements capital market 
Anderson and 
Yohn (2002)° 
Provide evidence that restatements of 10-K reports lead 
to negative returns and increased bid-ask spreads. 
Investor reactions are more pronounced for revenue 
recognition errors. Firms show a lower earnings re-
sponse coefficient after restatements. 
information content single-country setting
archival study 
explanatory 
US 
161 restatements 
1997-1999 
restatements capital market 
Andrè, Filip and 
Paugam (2015) 
Display that IFRS adoption leads to reduced condition-
al conservatism. However, this effect is mitigated in 
countries with strong accounting enforcement. 
institutional setting cross-country setting 
archival study 
explanatory 
16 countries 
13,711 firm-year 
observations 
2000-2010 
enforcement 
strength 
external institu-
tion 
Armstrong, 
Jagolinzer and 
Larcker (2010) 
Contrast prior research by not finding evidence of a 
positive association between CEO equity incentives 
and accounting irregularities. Instead, the authors detect 
that accounting irregularities occur less frequently at 
firms where CEOs have higher levels of equity incen-
tives. 
company  
characteristics 
single-country setting
archival study 
dependent 
US 
464 restatements 
157 error an-
nouncements 
2001-2005 
error an-
nouncements 
restatements 
internal institu-
tion 
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Content Description Context-Related 
References Findings Context of Analysis Research Approach Sample  
Examined 
Focused Area 
of Enforce-
ment 
Focused Area of 
Corporate  
Governance 
Arthaud-Day, 
Certo, Dalton 
and Dalton 
(2006) 
Provide evidence that restatement firms have higher 
CEO, CFO, director and audit committee member 
turnover rates and, thus, suggest the internal corporate 
governance mechanism to be effective. 
information content single-country setting
archival study 
explanatory 
US 
116 restatements 
1998-1999 
restatements internal institu-
tion 
Ashbaugh-
Skaife, Collins 
and Kinney 
(2007) 
Find that firms disclosing internal control deficiencies 
have more complex operations, recent organizational 
changes, greater accounting risk, more auditor resigna-
tions, have fewer resources available for internal con-
trol and have more prior SEC enforcement actions and 
financial restatements. 
company  
characteristics 
single-country setting
archival study 
explanatory 
US 
4,810 firm obser-
vations 
2003-2004 
restatements external institu-
tion 
Baber, Gore, 
Rich and Zhang 
(2013) 
Provide evidence that restatements increase municipal 
debt costs. However, adverse consequences of restate-
ments are mitigated by strong audit oversight and by 
provisions that encourage direct voter participation in 
the governance process. 
information content single-country setting
archival study 
explanatory 
US 
110 restatements 
2001-2004 
restatements capital market 
Baber, Liang and 
Zhu (2012) 
Results indicate that corporate governance characteris-
tics and the probability of financial accounting restate-
ments are related in 2005, but not in 1997. In addition, 
they show the importance of considering interactions of 
different corporate governance mechanisms when 
investigating determinants of accounting quality. 
company  
characteristics 
single-country setting
archival study 
dependent 
US 
54 restatements 
1997, 2005 
restatements internal institu-
tion 
external institu-
tion 
Badertscher and 
Burks (2011) 
Examine the length of disclosure lags around restate-
ments and identify the underlying causes indicating that 
lengthy lags are uncommon and are the result of time-
consuming fraud investigations. 
information content
company  
characteristics 
single-country setting
archival study 
explanatory 
US 
1,315 restate-
ments 
1997-2005 
restatements external institu-
tion 
Ball (2006) Argues that IFRS will only partially lead to a conver-
gence in actual financial reporting practice, e.g. due to 
a non-uniform enforcement. Thus, he uses enforcement 
to distinguish between institutional settings. 
institutional setting cross-country setting 
literature review 
--- 
--- enforcement 
strength 
capital market 
103 
Content Description Context-Related 
References Findings Context of Analysis Research Approach Sample  
Examined 
Focused Area 
of Enforce-
ment 
Focused Area of 
Corporate  
Governance 
Ball, Kothari, 
and Robin (2000) 
Distinguish between common-law and code-law coun-
tries, provide useful insights and show the influence of 
accounting standard regulation and enforcement on 
income conservatism and accounting income predicta-
bility. 
institutional setting cross-country setting 
archival study 
explanatory 
Seven countries 
40,359 firm-year 
observations 
1985-1995 
enforcement 
strength 
external institu-
tion 
Ball, Robin and 
Wu (2003) 
Indicate that preparers' financial reporting incentives 
depend on the sources of demand for, and political 
influence on, financial reporting. Hence, financial 
reporting outcome is determined by a variety of institu-
tional factors, e.g. public and private enforcement. 
 
institutional setting cross-country setting 
archival study 
explanatory 
Four Asian coun-
tries 
2,726 firm-year 
observations 
1984-1996 
enforcement 
strength 
external institu-
tion 
Bannister and 
Wiest (2001) 
Provide evidence that client firms of auditors that are 
subject to an SEC investigation have more income-
decreasing accruals 
company  
characteristics 
single-country setting
archival study 
explanatory 
US 
16 error an-
nouncements 
4,886 firm obser-
vations 
1980-1996 
error an-
nouncements 
external institu-
tions 
Barniv and Cao 
(2009) 
Find that investors tend to rely more on the information 
that analyst characteristics convey about forecast accu-
racy in restatement firms than in non-restatement firms. 
Investors' reliance also depends on the level of restate-
ment intensity and the length of reaction window. 
information content single-country setting
archival study 
explanatory 
US 
477 restatements 
1995-2003 
restatements capital market 
Barniv, Myring 
and Thomas 
(2005) 
Provide evidence that common-law countries - which 
are related to stronger investor protection laws - set 
better incentives for financial analysts and therefore 
lead to superior forecast accuracy. 
institutional setting cross-country setting 
archival study 
explanatory 
33 countries 
70,591 firm-year 
observations 
1984-2001 
enforcement 
strength 
external institu-
tion 
capital market 
Barth and Israeli 
(2013)  
[discussion of 
Christensen, Hail 
and Leuz (2013)] 
State that both IFRS adoption and enforcement are 
necessary to confer capital market benefits and that 
individual effects cannot be observed separately.  
institutional setting cross-country setting 
archival study 
explanatory 
56 countries 
762,094 firm-
quarter observa-
tions 
2001-2009 
enforcement 
reforms 
external institu-
tion 
capital market 
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Content Description Context-Related 
References Findings Context of Analysis Research Approach Sample  
Examined 
Focused Area 
of Enforce-
ment 
Focused Area of 
Corporate  
Governance 
Barth, Lands-
man and Lang 
(2008) 
Find that application of IFRS leads to superior account-
ing quality which is not necessarily due to the standards 
alone, but also due to a better institutional environment, 
e.g. through contemporaneous enforcement. 
institutional setting cross-country setting 
archival study 
explanatory 
21 countries 
1,896 firm-year 
observations 
1994-2003 
enforcement 
strength 
enforcement 
reforms 
external institu-
tions 
Barua and Smith 
(2013) 
Provide evidence that companies that are subject to a 
SEC enforcement action (AAER) experience audit fee 
premiums in subsequent years. 
information content single-country setting
archival study 
explanatory 
US 
154 error an-
nouncements 
2003-2006 
error an-
nouncements 
external institu-
tions 
Beasley (1996) Indicates that no-fraud firms have boards with signifi-
cantly higher percentages of outside directors than 
fraud firms but evidence does not support a positive 
effect of the presence of an audit committee on the 
financial statement likelihood. 
company  
characteristics 
single-country setting
archival study 
dependent 
US 
75 error an-
nouncements 
1982-1991 
error an-
nouncements 
internal institu-
tion 
Beasley, Carcel-
lo, Hermanson 
and Lapides 
(2000) 
Provide evidence that fraud firms have very weak 
corporate governance mechanisms, including fewer and 
less active audit committees, less independent boards 
and less internal audit support.  
company  
characteristics 
single-country setting
archival study 
--- 
US 
66 error an-
nouncements 
1987-1997 
error an-
nouncements 
internal institu-
tion 
Beasley, Carcel-
lo, Hermanson 
and Neal (2010) 
Provide a comprehensive analysis of fraudulent finan-
cial reporting occurrences investigated by the SEC in 
the years 1998-2007 and find 347 alleged cases. Pro-
vide additional insights on involvement of executive 
management, fraud techniques and auditor changes. 
information content
company  
characteristics  
single-country setting
archival study 
explanatory 
US 
347 error an-
nouncements 
1998-2007 
error an-
nouncements 
internal institu-
tion 
external institu-
tion 
capital market 
Beatty, Bunsis 
and Hand (1998) 
Document that a SEC investigation of an underwriter 
imposes indirect penalties on the underwriter and its 
past clients. Hence, underwriters experience IPO mar-
ket share declines, increased regulatory scrutiny and 
client risk. In addition, stock prices of clients decrease. 
information content single-country setting
archival study 
explanatory 
US 
29 investigation 
announcements 
1055 clients 
observations 
1980-1993 
investigation 
announce-
ments 
capital market 
Beneish (1999) Documents that managers in firms that overstate earn-
ings are more likely to engage in insider trading prior to 
the public discovery of the overstatement. On discov-
ery, investors react negatively to the error announce-
ment. On the contrary, managers do not face labor 
market consequences or trading sanctions by the SEC. 
information content
company  
characteristics  
single-country setting
archival study  
explanatory 
US 
64 error an-
nouncements 
1987-1993 
error an-
nouncements 
internal institu-
tion 
external institu-
tion 
capital market 
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Content Description Context-Related 
References Findings Context of Analysis Research Approach Sample  
Examined 
Focused Area 
of Enforce-
ment 
Focused Area of 
Corporate  
Governance 
Bhattacharya 
and Daouk 
(2002) 
Find that cost of equity does not change after the intro-
duction of insider trading laws, but decreases signifi-
cantly after the first prosecution. 
institutional setting cross-country setting 
archival study 
explanatory 
103 countries 
--- 
1969-1998 
enforcement 
strength 
enforcement 
reforms 
capital market 
Blankley, Hurtt 
and MacGregor 
(2014) 
Provide evidence that firms with abnormal audit report 
lags (time span between fiscal year end and report 
publication) are more likely to be subject to restate-
ments in the future. 
company  
characteristics 
single-country setting
archival study 
dependent 
US 
469 restatements 
2004-2007 
restatements external institu-
tion 
Böcking, Gros, 
and Worret 
(2015) 
Find that the German enforcement system is effective 
in detecting firms with erroneous financial reporting, 
although, it shows weak ability in constraining earnings 
management after error announcements. 
company  
characteristics 
single-country setting
archival study 
explanatory 
Germany 
87 error an-
nouncements 
3,539 firm-year 
observations 
2005-2011 
error an-
nouncements 
external institu-
tion 
Bonner, Palm-
rose and Young 
(1998) 
Provide evidence that auditors are more likely to be 
sued when financial statement frauds are of a common 
variety or when the frauds arise from fictitious transac-
tions. 
information content single-country setting
archival study 
explanatory 
US 
261 error an-
nouncements 
1982-1995 
error an-
nouncements 
external institu-
tion 
Bremser, Licata 
and Rollins 
(1991) 
Provide information about the registrants subject to an 
AAER, their auditors, the types of violations made, and 
the sanctions required by the SEC. Indicate that those 
firms receiving sanctions were significantly larger and 
had a higher proportion of opinion qualifications than 
their industry counterparts while their auditors received 
SEC sanctions only a small portion of the time. 
company  
characteristics 
single-country study 
archival study 
--- 
US 
171 error an-
nouncements 
1979-1989 
error an-
nouncements 
external institu-
tion 
Brocard, Franke 
and Völler 
(2015)° 
Cannot provide significant evidence of increased audi-
tor turnover after error announcements, but already 
after the publication of erroneous financial statements. 
Changes from Non-Big4 auditors to Big4 auditors are 
more likely, arguably in order to improve audit over-
sight. 
information content single-country setting
archival study 
explanatory 
Germany 
2,324 firm-year 
observations 
2005-2012 
error an-
nouncements 
external institu-
tion 
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Content Description Context-Related 
References Findings Context of Analysis Research Approach Sample  
Examined 
Focused Area 
of Enforce-
ment 
Focused Area of 
Corporate  
Governance 
Brown, Preiato 
and Tarca (2014) 
Calculate two new indices and suggest their indices 
have additional explanatory power (over more general 
legal proxies) for country-level measures of economic 
and market activity, financial transparency and earnings 
management. 
institutional setting cross-country setting 
archival study 
--- 
51 countries 
--- 
2002, 2005, 2008 
enforcement 
strength 
external institu-
tion 
Brown and 
Tarca (2005) 
Present the views of people involved in financial re-
porting standard settings and enforcement in France, 
UK, Germany and the Netherlands as well as the IASB, 
FEE and EFRAG about the challenges of achieving 
effective uniform enforcement. The goal of uniform 
enforcement is identified as a major challenge, in par-
ticular the coordination of enforcement activities and 
sanctions. 
institutional setting cross-country setting 
interviews 
--- 
France, UK, 
Germany, Nether-
lands 
--- 
--- 
enforcement 
strength 
enforcement 
reforms 
external institu-
tion 
Brown and 
Tarca (2007) 
Present material about the enforcers' activities in Aus-
tralia and the UK and show that both types of bodies 
can fulfill an enforcement role. Suggest that cross-
country differences are mitigated through international 
coordination activities. In addition, they indicate a 
relation between enforcement actions and political 
views held in government, corporate sector and ac-
counting profession. 
 
institutional setting 
information content 
cross-country setting 
archival study 
--- 
Australia, UK 
67 error an-
nouncements 
1998-2004 
enforcement 
strength 
external institu-
tion 
Burgstahler, Hail 
and Leuz (2006) 
Provide evidence that earnings management is affected 
by companies' reporting incentives and, hence, strong 
legal systems lead to less earnings management. 
institutional setting cross-country setting 
archival study 
explanatory 
13 countries 
378,122 firm-year 
observations 
1997-2003 
enforcement 
strength 
external institu-
tion 
Burks (2010) Finds that when disciplining CEOs after SOX, boards 
gravitate away from termination and toward bonus 
penalties. In contrast, boards appear to strengthen 
disciplinary actions against CFOs after SOX despite the 
decline in restatement severity. 
information content single-country setting
archival study 
explanatory 
US 
442 restatements 
1997-2005 
restatements internal institu-
tion 
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Burks (2011) Finds that the initial price reaction to restatement an-
nouncements becomes significantly less negative after 
SOX and suggests that price efficiency actually im-
proves after SOX. However, does not find an increase 
in disagreement among investors about the restate-
ments. 
information content
institutional setting 
single-country setting
archival study 
explanatory 
US 
1,473 restate-
ments 
1997-2005 
restatements 
enforcement 
reforms 
external institu-
tion 
capital market 
Byard, Li and Yu 
(2011) 
Provide evidence that IFRS adoption leads to a de-
crease in analysts' forecast errors and forecast disper-
sion, but only in those countries with strong enforce-
ment and domestic standards which differ significantly 
from IFRS. 
institutional setting cross-country setting 
archival study 
explanatory 
35 countries 
1,168 IFRS 
adopters 
2003-2006 
enforcement 
strength 
capital market 
Cai, Rahman 
and Courtenay 
(2008)° 
Provide evidence that IFRS adoption leads to a de-
crease in earnings management but that this only holds 
true for countries with stronger enforcement. 
institutional setting cross-country setting 
archival study 
explanatory 
32 countries 
102,636 firm-year 
observations 
2000-2006 
enforcement 
strength 
external institu-
tion 
Callao and Jarne 
(2010) 
Show that IFRS adoption leads to increased earnings 
management and that firms in countries with stronger 
legal enforcement exhibit lower earnings management. 
institutional setting cross-country setting 
archival study 
explanatory 
11 countries 
5,632 firm-year 
observations 
2003-2006 
enforcement 
strength 
external institu-
tion 
Callen, Livnat 
and Segal (2006) 
Identify factors that drive the capital market reaction 
after restatements and show that income-increasing 
restatements do not yield any significant reaction, 
which is probably due to a loss in trust. 
information content single-country setting
archival study 
explanatory 
US 
860 restatements 
1986-2001 
restatements capital market 
Carcello, Neal, 
Palmrose and 
Scholz (2011) 
Argue that CEO involvement in the director selection 
process decreases audit committee effectiveness. In 
addition, negative stock market reactions are mitigated 
if the firm maintains a completely independent audit 
committee. However, results are also driven by re-
statement severity and fraud. 
information content
company  
characteristics 
single-country setting
archival study 
dependent 
US 
104 restatements 
2000-2001 
restatements internal institu-
tion 
capital market 
Cascino and 
Gassen (2015) 
Find only a marginal effect of mandatory IFRS adop-
tion on accounting comparability. However, the effect 
is more pronounced for those firms with high compli-
ance incentives, as e.g. tighter accounting enforcement. 
institutional setting cross-country setting 
archival study 
explanatory 
Germany and 
Italy 
XXX firm-year 
observations 
YEARS? 
enforcement 
strength 
external institu-
tion 
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Chakravarthy, 
deHaan and 
Rajgopal (2014) 
Provide evidence that restatement firms undertake more 
reputation-building actions after the restatement than a 
control group and exhibit a more positive stock market 
reaction to these actions. Show that firm characteristics 
predict the types of stakeholders targeted by firms. 
information content
company  
characteristics  
single-country setting
archival study 
explanatory 
US 
94 restatements 
1997-2006 
restatements capital market 
other stakehold-
er 
Chen, Cheng and 
Lo (2014a) 
Find that material restatement firms experience a sig-
nificant decrease in the ERC over a prolonged period. 
They further find that among restatement firms, those 
that are subject to more credibility concerns and those 
that do not take prompt actions to improve reporting 
credibility experience a longer drop in the ERC.  
information content single-country setting
archival study 
explanatory 
US 
1,208 restate-
ments 
1997-2006 
restatements capital market 
Chen, Elder and 
Hung (2014b) 
Provide evidence that restatement firms with negative 
market reactions report their financial statements more 
conservatively in the year following the restatement. 
They also indicate that reaction severity and the audit 
by Big N auditors in the year following restatements 
determine accounting conservatism. 
information content
company character-
istics  
single-country setting US 
486 restatements 
1997-2005 
restatements 
enforcement 
reforms 
external institu-
tion 
capital market 
Cheng and 
Farber (2008) 
Find that the proportion of CEOs' compensation in the 
form of options declines significantly in the two years 
following the restatement and document that this is 
accompanied by a decrease in the riskiness of invest-
ments. 
company character-
istics 
single-country setting
archival study 
explanatory 
US 
289 restatements 
1997-2001 
restatements internal institu-
tions 
Christensen, Hail 
and Leuz (2013) 
[discussion by 
Barth and Israeli 
(2013)] 
Find that, across all countries, mandatory IFRS report-
ing had little impact on liquidity and that liquidity 
benefits are limited to EU countries that concurrently 
made substantive changes in reporting enforcement.  
institutional setting cross-country setting 
archival study 
explanatory 
56 countries 
762,094 firm-
quarter observa-
tions 
2001-2009 
enforcement 
reforms 
external institu-
tion 
capital market 
Coffee (2007) Labels US - private and public - enforcement to be 
strong and highlights a positive association to cost of 
equity capital. Distinguishes common-law and civil-law 
countries but attributes different levels of enforcement 
intensity to the level of retail ownership. 
institutional setting cross-country setting 
literature review 
--- 
multiple countries
--- 
--- 
enforcement 
strength 
external institu-
tion 
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Collins, Masli, 
Reitenga and 
Sanchez (2009) 
Suggest that restatements lead to higher CFO turnover 
and severe labor market penalties whereas the former is 
unaffected by SOX and the latter increased after SOX. 
information content
institutional setting 
single-country setting
archival study 
explanatory 
US 
363 restatements 
1999-2006 
restatements external institu-
tions 
internal institu-
tions 
Collins, Reitenga 
and Sanchez 
(2008) 
Results indicate that CFO turnover and bonus compen-
sation are affected by restatements, but only when the 
restatement firm is the target of a class-action suit. The 
same holds true for other executives. 
information content single-country setting
archival study 
explanatory 
US 
81 restatements 
1997-2003 
restatements internal institu-
tions 
Correia (2014) Finds that politically connected firms are less likely to 
be involved in SEC enforcement actions and face lower 
penalties on average. 
company  
characteristics 
single-country study 
archival study 
dependent 
US 
4,067 restated 
firm-years 
1980-2006 
restatements external institu-
tion 
Dao (2005) Describes and comments on the methods used by the 
French stock exchange regulator (AMF) for monitoring 
compliance with the national reporting rules as this 
bears upon the issue of enforcement of IFRS. Public 
enforcement in France is subject to double scrutiny 
although investigations are focused on disclosure veri-
fication and presentation requirements. 
institutional setting single-country setting
interview 
--- 
France  
--- 
--- 
enforcement 
strength 
external institu-
tion 
Daske, Hail, 
Leuz and Verdi 
(2008) 
Document that IFRS adoption capital-market benefits 
are limited to those countries with transparency incen-
tives and strong legal enforcement and, thus, underscor-
ing the central importance of firms' reporting incentives 
and countries' enforcement regimes for the quality of 
financial reporting. 
institutional setting cross-country setting 
archival study 
explanatory 
51 countries 
105,527 firm-year 
observations 
2001-2005 
enforcement 
strength 
capital market 
Dechow, Ge, 
Larson and 
Sloan (2011) 
Find that managers tend to be hiding diminishing per-
formance during misstatement years. Results also 
indicate that accruals are high and firms have a higher 
proportion of assets with valuations that are more sub-
ject to managerial discretion. Finally, they develop a 
model to predict financial misstatements.  
information content single-country study 
archival study 
dependent 
US 
2,261 error an-
nouncements 
1982-2005 
error an-
nouncements 
external institu-
tion 
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Dechow, Sloan 
and Sweeney 
(1996) 
Argue that a an important motivation for earnings 
management is to attract external financing at low cost 
and show that firms manipulating earnings are more 
likely to have a weak level of corporate governance. 
They also document a significant increase in firms' cost 
of capital after discovery of financial misstatements. 
company  
characteristics 
single-country setting
archival study 
dependent 
explanatory 
US 
92 error an-
nouncements 
1982-1992 
error an-
nouncements 
internal institu-
tion  
capital market 
DeFond and 
Smith (1991) 
[Critical discus-
sion of Feroz, 
Park and Pastena 
(1991)] 
Argue that error announcements are often related to 
fraud issues or material effects on net income. The 
observed negative market reaction further indicates that 
the market did not fully anticipate these misstatements. 
Finally, they argue that smaller auditors are punished 
more frequently due to less defending resources or 
being not a member of the SEC Practice Section. 
information content single-country setting
archival study 
explanatory 
US 
188 error an-
nouncements 
1982-1989 
error an-
nouncements 
external institu-
tion 
capital market 
Desai, Hogan 
and Wilkins 
(2006a) 
Provide evidence that restating firms exhibit a higher 
management turnover within 24 months. In addition, 
employment prospects of the displaced managers due to 
restatements are poorer than for those of a control 
group. Hence, private enforcement violations are severe 
and may serve as partial substitutes for public enforce-
ment of GAAP violations. 
information content single-country setting
archival study 
explanatory 
US 
146 restatements 
1997-1998 
restatements internal institu-
tion 
Desai, Krishna-
murthy and 
Venkatarman 
(2006b) 
Find that short sellers accumulate positions in restating 
firms several months in advance of the restatement and 
subsequently unwind these positions after the drop in 
share price induced by the restatement. This effect is 
larger for firms with high level of accruals prior to 
restatements. Heavily shorted firms experience poor 
subsequent performance and higher rate of delisting. 
information content single-country setting
archival study 
explanatory 
US 
477 restatements 
1997-2002 
restatements capital market 
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Dyreng, Mayew 
and Williams 
(2012) 
Suggest that higher levels of religious adherence are 
associated with both lower likelihood of financial 
restatement and less risk that financial statements are 
misrepresented because of overstated (understated) 
revenues/assets (expenses/liabilities). Accruals also 
exhibit smaller deviations from expectations. In addi-
tion, relation holds for tax sheltering and forthcoming 
with bad news in voluntary disclosures. 
company  
characteristics 
single-country setting
archival study 
explanatory 
US 
45,278 firm-year 
observations 
1990-2008 
restatements internal institu-
tion 
Ebner, Höltken 
and Zülch (2015) 
Find pronounced investor reactions in the years 2006-
2009, however not for the subsequent years 2010-2013. 
Identifying the drivers of investor reactions, impacts on 
profitability and financial leverage enhance the ob-
served stock price decline, whereas the number of 
errors, as well as core-earnings violations, attenuates 
investor reactions. Moreover, the authors do not find 
evidence of a change in investor perception over time. 
information content 
company  
characteristics 
single-country setting 
archival study 
explanatory 
Germany 
88 error an-
nouncements 
2006-2013 
error an-
nouncements 
capital market 
Erickson, Hanlon 
and Maydew 
(2006) 
Find that the probability of accounting fraud is increas-
ing in the percent of total executive compensation that 
is stock-based and the likelihood of management want-
ing to obtain external financing. In addition, they find 
negative wealth consequences for managerial stock 
holdings in fraud firms. 
company  
characteristics 
single-country setting 
archival study 
dependent 
US 
50 error an-
nouncements 
1996-2003 
error an-
nouncements 
internal institu-
tion 
Ernstberger, 
Stich and Vogler 
(2012a) 
Provide evidence that the three enforcement reforms in 
Germany in 2005 have decreased earnings manage-
ment, increased stock liquidity and partially market 
valuation. They find more pronounced effects for firms 
with low internal and external corporate governance 
mechanisms. 
institutional setting single-country setting
archival study 
explanatory 
Germany 
1,464 firm-year 
observations 
2003-2006 
enforcement 
reforms 
external institu-
tion 
capital market 
Ernstberger, 
Hitz and Stich 
(2012b) 
Find that the presence of opportunistic motives is con-
ducive to erroneous accounting, while governance 
quality decreases the likelihood that firms prepare 
compliant financial statements. However, results do not 
indicate that IFRS reporting quality is impaired by 
other unintentional factors. 
company  
characteristics 
single-country setting
archival study 
dependent 
Germany 
64 error an-
nouncements 
2005-2010 
error an-
nouncements 
external institu-
tion 
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Ettredge, Huang 
and Zhang 
(2013) 
Provide evidence that firms exhibit a decreased propen-
sity to issue quarterly earnings forecasts following 
restatements. Those that do make forecasts issue fewer 
forecasts in post-restatement periods and published 
post-restatement forecasts are less precise and less 
optimistically biased. 
information content
company  
characteristics 
single-country setting
archival study 
explanatory 
US 
1,512 restate-
ments 
1999-2006 
restatements capital market 
Ettredge, Scholz, 
Smith and Sun 
(2010) 
Document increasing balance sheet bloat in years prior 
to the restatement periods and find that firms which 
fraudulently misstate their results engage significantly 
more in balance sheet bloating. This is also for compa-
nies restating core earnings. 
information content
company  
characteristics 
single-country setting
archival study 
dependent 
US 
354 restatements 
1994-2003 
restatements external institu-
tion 
Farber (2005) Documents firm characteristics of fraud firms and 
shows that restating firms have fewer numbers and 
percentages of outside board members, fewer audit 
committee meetings, fewer financial experts on the 
audit committee, smaller percentage of Big4 auditors 
and higher percentage of CEOs who are also chairmen 
of the board of directors. After fraud detection, the 
firms take actions to improve governance, although, 
analyst following and institutional holding do not in-
crease. However, results also indicate that firms that 
take actions to improve corporate governance have 
superior stock price performance suggesting that inves-
tors appear to value governance improvements. 
company  
characteristics 
single-country setting
archival study 
explanatory 
US 
87 error an-
nouncements 
1982-2000 
error an-
nouncements 
internal institu-
tion 
capital market 
Fearnley, Hines, 
McBride, and 
Brandt (2002) 
Find the FRRP to have motivated auditors to improve 
accounting compliance by increasing the possibility of 
some errors being exposed and to have enhanced the 
independence of auditors at the pre-conventional level 
of ethical cognition by changing the cost-benefit for 
auditors of permitting non-compliance. 
institutional setting single-country setting
interview 
explanatory 
UK 
15 interviews 
--- 
enforcement 
reforms 
external institu-
tion 
Feldmann, Read 
and Abdolmo-
hammadi (2009) 
Provide evidence that restatements lead to higher sub-
sequent audit fees reflecting higher cost of both an 
increase in perceived audit risk and a loss or organiza-
tional legitimacy. In addition, results indicate a positive 
association between CFO turnover and audit fees.  
company  
characteristics 
single-country setting
archival study 
explanatory 
US 
114 restatements 
2004-2005 
restatements external institu-
tions 
internal institu-
tions 
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Feroz, Park and 
Pastena (1991) 
Describe SEC's accounting-based enforcement activi-
ties to anticipate emerging reporting problems and to 
maintain the credibility of the disclosure system. Mate-
rial income misstatements affect financial analysts' 
expectations and enforcement targets' managers often 
suffer negative [labor market] consequences. SEC's 
auditing enforcement activities encourage auditors to 
conscientiously apply GAAP, although, smaller firms 
appear to be sanctioned more frequently. 
information content single-country setting
archival study 
explanatory 
US 
188 error an-
nouncements 
1982-1989 
error an-
nouncements 
external institu-
tion 
capital market 
Files, Sharp and 
Thompson (2014) 
Provide evidence of firm characteristics and conse-
quences of repeat restatements and document that 
repeat restatements are more likely for firms with non-
Big N auditors and ex ante lower accounting quality. 
Results also indicate that auditor switch mitigates 
likelihood of repeat restatement and that repeat re-
statements are positively associated with more severe 
stock price decline. 
information content
company  
characteristics 
single-country setting 
archival study 
explanatory 
US 
2,212 restate-
ments 
2002-2006 
restatements capital market 
Files, Swanson 
and Tse (2009) 
Find that disclosure prominence is significantly nega-
tively associated with returns in a model that controls 
for error severity, restatement magnitude and other 
restatement characteristics. Similarly, the likelihood of 
class action lawsuits is significantly reduced with less 
prominent disclosure. 
information content single-country setting
archival study 
explanatory 
US 
381 restatements 
1997-2002 
restatements capital market 
Firth, Mo and 
Wong (2005) 
Find that auditors are more likely to be sanctioned by 
the regulators for failing to detect and report material 
misstatements frauds (e.g., revenue-related) rather than 
disclosure frauds.  
information content single-country setting
archival study 
dependent 
China 
72 error an-
nouncements 
1996-2002 
error an-
nouncements 
external institu-
tion 
Francis, Michas 
and Yu (2013) 
Provide evidence that restatements are more likely to 
occur for the clients of smaller Big 4 auditor offices 
and that there is no difference in probability between 
small Big 4 auditor offices and non-Big 4 auditor offic-
es concerning the likelihood of restatements. 
company  
characteristics 
single-country setting
archival study 
dependent 
US 
1,196 restate-
ments 
2003-2008 
restatements external institu-
tion 
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GAO (2002) Provides a descriptive statistic of restatements in the 
US between 1997 and 2002. Thus, the statistic is an 
often-used basis of many studies' datasets. It also pro-
vides empirical evidence for the impact on stock price 
and investor confidence. 
information content single-country setting
archival study 
explanatory 
US 
919 restatements 
1997-2002 
restatements capital market 
GAO (2006) Provides a descriptive statistic of restatements in the 
US between 2002 and 2005. Thus, the statistic is an 
often-used basis of many studies' datasets. It also pro-
vides empirical evidence for the impact on stock price 
and investor confidence. 
information content single-country setting
archival study 
explanatory 
US 
1,390 restate-
ments 
2002-2006 
restatements capital market 
Gietzmann and 
Pettinicchio 
(2014) 
Provide evidence that a SEC comment letter - which is 
the primary regulatory instrument by which the SEC 
can start the process of requesting additional infor-
mation about the accounting treatment - leads to audi-
tors' reassessment of risk of the specific firm and up-
ward adjustment of audit fees for the period of the 
comment letter. If auditors do not assist the client re-
spond to a specific comment letter the rise in audit fees 
persists. 
information content
company  
characteristics 
single-country setting
archival study 
explanatory 
US 
15,267 firm-year 
observations 
2004-2008 
investigation 
announce-
ments 
external institu-
tion 
Gordon, Henry, 
Peytcheva and 
Sun (2013) 
Provide evidence that management's disclosure choices 
related to a restatement are associated with the market 
reaction at the time the restatement is announced.  
information content single-country setting
archival study 
explanatory 
US 
365 restatements 
1997-2002 
restatements capital market 
Hail, Leuz and 
Wysocki (2010) 
Argue that the role of accounting standards for the 
quality of corporate reporting is limited and that other 
supporting institutions - such as managerial reporting 
incentives or enforcement - play an important role.  
 
institutional setting cross-country setting 
literature review 
--- 
--- enforcement 
strength 
enforcement 
reforms 
external institu-
tion 
capital market 
Haw, Hu, Hwang 
and Wu (2004) 
Provide evidence that income management is restricted 
by the strength of statutory protection of minority rights 
and, thus, the efficiency of the judicial system. But, 
results indicate that tax enforcement is more effective 
than the effects of a common law tradition. 
institutional setting cross-country setting 
archival study 
explanatory 
22 countries 
25,210 firm-year 
observations 
1996-1999 
enforcement 
strength 
external institu-
tion 
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Häfele and 
Riediger (2015)° 
Show that error announcements yield stock price de-
clines of unaffected companies in the same industry 
with the error firm, thereby hinting at contagion effects 
of mitigated investor confidence. Peer firms react with 
more informative financial reporting, which does not 
lead to more accurate financial forecasts, though. 
Moreover, the authors cannot find evidence of in-
creased auditor turnover due to error announcements. 
information content 
company  
characteristics 
single-country setting
archival study 
explanatory 
Germany 
36 error firms and 
167 industry peers 
2005-2013 
error an-
nouncements 
capital market 
Healy and 
Palepu (2001) 
Argue that regulated financial reports are informative to 
investors and also refer to enforcement with regard to 
distinguishing between countries that have established 
financial reporting and auditing standards. 
institutional setting cross-country setting 
literature review 
--- enforcement 
strength 
capital market 
Heese (2015)° Posits that SEC's enforcement actions are influenced by 
government's preferences for firms that contribute to 
the government's policy of fostering employment con-
ditions. 
company  
characteristics 
single-country setting
archival study 
dependent 
US 
306 AAERs  
1982-2012 
error an-
nouncements 
external institu-
tion 
Hennes, Leone 
and Miller (2008) 
Distinguish between unintentional errors and intention-
al irregularities in restatements plus provide evidence 
that investor reactions are larger to irregularities. 
CEO/CFO turnover is also positively associated with 
irregularities. 
information content single-country setting
archival study 
explanatory 
US 
188 restatements 
2002-2006 
restatements internal institu-
tion 
capital market 
Hennes, Leone 
and Miller (2014) 
Find that non-Big 4 auditors are more likely to be 
dismissed after more severe restatements. Positive 
market reactions to auditor dismissal indicate the im-
portant role of auditors in the financial markets with 
regard to financial reporting credibility. 
information content
company  
characteristics 
single-country setting
archival study 
explanatory 
US 
2,036 restate-
ments 
1997-2010 
restatements external institu-
tion 
Hitz, 
Ernstberger and 
Stich (2012) 
Evidence indicates that investors react to error an-
nouncements and, thus, the name and shame mecha-
nism exists. Investor reaction is mainly driven by error 
severity. 
information content single-country setting 
archival study 
explanatory 
Germany 
51 error an-
nouncements 
2005-2009 
error an-
nouncements 
capital market 
Hitz and Müller-
Bloch (2014)° 
Suggest that the costs of IFRS compliance and en-
forcement play a decisive role for firms' decisions to 
migrate from the regulated market to unregulated seg-
ments. 
institutional setting 
company  
characteristics 
single-country setting
archival study 
explanatory 
Germany 
86 going-grey 
observations 
2006-2014 
error an-
nouncements 
external institu-
tion 
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Holthausen 
(2003) 
[discussion of 
Ball, Robin and 
Wu (2003)] 
Argues that adoption of IAS standards by countries 
with weak incentives and enforcement mechanisms will 
likely lead to damaging the perceived quality of IAS 
standards. Hence, strength of enforcement can be used 
to characterize countries' institutions. 
institutional setting cross-country setting 
archival study 
explanatory 
Four Asian coun-
tries 
2,726 firm-year 
observations 
1984-1996 
enforcement 
strength 
external institu-
tion 
Holthausen 
(2009) 
Argues, based on the notion that both public and pri-
vate enforcement are correlated with capital-market 
outcomes, that enforcement has an important effect on 
how the IFRS adoption effects financial reporting 
outcomes. In addition, enforcement has to be aligned to 
the overall portfolio of countries' institutional and 
economic forces. 
institutional setting cross-country setting 
literature review 
--- 
--- enforcement 
strength 
external institu-
tion 
Hope (2003) Constructs a comprehensive measure of enforcement 
and finds a strong association between level of en-
forcement and analysts' forecast accuracy.  
institutional setting cross-country setting 
archival study 
explanatory 
22 countries 
1,309 observa-
tions 
1991, 1993 
enforcement 
strength 
capital market 
Hribar and 
Jenkins (2004) 
Show that accounting restatements lead to both de-
creases in expected future earnings and increases in the 
firm's cost of equity capital. 
information content single-country setting
archival study 
explanatory 
US 
292 restatements 
1997-2002 
restatements capital market 
Huang and 
Scholz (2012) 
Provide evidence that restatements increase the odds of 
an auditor resignation and that this is driven by re-
statements involving fraud, reversing profit to loss, and 
press disclosure. In addition, restatement firm tend to 
hire smaller audit firms following a resignation. 
company  
characteristics 
single-country setting
archival study 
explanatory 
US 
1,014 restate-
ments 
2003-2007 
restatements external institu-
tion 
Hung (2001) Shows that the use of accrual accounting negatively 
affects the value relevance of accounting performance 
for countries with weak shareholder protection. In 
addition, accrual accounting does not negatively affect 
the value relevance for countries with strong sharehold-
er protection. 
institutional setting cross-country setting 
archival study 
explanatory 
21 countries 
17,743 firm-years
1991-1997 
enforcement 
strength 
capital market 
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Jackson (2008) 
[discussion of 
Coffee (2007)] 
Cautions to compare the strength of enforcement sys-
tems based on superficial analysis of regulatory intensi-
ty. Provides an analysis of regulatory intensity by 
looking at regulatory inputs (staffing or budget) and 
regulatory outputs (enforcement actions or monetary 
sanctions). 
institutional setting cross-country setting 
literature review 
--- 
8 countries enforcement 
strength 
external institu-
tion 
Jackson and Roe 
(2009) 
Use securities regulators' resources to proxy for regula-
tory intensity and provide evidence for the positive 
association between private enforcement via disclosure 
and capital market development. 
institutional setting cross-country setting 
literature review 
53 countries enforcement 
strength 
external institu-
tion 
Jennings, Kedia 
and Rajgopal 
(2011)° 
By looking at peers of restatement firms, they find 
significant deterrence associated with both SEC en-
forcement actions and class action lawsuits. Discretion-
ary accruals are reduced by firms subject to SEC action 
or litigation.  
company  
characteristics 
single-country setting
archival study 
explanatory 
US 
64,462 company-
years 
1996-2006 
error an-
nouncement 
restatements 
external institu-
tion 
Johnson, Ryan 
and Tian (2009) 
Show that fraud firms have significantly greater incen-
tives from unrestricted stockholdings and that those are 
their largest incentive source. In addition, fraud firms 
have characteristics that suggest a lower likelihood of 
fraud detection. 
company  
characteristics 
single-country setting
archival study 
dependent 
US 
87 error an-
nouncement 
1992-2005 
error an-
nouncements 
internal institu-
tion 
Karpoff, Lee and 
Martin (2008) 
Measure the market penalty in response to firms cook-
ing the books and provide evidence that the reputation-
al penalty - measured as expected loss in the present 
value of future cash flows - exceeds penalties imposed 
through the legal system. 
information content single-country setting 
archival study 
explanatory 
US 
585 enforcement 
actions 
1978-2005 
error an-
nouncements 
investigation 
announce-
ments 
external institu-
tion 
capital market 
Kedia and Phil-
ippon (2009) 
Show that during periods of suspicious accounting, 
firms hire and invest excessively, while managers 
exercise options. When the misreporting is detected, 
firms shed labor and capital and productivity improves. 
company  
characteristics 
single-country setting
model-based 
archival study 
explanatory 
US 
572 restatements 
1997-2003 
restatement external institu-
tion 
Kedia and 
Rajgopal (2011) 
Suggest that firms located closer to SEC and areas with 
greater past SEC enforcement activity are less likely to 
restate their financial statements and, thus, argue that 
SEC tends to investigate neighboring companies. 
institutional setting 
company  
characteristics 
single-country setting
archival study 
explanatory 
US 
331 restatements 
1997-2002 
restatements external institu-
tion 
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Kim, Park and 
Wier (2012) 
Find that socially responsible firms are less likely to 
manage earnings, to manipulate real operating activities 
and to be subject of SEC investigations.  
company  
characteristics 
single-country setting
archival study 
dependent 
US 
18,160 firm-year 
observations 
1991-2008 
error an-
nouncements 
external institu-
tion 
Kläs and Werner 
(2014)° 
Find negative economic consequences that spill over to 
other firms audited by the auditor of the respective 
erroneous financial statement. Reactions are larger if 
auditor is a Big 4 company. 
information content
company  
characteristics 
single-country setting
archival study 
explanatory 
Germany 
68 error an-
nouncements 
541 auditor-client 
observations 
2006-2013 
error an-
nouncements 
external institu-
tion 
capital market 
Kleinman, Lin 
and Palmon 
(2014) 
Description of institutional cross-country differences in 
the field of audit oversight and implications for con-
sistent application of accounting standards 
institutional setting cross-country setting 
literature review 
--- 
--- enforcement 
strength 
external institu-
tion 
Königsgruber 
(2012) 
Shows - based on a game-theoretic model - that report-
ing quality strictly increases with tighter enforcement, 
although, the effect of stricter enforcement on capital 
allocation is non-monotonic. 
institutional setting --- 
model-based                  
explanatory 
--- enforcement 
strength 
external institu-
tion 
La Porta, Lopez-
de-Silanes and 
Shleifer (2006) 
Provide little evidence that public enforcement benefits 
stock markets, but strong evidence that laws mandating 
disclosure and facilitating private enforcement through 
liability rules benefit stock markets. 
institutional setting cross-country setting 
archival study 
explanatory 
49 countries enforcement 
strength 
external institu-
tion 
La Porta, Lopez-
de-Silanes, 
Shleifer and 
Vishny (1997) 
Determine legal environment [character of legal rules 
and quality of law enforcement] to matter for the size 
and extent of a country's capital market because it 
protects potential investors [financiers] against expro-
priation by entrepreneurs. Construct a measure of in-
vestor protection to illustrate differences between legal 
environments across origins. 
institutional setting cross-country setting 
archival study 
explanatory 
49 countries enforcement 
strength 
external institu-
tion 
La Porta, Lopez-
de-Silanes, 
Shleifer and 
Vishny (1998) 
Show that common-law countries generally have the 
strongest, and code-law countries weaker, legal protec-
tions of investors. Concentration of ownership in larger 
public companies is negatively related to the level of 
investor protection. 
institutional setting cross-country setting 
archival study 
explanatory 
49 countries enforcement 
strength 
external institu-
tion 
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La Porta, Lopez-
de-Silanes, 
Shleifer and 
Vishny (2000) 
Describe the differences in laws and effectiveness of 
their enforcement across countries from a corporate 
governance perspective. Argue that the legal approach 
is a more fruitful way to understand corporate govern-
ance and its reform than the conventional distinction 
between bank-centered and market-centered financial 
systems. 
institutional setting cross-country setting 
archival study 
explanatory 
49 countries enforcement 
strength 
external institu-
tion 
Land (2010) Shows significant associations between measures of 
earnings restatement severity and the probability of 
CEO turnover. In addition, firms with CEO turnover 
and earnings restatement are more likely to be issued an 
SEC AAER indicating that financial fraud has oc-
curred. 
information content
company  
characteristics 
single-country setting
archival study 
explanatory 
US 
230 restatements 
1996-1999 
error an-
nouncements 
restatements 
internal institu-
tion 
external institu-
tion 
Landsman, 
Maydew and 
Thornock (2012) 
Suggest that information content increased in countries 
that mandated adoption of IFRS, although the effect 
depends on the strength of legal enforcement in the 
adopting country. Thus, they use enforcement to distin-
guish between institutional settings. 
institutional setting cross-country setting 
archival study 
explanatory 
27 countries 
21,703 firm-years
2002-2007 
enforcement 
strength 
external institu-
tion 
Laux and Stock-
en (2013)° 
Find that isolated changes to standards can have unin-
tended consequences on reporting quality if respective 
enforcement remains unchanged. In addition, increase 
in enforcement should be combined either with tougher 
or weaker standards depending on the information 
environment. 
institutional setting --- 
model-based  
explanatory 
--- enforcement 
strength 
enforcement 
reforms 
external institu-
tion 
Lazer, Livat and 
Tan (2004)° 
Provide evidence that firms which switched auditors 
have significant higher incidence and magnitude of 
quarterly restatements compared to those that did not. 
Show that incoming auditors exercise tighter controls 
over new audit clients than over existing clients. 
company  
characteristics 
single-country setting
archival study 
dependent 
US 
51,606 firm-year 
observations 
1988-2002 
restatements external institu-
tion 
Leng, Feroz, Cao 
and Davalos 
(2011) 
Provide evidence on performance for firms having 
faced an AAER in previous years. Those firms also 
face higher failure risk in the post-AAER period. 
Hence, evidence suggests long lasting effects of en-
forcement actions. 
information content
company  
characteristics 
single-country setting
archival study 
explanatory 
US 
239 error an-
nouncements 
1982-2004 
error an-
nouncements 
capital market 
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Leone and Liu 
(2010) 
Document that the probability of CEO (CFO) turnover 
in the wake of an accounting irregularity is lower 
(higher) when the firm's CEO is also a founder. Hence, 
board mechanisms differ for firm where the CEO is a 
founder. 
company  
characteristics 
single-country setting
archival study 
explanatory 
US 
96 restatements 
1997-2006 
restatements internal institu-
tion 
Leuz, Nanda and 
Wysocki (2003) 
Show the negative relationship between earnings man-
agement and [level of] investor protection as the latter 
limits insiders' ability to acquire private control bene-
fits. Hence, a endogenous link between [level of] cor-
porate governance and earnings quality is suggested.  
institutional setting cross-country setting 
archival study 
explanatory 
31 countries 
70,955 firm-year 
observations 
1990-1999 
enforcement 
strength 
external institu-
tion 
Leuz, Triantis 
and Wang (2008) 
Argue that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act motivated several 
firm to deregister. Those firms go dark due to poor 
future prospects, distress and increased compliance 
costs. In addition, controlling insiders of low-level 
governance firms protect private control benefits by 
deregistration.  
institutional setting 
company  
characteristics 
single-country setting
archival study 
explanatory 
US 
814 going-
dark/private ob-
servations 
1998-2004 
enforcement 
strength 
enforcement 
reforms 
external institu-
tion 
Li (2010) Finds evidence that the IFRS mandate significantly 
reduces the cost of equity capital and that this reduction 
is present only in countries with strong legal enforce-
ment, increased disclosure and enhanced comparability 
of financial reporting. 
institutional setting cross-country setting 
archival study 
explanatory 
18 countries 
6,456 firm-years 
1995-2006 
enforcement 
strength 
capital market 
Liang (2004) Show that various economic trade-offs give rise to 
endogenous earnings management, i.e. the owner may 
reduce agency costs by designing a compensation 
contract that tolerates some earnings management 
because compensation risk allocation works more 
efficiently. As a consequence, applying a zero-
tolerance [enforcement] policy is economically unde-
sirable. 
institutional setting --- 
model-based  
explanatory 
--- enforcement 
strength 
external institu-
tion 
Liu, Raghunan-
dan, and Rama 
(2009) 
Provide evidence that shareholders of restating firms 
are more likely to vote against auditor ratification 
compared with firms without restatements or restating 
firms in the preceding period. 
information content single-country setting
archival study 
explanatory 
US 
97 restatements 
2005-2006 
restatements external institu-
tion 
capital market 
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Liu, Rowe and 
Wang (2012) 
Indicate that restatement magnitude, duration, and the 
content impact credit-rating response and, thus, provide 
evidence of the SOX-legislation's effectiveness.  
information content single-country setting
archival study 
explanatory 
dependent 
US 
487 restatements 
1997-2005 
restatements external institu-
tion 
capital market 
Lobo and Zhao 
(2013) 
Find a robust negative association betweeen audit effort 
and annual report restatements after controlling for 
auditor risk adjustments and restated unaudited reports. 
company  
characteristics 
single-country setting
archival study 
explanatory 
dependent 
US 
25,408 firm-year 
observations 
2000-2009 
restatements external institu-
tion 
Lohse, Pascalau 
and Thomann 
(2013) 
Provide evidence - based on an SEC-enforcement 
perspective - that an increase in resources available for 
public enforcement improves accounting compliance.  
institutional setting single-country setting
model-based 
archival study 
explanatory 
US 
--- 
1946-2010 
enforcement 
strength 
external institu-
tion 
Mande and Son 
(2013) 
Argue that restating firms in response to pressure from 
capital markets will dismiss their auditors to increase 
audit quality and restore reputational capital lost when 
the restatements are announced to the investing public. 
Association is strengthened when restatement severity 
increases. 
information content single-country setting
archival study 
explanatory 
US 
1,807 restate-
ments 
2001-2006 
restatements external institu-
tion 
capital market 
Markelevich and 
Rosner (2013) 
Show that firms that pay significantly higher audit fees, 
non-auditing service fees and total fees are more likely 
to be sanctioned for issuing materially misstat-
ed/fraudulent financial statements.  
company  
characteristics 
single-country setting
archival study 
dependent 
US 
286 error an-
nouncements 
2000-2010 
error an-
nouncements 
external institu-
tion 
Marton and 
Runesson (2014)° 
Provide evidence - focused on the recognition of in-
curred losses in banks - that enforcement increases 
accounting quality for high-judgment standards, but 
decreases quality for standards that limit management 
exercise of judgment. 
institutional setting cross-country setting 
archival study 
explanatory 
28 countries 
2,094 firm-year 
observations 
2001-2010 
enforcement 
strength 
enforcement 
reforms 
capital market 
Meser, Veith and 
Zimmermann 
(2015) 
Display that higher regulatory levels of disclosure and 
enforcement are associated with increased stock li-
quidity and valuation in the long run. 
institutional setting single-country setting
archival study 
explanatory 
Germany 
3,981 firm-year 
observations 
1996-2010 
Enforcement 
reforms 
capital market 
Neel (2013)° Finds that benefits of mandatory IFRS adoption are 
restricted to countries in the EU that have a high level 
of enforcement or implemented proactive financial 
statement review in 2005. Thus, he uses enforcement to 
institutional setting cross-country setting 
archival study 
explanatory 
23 countries 
14,888 firm-years
2001-2008 
enforcement 
strength 
enforcement 
reforms 
external institu-
tion 
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ment 
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Corporate  
Governance 
distinguish between institutional settings. 
Nourayi (1994) Uses stock price changes as indicator for the enforce-
ment effect and reveals a negative market reaction to 
the announcement of investigations. Violations of 
disclosures or recognition/measurement issues result in 
more negative market reactions. 
information content single-country setting
archival study 
explanatory 
US 
82 SEC litigation 
releases 
1977-1984 
investigation 
announce-
ments 
capital market 
Palmrose, Rich-
ardson and 
Scholz (2004) 
Document that restatements involving fraud, affecting 
more accounts decreasing reported income and attribut-
ed to auditors or management are associated with more 
negative market reactions. Hence, violations against 
management competence and integrity face stronger 
penalties. 
information content single-country setting
archival study 
explanatory 
US 
403 restatements 
1995-1999 
restatements capital market 
Palmrose and 
Scholz (2004) 
Find that companies with core restatements have higher 
frequencies of intentional misstatements (fraud) and 
subsequent bankruptcy or delisting. Likewise, these 
companies have more material misstatements and more 
negative security price reactions. Overall, they find an 
association between accounting items and litigation.  
information content single-country setting
archival study 
explanatory 
US 
492 restatements 
1995-1999 
restatements capital market 
Peasnell, Pope 
and Young 
(2001) 
Provide evidence that firms subject to adverse rulings 
by the FRRP are associated with weak performance in 
the defect year and tend to have a non-Big Five auditor, 
no audit committee and a higher proportion of outside 
directors. 
company  
characteristics 
single-country setting
archival study 
dependent 
UK  
47 error an-
nouncements 
1992-1998 
error an-
nouncements 
external institu-
tion 
Plumlee and 
Yohn (2008)° 
Document that the restatements related to earnings and 
restatement disclosures through an 8K filing are posi-
tively associated with investor reactions.  
information content
company  
characteristics 
single-country setting
archival study 
dependent 
US 
1,303 firm-year 
observations 
2003-2006 
restatements capital market 
Plumlee and 
Yohn (2010) 
Provide evidence that companies regularly attribute 
restatements to basic internal errors but also to certain 
characteristics of accounting standards such as lack of 
clarity or proliferation of the literature due to the lack 
of clarity. 
information content single-country setting
archival study 
explanatory 
US 
3,744 restate-
ments 
2003-2006 
restatements external institu-
tion 
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Pope (2003) 
[discussion of 
Hope (2003)] 
Demands further research to investigate the role of 
enforcement and disclosure as fundamental determi-
nants of usefulness of an accounting regime, or as 
complements to recognition rules operating in different 
accounting regimes. 
institutional setting cross-country setting 
archival study 
explanatory 
22 countries 
1,309 observa-
tions 
1991, 1993 
enforcement 
strength 
capital market 
Preiato, Brown 
and Tarca 
(2013)° 
Construct two indexes that focus specifically on audit-
ing and accounting enforcement and find that in coun-
tries with a stronger enforcement of financial reporting 
financial analysts exhibit higher forecast accuracy and 
less dispersion. 
institutional setting cross-country setting 
archival study 
explanatory 
37 countries 
357,034 firm-
month observa-
tions 
2002-2009 
enforcement 
strength 
external institu-
tion 
capital market 
Richardson, 
Tuna and Wu 
(2002)° 
Document that firms restating earnings have high mar-
ket expectations for future earnings growth and face 
higher levels of outstanding debt. In consequence, firms 
are motivated to adopt aggressive accounting policies 
and, thus, operating and investing accruals are key 
indicators of the earnings management that lead to the 
restatement. 
information content
company  
characteristics 
single-country setting
archival study 
dependent 
US 
440 firm-year 
observations 
1971-2000 
restatements capital market 
Romanus, Maher 
and Fleming 
(2008) 
Find that auditor industry specialization is negatively 
associated with the likelihood of accounting restate-
ment in general and restatements affecting core income. 
In addition, changing to specialized auditors increases 
the likelihood of restatements. 
company  
characteristics 
single-country setting
archival study 
dependent 
US 
456 restatements 
1998-2003 
restatements external institu-
tion 
Samarasekera, 
Chang and Tarca 
(2012)° 
Document an increase in value relevance under IFRS 
[compared to UK GAAP] for all firms and that firms 
are less likely to manage towards earnings targets. 
Further results point to a favorable impact of changes in 
the regulatory scrutiny of cross-listed firms in the IFRS 
period. 
 
institutional setting single-country setting
archival study 
explanatory 
UK 
4,179 firm-years 
2000-2009 
enforcement 
strength 
enforcement 
reforms 
external institu-
tion 
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Schmidt and 
Wilkins (2013) 
Find that companies that engage Big 4 auditors have 
shorter dark periods (time between identification and 
correction of financial misstatements) than companies 
that do not engage Big 4 auditors. The effect is stronger 
for firms that have financial experts on the audit com-
mittee and even stronger if the experts chair the com-
mittee.  
company  
characteristics 
single-country setting
archival study 
dependent 
US 
154 restatements 
2004-2009 
restatements internal institu-
tion 
external institu-
tion 
Scholz (2008) Investigates the increase in restatements over the dec-
ade from 1997 to 2006 and describes the characteristics 
and consequences of financial statement restatements. 
Restating companies are labeled as 'typically unprofita-
ble'. 
information content
company  
characteristics 
single-country setting
archival study 
dependent 
explanatory 
US 
6,633 restate-
ments 
1997-2006 
restatements external institu-
tion 
capital market 
Scott and Gist 
(2014) 
Find a positive and significant relation between an SEC 
investigation event and audit fees and, thus, indicate 
that auditors charge a statistically and economically 
significant audit fee premium to clients under SEC 
investigation. 
company  
characteristics 
single-country setting
archival study 
explanatory 
US 
29 investigation 
announcements 
2001 
investigation 
announce-
ments 
external institu-
tion 
Soderstrom and 
Sun (2007) 
Argue that accounting quality is affected directly by the 
legal and political system through enforcement and 
litigation against managers and auditors. Enforcement 
is especially important if it comes to applying princi-
ples-based IFRS. 
institutional setting cross-country setting 
literature review 
--- 
--- enforcement 
strength 
external institu-
tion 
capital market 
Srinivasan (2005) Finds significant labor market penalties for directors of 
firms being penalized by SEC enforcement actions. For 
firms that overstate earnings, the likelihood of director 
departure increases in restatement severity. Overall, 
results indicate, especially for audit committee mem-
bers, that outside directors bear reputational costs for 
financial reporting failure. 
information content
company  
characteristics 
single-country setting
archival study 
explanatory 
US 
409 restatements 
1997-2001 
restatements internal institu-
tion 
Srinivasan, 
Wahid and Yu 
(2015) 
Provide evidence that foreign firms which are cross-
listed in the US are less likely subject to a restatement 
than their US peers. The authors suggest that this dif-
ference is mainly driven by home country characteris-
tics of the respective firm, i.e. firms from rather weak 
enforcement countries are less likely to restate.  
institutional setting single-country setting
archival study 
dependent 
US 
874 restatements 
2000-2010 
restatements external institu-
tion 
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Stanley and 
DeZoort (2007) 
Results indicate that a negative relation between the 
length of auditor-client relationship and the likelihood 
of restatement. For short tenure engagements, auditor 
industry specialization and audit fees are negatively 
related to the likelihood of restatement. For long tenure 
engagement, non-audit fees increase the likelihood of 
restatement. 
company  
characteristics 
single-country setting
archival study  
dependent 
US 
191 restatements 
2000-2004 
restatements external institu-
tion 
Strohmenger 
(2014) 
Documents the underperformance of firms with errone-
ous financial statements in important financial ratios 
and the inferior level of earnings quality. Hence, the 
German enforcement system is labeled as effective. 
company  
characteristics 
single-country setting
archival study 
explanatory 
Germany 
85 error an-
nouncements 
2004-2011 
error an-
nouncements 
external institu-
tion 
Sue, Chin and 
Chan (2013) 
Show that financial reporting quality of family firms is 
conditioned on both divergence of voting and cash flow 
rights and the firm's reputation for integrity. Moreover, 
detection of accounting irregularities is associated with 
more serious accounting restatements.  
information content
company  
characteristics 
single-country 
archival 
dependent 
Taiwan 
249 restatements 
1996-2006 
restatements capital market 
Thompson and 
McCoy (2008) 
Find that restatements generally lowered rather than 
increased reported income and that the likelihood of 
changing the auditor increases with restatement severi-
ty.  
information content single-country setting
archival study 
explanatory 
US 
169 restatements 
2001-2002 
restatements external institu-
tion 
Wang and Chou 
(2011) 
Provide evidence that the likelihood of CEO/CFO 
turnover increases with restatement severity. The effect 
is stronger for restatements related to core-earnings and 
magnitude of amounts. Strong evidence exists for post-
SOC period. 
information content
company  
characteristics 
single-country setting
archival study 
explanatory 
US 
512 restatements 
2002-2005 
restatements internal institu-
tion 
Weber, Willen-
borg and Zhang 
(2008) 
Show, by studying the stock and audit market effects 
associated with an accounting scandal, that the auditor's 
clients experience negative abnormal returns. Addition-
ally, the find this effect to be stronger for firms with a 
higher demand for audit quality. Finally, the auditor 
loses clients that are peers to the erroneous firm.  
information content 
company  
characteristics 
single-country setting
archival study 
explanatory 
Germany 
1 error an-
nouncement 
2002 
error an-
nouncements 
external institu-
tion 
capital market 
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Wiedman and 
Hendricks (2013) 
Find that accrual quality improves significantly follow-
ing the restatement and that this improvement is ob-
served for both earnings and non-earnings error re-
statements. The extent of real earnings' management 
also decreases. Overall, the effect is stronger for firms 
with CEO turnover. 
information content 
company  
characteristics 
single-country setting
archival 
explanatory 
US 
308 restatements 
1997-2003 
restatements external institu-
tion 
Wilson (2008) Provides evidence about the decline in Earnings Re-
sponse Coefficient after restatements and shows that 
duration is higher for revenue recognition errors and 
those that lead to a large stock price decline. Further 
results indicate that there is no loss in information 
content of earnings for firms that change their corporate 
governance structure after the restatement. 
information content
company  
characteristics 
single-country setting
archival study 
explanatory 
US 
215 restatements 
1997-2002 
restatements internal institu-
tion 
external institu-
tion 
capital market 
Wu (2002)° Finds a strongly negative short-term market reaction to 
restatement announcements and shows that both quanti-
tative information and qualitative characteristics of 
restatements carry significant explanatory power. In 
addition, she shows a significant downward pattern in 
the six-month period leading up to the restatement and 
a negative post-announcement drift up to four months.  
information content single-country setting
archival study 
explanatory 
US 
1,211 restate-
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Zaidi and Huerta 
(2014) 
IFRS can positively affect the economic growth of a 
country; this however is dependent on a proper en-
forcement. 
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102 countries 
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Abstract 
This paper provides additional insights how shareholders perceive error announcements 
in the German enforcement system whose task is to ensure a preventive and sanctioning 
function via adverse publicity. Although US research provides large and unambiguous 
evidence of sanctions which are based on capital market reactions, but also personal 
consequences of responsible managers and auditors, the few studies which investigated 
the German enforcement system do not yield comparable results, thereby questioning its 
efficacy. Tackling this research gap, our results do not suggest increased audit firm 
changes for companies subject to error announcements, while the employed audit teams 
exhibit an increased fluctuation. In addition, we investigate the impact of auditor chang-
es on accounting quality. We find some evidence that firms with auditor changes exhibit 
an increase in accounting quality, which however already takes place in the gap year 
between error announcement and auditor change. Consequently, we interpret auditor 
changes serving as a ‘label’ of improved corporate governance, rather than indeed im-
proving corporate governance. 
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1 Introduction 
This paper provides additional insights in shareholder perceptions of error announce-
ments in the German enforcement setting by investigating potential impacts on abnor-
mal auditor1 turnover. The German enforcement system consists of the private Financial 
Reporting Enforcement Panel (FREP) and the securities authority Bundesanstalt für 
Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht (BaFin). This two-tier mechanism has started its review-
ing activities on July 1, 2005, and is supposed to ensure a preventive and sanctioning 
function via adverse publicity in case of error findings. 
Research provides numerous studies on the beneficial effect of enforcement institutions, 
both with regard to its preventive and sanctioning function. In respect of the preventive 
function, several cross-country studies highlight the positive effect of enforcement, both 
stand-alone and in connection with IFRS adoption (Daske et al., 2008; Ernstberger et 
al., 2012b; Samarasekera et al., 2012; Christensen et al., 2013). 
Turning to the sanctioning function, to date the vast majority of studies investigate the 
US enforcement setting: They provide mostly unambiguous evidence that restatements 
negatively affect investor reactions and analysts’ forecasts (Feroz et al., 1991; Dechow 
et al., 1996) and financial statement credibility (Wilson, 2008), to name but a few, but 
also lead to higher turnover of responsible managers (Arthaud-Day et al., 2006; Desai et 
al., 2006; Collins et al., 2009), members in the board of directors (Johnstone et al., 
                                                          
1  For the sake of linguistic simplicity, in the following the term ‘auditor’ comprises both the audit firm 
and the personally responsible auditors (i.e. the audit team) who conduct the audit. Only if we need to 
explicitly distinguish between the audit firm and the audit team, we use the more concrete terms ‘audit 
firm’ and ‘audit team’. 
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2011), audit committee members (Carver, 2014), and audit firms (Kryzanowski and 
Zhang, 2013; Mande and Son, 2013).  
Notwithstanding this rich universe of studies, we take notice that there is only little evi-
dence on the German enforcement system to date. First studies cast doubt on pro-
nounced capital-market effects due to error announcements (Hitz et al., 2012; Ebner et 
al., 2015a), furthermore research observes increased audit firm turnover already before 
the publication of detected accounting errors (Brocard et al., 2015), thereby putting the 
interaction between enforcement and shareholder monitoring into perspective. Similar 
limited evidence holds for the expected deterrence mechanism of error announcements 
on future earnings management activities (Böcking et al., 2015), which can be observed 
in the US setting though. Consequently and based on the notion that the US results 
might not be transferable, we feel encouraged to shed further light on the genuine Ger-
man setting. 
Motivated by the contradicting findings on the role of adverse publicity on auditor turn-
over in the US and Germany, we extend the analysis of Brocard et al. (2015) by distin-
guishing between changes of the audit firm – which can be considered well-investigated 
by now –, and changes of the responsible audit team which conducts the audit. We ar-
gue that changing the responsible audit team while keeping the audit firm might be a 
suitable compromise between signaling improved corporate governance and maintain-
ing relations to the audit firm, which might also be characterized by non-audit services. 
In addition, we aim to bridge the gap between the expected sanctioning and preventive 
function of enforcement by analyzing whether changes of the audit firm or the audit 
team yield enhanced accounting quality or shall solely aim to achieve a ‘labeling effect’. 
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We examine a sample of 99 German firms that are subject to error announcements in 
the period 2006-2012 and compare their auditor turnover with those of non-error control 
companies that are most similar in size and industry. Contrary to prior US research and 
in line with the study of Brocard et al. (2015), we cannot provide evidence that error 
announcements are associated with higher audit firm turnover, with our findings rather 
hinting at the opposite; in contrast, the results suggest increased likelihood of audit team 
changes for firms subject to error announcements. 
Based on two small subsamples of the error sample, our results indicate that firms with 
audit firm changes exhibit increased accounting quality in the year after the error an-
nouncement, while the audit firm change itself does not yield a comparable effect. Con-
sequently, we argue that changes of the audit firm rather serve as a pure label of re-
stored corporate governance to stakeholders, instead of actually improving corporate 
governance via an increase in accounting quality. 
The structure of our paper is as follows: Section 2 illuminates the institutional back-
ground of the German enforcement system and Section 3 presents prior researchers’ 
findings and our hypotheses development. Thereafter, Section 4 describes our employed 
methodology, followed by the study’s results. After presenting the findings of various 
robustness tests in Section 6, we conclude in Section 7. 
2 Institutional Background: The German Enforcement System 
The German enforcement system is rooted in the so-called ‘IAS Regulation’ (Regula-
tion (EC) No. 1606/2002) which requires companies listed in a regulated market in the 
EU to prepare their consolidated financial statements in accordance with IFRS. Driven 
by the conviction that a ‘proper and rigorous enforcement regime is key to underpinning 
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investor confidence in financial markets’ (Regulation (EC) No. 1606/2002, recital 16), 
the ‘IAS Regulation’ furthermore requires EU member states to ensure the consistent 
and faithful application of IFRS by appropriate enforcement mechanisms. While en-
forcement of accounting standards thus remains an issue performed at a national level, 
several activities coordinated by the Committee of European Securities Regulators 
(CESR, since 2011 replaced by the European Securities and Markets Authority (ES-
MA)) strive to provide guidance on a common approach to enforcement.2 
Before 2004, enforcement of accounting standards in Germany was only carried out by 
independent auditors and internal corporate governance mechanisms. In order to keep 
pace with the above-mentioned developments and additionally driven by several ac-
counting scandals in Germany and abroad,3 the German legislator passed the 
Bilanzkontrollgesetz (BilKoG – Accounting Enforcement Act) in 2004, being part of a 
major three-stage enforcement reform.4 Its most important novelty is the set-up of a 
two-tiered enforcement mechanism which consists of a private Financial Reporting En-
forcement Panel (FREP) and the financial markets authority Bundesanstalt für Fi-
nanzdienstleistungsaufsicht (BaFin). Due to the fact that the unique structure of the 
German enforcement system has already been extensively outlined in several previous 
scientific articles (see e.g. Ernstberger et al., 2012b; Hitz et al., 2012; Strohmenger, 
2014; Böcking et al., 2015; Ebner et al., 2015a), we focus our depiction on its most es-
                                                          
2  CESR Standards No. 1 and 2 on Financial Information may serve as examples of such harmonizing 
activities, despite the fact that they remain only non-binding ‘soft-law’ (see e.g. Berger, 2010, p. 19). 
They have been superseded by ESMA’s final guidelines on enforcement (see ESMA, 2014). 
3  While the cases of Enron and Worldcom certainly attracted the greatest amount of attention, there were 
also several accounting scandals in Germany which displayed the incapability of the established mech-
anisms to ensure compliance with accounting standards (e.g. Flowtex, see Heck, 2006).  
4  Besides the Accounting Enforcement Act, the German legislator passed the Ab-
schlussprüferaufsichtsgesetz (APAG – Auditor Oversight Law) and the Bilanzrechtsreformgesetz 
(BilReG – Accounting Law Reform Act). For more detailed information see Ernstberger et al. (2012b), 
p. 220. 
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sential features that might be helpful in understanding the subsequent hypotheses devel-
opment. 
On the first stage, FREP conducts both proactive and reactive reviews of the most re-
cently published financial reports. Proactive investigations are based on a random- and 
risk-based selection process that accounts for some 80-85% of total investigations. This 
procedure is designed to ensure that all companies are regularly reviewed in dependence 
of their stock index listing, which is once in 4-5 years for DAX, MDAX, SDAX and 
TecDAX companies, and once in 8-10 years for the remaining companies (FREP, 
2009). Reactive investigations account for the remaining 15-20% of reviews and are 
conducted in case of specific information on accounting malfeasance or on request of 
BaFin. If a company refuses to cooperate with FREP or to accept FREP’s findings, the 
case enters the second stage and is handed over to BaFin which is equipped with the 
authoritative power to enforce the review procedure. In case that either FREP or BaFin 
detect non-compliance with IFRS, the respective company is required to publish the 
established error in the federal gazette (Bundesanzeiger). Error detection and an-
nouncement mark the end of each case-related investigation procedure. 
In contrast to other enforcement institutions that complement adverse publicity with 
additional sanctioning mechanisms (Rashkover and Winter, 2005 and 2006; Berger, 
2010), the German enforcement system solely relies on error announcements to ensure 
the politically postulated preventive and sanctioning function (German Government, 
2004). Focusing on the years 2005-2012 as the basis of this study, FREP has conducted 
848 investigations which yielded 192 detected errors. While this is equivalent to an er-
ror rate of 23%, it must be noted that the normalized error rate – which is adjusted for 
multiple counting of single errors and examinations that confirm known errors (FREP, 
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2011) – materially declined in the years 2011 and 2012. Nevertheless, the normalized 
error rate still adds up to 20% in the whole sample period. Though other European 
countries exhibit similar error rates (Berger, 2010; for converse US evidence see Hitz et 
al., 2012), this number is remarkable and hints at a possible failure of the existing en-
forcement mechanisms in the form of external auditor and supervisory board (Böcking 
et al., 2015). 
== Insert Table 1 here == 
3 Previous Research and Hypotheses Development 
3.1 Previous Research 
Error findings by enforcement institutions provide unambiguous ex-post evidence that 
financial reports have not been prepared in accordance with the applicable accounting 
standards (Palmrose and Scholz, 2004). For this reason they serve as information update 
for stakeholders – especially investors – who revise their a-priori beliefs of a company’s 
economic constitution (Healy and Palepu, 2001). Several US studies investigate the 
effect of adverse publicity and document negative stock market reactions (see e.g. Feroz 
et al., 1991; Dechow et al., 1996; Anderson and Yohn, 2002; Karpoff et al., 2008), fore-
cast revision and dispersion of financial analysts (Palmrose et al., 2004; Barniv and 
Cao, 2009), and increased cost of capital (Hribar and Jenkins, 2004; Liu et al., 2012; 
Baber et al., 2013). Moreover, credibility of financial statement information decreases 
after established accounting malfeasance (Anderson and Yohn, 2002; Wu, 2002; Wil-
son, 2008). 
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Moreover, there is clear empirical evidence that firms with weak corporate governance 
structures are more inclined to be subject of error findings (Beasley, 1996; Beasley et 
al., 2000; Peasnell et al., 2001; Farber 2005; Beasley et al., 2010; Ernstberger et al., 
2012a). Conversely, companies that respond to adverse publicity by strengthening their 
corporate governance can mitigate adverse reactions by stakeholders. Possible actions 
comprise changes to the board of directors, internal audit functions, or external audit 
firms (Farber, 2005; Almer et al., 2008; Wilson, 2008; Wiedmann and Hendricks, 2013; 
Chakravarthy et al., 2014; Chen et al., 2014). Going in line with these findings, several 
studies provide evidence that publication of detected errors leads to increased turnover 
of members of the board of directors (Johnstone et al., 2011), audit committee members 
(Srinivasan, 2005; Johnstone et al., 2011; Carver, 2014), and top management (Arthaud-
Day et al., 2006; Desai et al., 2006; Collins et al., 2009; Land, 2010; Johnstone et al., 
2011; Wang and Chou, 2011; for contradicting evidence see Beneish, 1999). 
By constituting a further pivotal part of a company’s corporate governance, the auditor 
indisputably is in charge of ensuring the preparation of financial statements in accord-
ance with applicable accounting standards. Consequently, erroneous financial account-
ing must be regarded as a result of audit failure (Larcker and Richardson, 2004; Stanley 
and DeZoort, 2007). This is all the more serious considering that investors are reliant on 
correct financial reporting in order to properly perform their investment decisions and – 
in combination with other internal and external corporate governance mechanisms – 
supervisory activities (Höltken and Ebner, 2015). These arguments support calls for an 
auditor change, however it must be kept in mind that such a shift also poses the risk of 
potential switching costs. The latter might be driven by learning-curve effects of the 
191 
auditor in charge (Johnson et al., 2002) and industry specialization (Agrawal and 
Cooper, 2016). 
Notwithstanding the advanced number of studies covering the impact of adverse public-
ity on management and director fluctuation, the effect on auditor turnover has not been 
extensively investigated yet. First evidence suggests that shareholders of restating com-
panies are less likely to vote for audit firm ratification (Hermanson et al., 2009; Liu et 
al., 2009), and that audit firms of restating companies tend to resign from their mandate 
(Huang and Scholz, 2012). Thompson and McCoy (2008) provide univariate results 
showing that restatements increase the likelihood of audit firm turnover, which gets 
backed by multivariate analyses of Kryzanowski and Zhang (2013) and Mande and Son 
(2013). In contrast, Agrawal and Cooper (2016) cannot provide unambiguous evidence 
of increased audit firm fluctuation. 
While the findings above unexceptionally apply to the SEC enforcement, to date there is 
only little empirical evidence for the German two-tier enforcement system. In light of its 
unique structure and different institutional embedding, the US results are not readily 
transferable to the German context, thereby emphasizing the necessity of conducting 
original studies (Höltken and Ebner, 2015). Similar to the US studies, the German stud-
ies allow some inference whether the postulated preventive and sanctioning function of 
enforcement (Berger, 2010) effectively comes true and can thereby be regarded as an 
evaluation of the installed enforcement mechanism.  
Hitz et al. (2012) and Ebner et al. (2015a) have made a start by providing evidence of 
stock market reactions due to error announcements, which however are much more at-
tenuated compared with the findings of the US studies named above. Turning to person-
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al consequences, to date there is only one study covering this aspect: Brocard et al. 
(2015) investigate the effect of erroneous financial statements on changes of the audit 
firm, labeling the association between the two variables as highly significant. Moreover, 
the authors also examine the impact of error announcements on changes of the audit 
firm; however, the level of significance is slightly below ten percent, thereby indicating 
that auditor changes rather take place prior to publication of detected errors. Conse-
quently, Brocard et al. (2015) do provide evidence of management instead of sharehold-
er reactions to erroneous financial statements. Notwithstanding, evidence on the change 
of the audit team in charge – instead of the audit firm – is still missing to date. 
Bridging the gap between the two depicted streams of literature – stakeholder percep-
tions of adverse publicity and changes in corporate governance –, the question remains 
whether such an interdependence is basically the result of a ‘labeling effect’, i.e. that 
firms only pretend to improve corporate governance; or whether stakeholder reactions 
truly reflect improvements in corporate governance. While Wiedmann and Hendricks 
(2013) show that US restatement companies switching to a lower-quality audit firm ex-
hibit a lower accounting quality, comparable evidence for Germany is still missing to 
date. Böcking et al. (2015) solely investigate the effect of error announcements on earn-
ings quality without controlling for changes in corporate governance structures, but find 
no statistically significant improvement. Consequently, research does not provide sup-
port for the postulated preventive function due to error announcements in the German 
setting. 
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3.2 Hypotheses Development 
As described above, prior literature hints at an association between restatements or Ac-
counting and Auditing Enforcement Releases (AAER) and audit firm turnover, however 
only for the US setting. In Germany, first evidence cannot clearly support the hypothe-
sis of increased audit firm changes due to error announcements, since corresponding 
consequences apparently take place already prior to publication of established account-
ing errors.  
Being the first part of our analysis, we focus on the interrelation between error an-
nouncements and shareholder monitoring instead of management reactions, thereby 
investigating the role of enforcement and its outcomes (i.e. error announcements) in the 
functioning of corporate governance. Going beyond the work of Brocard et al. (2015), 
we are not solely interested in changes of the audit firm, but additionally exploit a fea-
ture of German audits by investigating changes of the personally responsible auditors, 
i.e. the employed audit team.5 We argue that between the poles of no change and change 
of the audit firm, keeping the audit firm and simultaneously changing the audit team 
might constitute a further possibility of shareholder reaction. This might be of special 
interest for those auditor-client relationships that go beyond the pure audit of financial 
statements, but also entail non-audit services. Consequently, we state our first set of 
hypotheses as follows:  
H1a: Companies with an error announcement exhibit higher audit firm 
turnover than comparable companies without an error announcement. 
                                                          
5  In Germany, audit reports do not only indicate the employed audit firm, but also the names of the audi-
tor/auditors who is/are responsible for the proper execution of the audit. 
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H1b:  Companies with an error announcement exhibit higher audit team 
turnover than comparable companies without an error announcement. 
Based on the findings of H1a and H1b and pursuing prior US evidence by Wiedmann 
and Hendricks (2013), we want to find out whether those companies that change the 
audit firm or the audit team due to an error publication indeed yield improvements in 
accounting quality, which might justify the observed attenuated stakeholder reactions in 
response to error announcements. On the other hand, it appears possible that companies 
solely change the auditor in order to blame a scapegoat for the detected accounting er-
rors, but actually are not interested in improving accounting compliance; we call this a 
pure ‘labeling effect’. In this case, we would not expect accounting quality to change 
materially. 
H2a: Error firms with a change of the audit firm exhibit an increase of ac-
counting quality, compared to error firms without an auditor change. 
H2b: Error firms with a change of the audit team exhibit an increase of ac-
counting quality, compared to error firms without an auditor change. 
4 Methodology 
4.1 Auditor Turnover 
Being a pivotal variable of our analyses, we extend prior definitions of auditor changes 
by distinguishing between the audit firm and the responsible auditors who conduct the 
audit, i.e. the audit team. Given the fact that the latter are apparent in German auditor 
reports, we can easily supplement our analyses with this detailed feature. 
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We define audit firm turnover as a change of a company’s audit firm in the years [0;1] 
and [0;2] subsequent to an error announcement (CHANGEFIRM[0;1] and CHANGE-
FIRM[0;2]).6 For the sake of completeness, we also examine the years [-1;0] in order to 
account for auditor changes on behalf of the management (CHANGEFIRM[-1;0]). 
Nonetheless, the focus of our paper is shareholders’ reaction on error announcements, 
which we assume to take place after the public disclosure of the error. The coding of the 
years is congruent with calendar years, consequently an error announcement in Decem-
ber of year t and election of a new audit firm in March of year t+1 is coded as auditor 
turnover in the event window [0;1]. We focus on audit firm elections in shareholders’ 
meetings in order to identify audit firm turnover.  
In order to avoid a change of the audit firm’s name being classified as audit firm 
change, we additionally pay attention to the names of the audit team; thus, if the audit 
team remains the same, but the audit firm changes, we do not code an auditor turnover. 
Though this happened in only a few cases, we regard our approach of manually collect-
ing the dependent variable as being superior compared to prior studies from the US that 
rely on conventional database solutions. 
Equivalently to the change of the audit firm, we define the change of the audit team. By 
doing so, we create the binary variables CHANGETEAM[0;1] and CHANGE-
TEAM[0;2] in case that both personally responsible auditors change in the one or two 
years subsequent to the error announcement, respectively. In line with audit firm 
change, we complement our analyses with a change of the audit team in the year before 
the error announcement (CHANGETEAM[-1;0]). It is noteworthy that the different var-
                                                          
6  For a similar approach of investigating two years after publication of the detected error see 
Kryzanowski and Zhang (2013) and Agrawal and Cooper (2016). 
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iations of CHANGETEAM comprise both companies that keep the audit firm and those 
that do not, with the change of the audit team being the only determining factor. 
4.2 Earnings Management 
We follow prior literature and proxy accounting quality with earnings management met-
rics in form of discretionary accruals models (see e.g. Barth et al., 2008; Wiedmann and 
Hendricks, 2013). More specifically and aiming to exploit the benefits of different 
methodological approaches, we use the original Jones (1991) model, the modified Jones 
model by Dechow et al. (1995), and the performance-adjusted Jones model by Kothari 
et al. (2005) in order to identify management discretion. In line with previous studies 
(Chen et al., 2010; Böcking et al., 2015), we calculate total accruals (TA) according to 
the cashflow-based approach as follows:7 
ܶܣ௜,௧ ൌ ܰ݁ݐ	ܫ݊ܿ݋݉݁௜,௧ െ ܱ݌݁ݎܽݐ݅݊݃	ܥܽݏ݄݂݈݋ݓ௜,௧                                              ሺ1ሻ 
Based on this definition, we estimate the following coefficients in order to obtain non-
discretionary accruals:8 
Jones (1991): 
்஺೔,೟
஺೔,೟షభ ൌ ߙ଴ ൅ ߚଵ
ଵ
஺೔,೟షభ ൅ ߚଶ
∆ௌ௔௟௘௦೔,೟
஺೔,೟షభ ൅ ߚଷ
௉௉ா೔,೟
஺೔,೟షభ ൅ ߝ௜,௧                                                     	ሺ2ሻ 
 
 
                                                          
7  The relevant Datastream Worldscope items are WC01551 and WC04860, respectively. 
8  The respective Datastream Worldscope items are the following: ܣ௜,௧= Total assets [WC02999]; 
݈ܵܽ݁ݏ௜,௧= Net sales or revenues [WC01001]; ܲܲܧ௜,௧= Property, plant & equipment - net [WC02501]; 
ܴ݁ܿ݁݅ݒܾ݈ܽ݁ݏ௜,௧= Receivables (net) [WC02051]; ܴܱܣ௜,௧= (net income before extraordinary 
items/preferred dividends / total assets) [WC01551 / WC02999]. 
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Dechow et al. (1995): 
்஺೔,೟
஺೔,೟షభ ൌ ߙ଴ ൅ ߚଵ
ଵ
஺೔,೟షభ ൅ ߚଶ
∆ௌ௔௟௘௦೔,೟ି∆ோ௘௖௘௜௩௔௕௟௘௦೔,೟
஺೔,೟షభ ൅ ߚଷ
௉௉ா೔,೟
஺೔,೟షభ ൅ ߝ௜,௧                             			ሺ3ሻ 
Kothari et al. (2005): 
்஺೔,೟
஺೔,೟షభ ൌ ߙ଴ ൅ ߚଵ
ଵ
஺೔,೟షభ ൅ ߚଶ
∆ௌ௔௟௘௦೔,೟ି∆ோ௘௖௘௜௩௔௕௟௘௦೔,೟
஺೔,೟షభ ൅ ߚଷ
௉௉ா೔,೟
஺೔,೟షభ ൅ ߚସܴܱܣ௜,௧ ൅ ߝ௜,௧            ሺ4ሻ              
We estimate industry-year specific coefficients9 of the models above for a population of 
all German firms with listed equity in the regulated market, which we obtain at ESMA’s 
website.10 Following conventions, we exclude foreign and financial companies; moreo-
ver, we require a minimum of 5 observations for each industry-year combination.11 
Thereafter, we use the calculated coefficients for the error sample (adjusted by financial 
companies) only, i.e. a subsample of the population above, in order to obtain non-
discretionary accruals. The difference of total and non-discretionary accruals yields dis-
cretionary accruals as our proxy for earnings management.12 
4.3 Research Approach 
Our research approach is twofold, given the two sets of hypotheses and the correspond-
ing streams of analyses. Starting with hypotheses H1a and H1b, we investigate the im-
pact of error announcements on auditor changes. We do so by conducting univariate 
                                                          
9  Coefficients are estimated separately for each industry and year combination within the period 2005-
2014. We opt for one-digit SIC codes given the fact that the use of this industry classification yields 
the lowest number of industry-year combinations that cannot be estimated due to limited data availabil-
ity. 
10  http://mifiddatabase.esma.europa.eu/Index.aspx?sectionlinks_id=14&language=0&pageName=Mi 
FIDLiquid Search (last retrieved: 12/13/2015). 
11  While we acknowledge that there is no consensus on how many firm-year observations should be re-
quired to estimate discretionary accruals, some studies from prior literature exhibit a similar number as 
ours (Doukakis, 2014, opts for 8 observations, and Ernstberger et al., 2012b, for 5).  
12  Despite the fact that research on earnings management mostly deals with absolute discretionary accru-
als, we also employ signed discretionary accruals to grasp tendencies of over- or understating of earn-
ings. This is also in line with some selected pieces of research (see e.g. Ecker et al., 2013, and Owens 
et al., 2015). 
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tests that simply compare the mean of the error and control sample for each of the audi-
tor change variables described above (labeled as CHANGE in the following). Since uni-
variate analyses provide first evidence on statistical associations, but lack explicit incor-
poration of other determining factors, we complement them with multivariate analyses. 
We perform logistic regressions for both the error and control sample with the following 
equation:13 
ܥܪܣܰܩܧ௜,௧ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵܧܴܴܱܴ௜,௧ିଵ ൅ ߚଶܧܺܲܧܴ ௜ܶ,௧ିଵ ൅ ߚଷܮܴܶܶܰ௜,௧ିଵ
൅ ߚସܴܵܶܶܰ௜,௧ିଵ ൅ ߚହܵܧܩ௜,௧ିଵ ൅ ߚ଺ܵܫܼܧ௜,௧ିଵ ൅ ߚ଻ܮܧ ௜ܸ,௧ିଵ
൅ ߚ଼ܴܱܣ௜,௧ିଵ ൅ ߚଽܮܱܵ ௜ܵ,௧ିଵ ൅ ߚଵ଴ܩܴܱܹܶܪ௜,௧ିଵ ൅ ߝ																												ሺ5ሻ 
The variable of interest ERROR partitions the error and control sample, taking the value 
one for error firms and zero otherwise. In line with prior literature,14 we include addi-
tional variables that are designed to control for alternative drivers of auditor turnover; 
they are explained in detail in Table 2, Panel A. 
Turning to the investigation of hypotheses H2a and H2b, we conduct a univariate analy-
sis, too. Given the fact that earnings management activities might also be driven by 
macroeconomic developments – which presumably does not hold for auditor turnover15 
–, we identify the change in earnings management activities before and after the auditor 
change, compared with a control sample of firms that does not change the auditor sub-
sequent to error announcements. By doing so, we obtain the difference-in-differences 
                                                          
13  For the sake of simplicity, we only display the subindex for the case of auditor change in [0;1] in equa-
tion 5. 
14  Several studies examine a similar research question as we do (Huang and Scholz, 2012; Mande and 
Son, 2013; Hennes et al., 2014; Brocard et al., 2015). They serve as precious orientation for the cited 
supplementing literature. 
15  As a matter of fact, we do not know any auditor turnover study that employs a difference-in-
differences design, arguably since the expected value of auditor turnover is zero, i.e. normally we do 
not expect a firm to change its auditor. 
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(DiD), which is supposed to identify the effect of auditor turnover on earnings man-
agement (see also Daske et al., 2008; Ebner et al., 2015b): 
ܦ݅ܦ ൌ ሺሾܱܲܵܶ_ܥܪܣܰܩܧ்௥௘௔௧௠௘௡௧ െ ܴܲܧ_ܥܪܣܰܩܧ்௥௘௔௧௠௘௡௧ሿ
െ ሾܱܲܵܶ_ܥܪܣܰܩܧ஼௢௡௧௥௢௟
െ ܴܲܧ_ܥܪܣܰܩܧ஼௢௡௧௥௢௟ሿሻ																																																																														ሺ6ሻ	 
In order to additionally investigate the impact of the error announcement on earnings 
management, we calculate the difference in earnings management around the public 
error detection: 
ܦ݅ܦ ൌ ሺሾܱܲܵܶ_ܦܧܶܧܥ ்ܶ௥௘௔௧௠௘௡௧ െ ܴܲܧ_ܦܧܶܧܥ ்ܶ௥௘௔௧௠௘௡௧ሿ
െ ሾܱܲܵܶ_ܦܧܶܧܥ ஼ܶ௢௡௧௥௢௟
െ ܴܲܧ_ܦܧܶܧܥ ஼ܶ௢௡௧௥௢௟ሿሻ																																																																																ሺ7ሻ 
By doing so, we aim to catch a glimpse on whether the auditor change is the actual 
driver of changes in earnings management, or whether accounting quality already im-
proved after the error publication, thereby reducing the auditor change to a label of im-
proved corporate governance in the communication with stakeholders. Due to limited 
data availability for auditor changes in [0;1], we only investigate the impact of earnings 
management for auditor changes in [0;2]. Consequently, the post-change year is two 
years after the error announcement.16 
We incorporate alternative drivers of accounting quality by additionally conducting a 
regression analysis with the following equation: 
                                                          
16  Therefore, the corresponding subindex is t-2. 
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ܧܯ௜,௧ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵܥܪܣܰܩܧ௜,௧ିଶ ൅ ߚଶܱܲܵܶ_ܥܪܣܰܩܧ
൅ ߚଷܱܲܵܶ_ܥܪܣܰܩܧݔܥܪܣܰܩܧ௜,௧ିଶ ൅ ߚସܵܫܼܧ௜,௧ିଶ ൅ ߚହܩܴܱܹܶܪ௜,௧ିଶ
൅ ߚ଺ܮܧ ௜ܸ,௧ିଶ ൅ ߚ଻ܧܫܷܵܵܧ௜,௧ିଶ ൅ ߚ଼ܦܫܷܵܵܧ௜,௧ିଶ ൅ ߚଽܱܥܨ௜,௧ିଶ
൅ ߚଵ଴ܷܴܶ ௜ܰ,௧ିଶ ൅ ߝ																																																																																									ሺ8ሻ 
CHANGE denotes our variable of interest by partitioning the error sample in two sub-
samples: one subsample with an auditor change subsequent to the error announcement, 
and one subsample without corresponding auditor change. POST_CHANGE is a binary 
variable that takes the value one for periods after the auditor change. In order to obtain 
the DiD in the multivariate analysis, we employ an interaction term 
POST_CHANGExCHANGE (for a similar approach see e.g. Ebner et al., 2015b).  
Similar to the univariate analyses and the distinction between POST_DETECT and 
POST_CHANGE, we also conduct a multivariate analysis with the respective interaction 
term POST_DETECTxCHANGE in order to obtain the DiD: 
ܧܯ௜,௧ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵܥܪܣܰܩܧ௜,௧ିଶ ൅ ߚଶܱܲܵܶ_ܦܧܶܧܥܶ ൅ ߚଷܱܲܵܶ_ܦܧܶܧܥܶݔܥܪܣܰܩܧ௜,௧ିଶ
൅ ߚସܵܫܼܧ௜,௧ିଶ ൅ ൅ߚହܩܴܱܹܶܪ௜,௧ିଶ ൅ ߚ଺ܮܧ ௜ܸ,௧ିଶ ൅ ߚ଻ܧܫܷܵܵܧ௜,௧ିଶ
൅ ߚ଼ܦܫܷܵܵܧ௜,௧ିଶ ൅ ߚଽܱܥܨ௜,௧ିଶ ൅ ߚଵ଴ܷܴܶ ௜ܰ,௧ିଶ ൅ ߝ																																										ሺ9ሻ 
The control variables are obtained from previous research on earnings management (cf. 
Barth et al., 2008; Ernstberger et al., 2012b; Wiedmann and Hendricks, 2013; Böcking 
et al., 2015); we explain them in detail in Table 2, Panel B. 
== Insert Table 2 here == 
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4.4 Sample Selection 
The study is based on a sample of German firms that have been subject to error an-
nouncements by FREP or BaFin within the years 2006-2012.17 A search in the federal 
gazette (Bundesanzeiger), which is the compulsory publication medium of error an-
nouncements, yields 186 results.18 After merging 6 error announcements that have been 
separately published at the same day for the single and consolidated accounts of 3 com-
panies, 183 findings remain. A double check with Handelsblatt and Börsenzeitung, two 
prestigious German business newspapers and stock exchange gazettes, confirms these 
results. Based on this starting point, we conduct the following adjustments: we exclude 
16 error announcements from firms which are headquartered abroad and 13 error an-
nouncements that are solely clarifications of prior error announcements. In order to en-
sure comparable corporate governance settings, we delete 7 firms without listed equity. 
Due to constrained data availability in Datastream, we exclude additional 27 compa-
nies. Furthermore, 16 error announcements are deleted since the corresponding firms do 
not provide information about their auditor in the two years surrounding the error an-
nouncements. Ultimately and to avoid double counting, we merge 2 error announce-
ments that have been published by the same company within a single year. Given this 
selection process, we remain with a final sample of 103 error announcements. 
In order to examine auditor turnover and its determinants, we compare the sample of 
error firms with a control sample. Following prior literature both in the field of auditor 
                                                          
17  Although FREP started its enforcement activities already on 1 July 2005, the first error was announced 
on 3 February 2006. Error announcements of the years 2013 and 2014 are not considered due to the 
fact that we require two years following-up an error announcement in order to identify auditor changes. 
18  Apart from the different sample period, the following approach is similar to the one applied in Ebner et 
al. (2015a). 
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turnover (Kryzanowski and Zhang, 2013; Agrawal and Cooper, 2016) and with regard 
to the German enforcement system (Ernstberger et al., 2012a; Strohmenger, 2013 and 
2014; Puritscher, 2015), we assign one comparable company to each error firm. The 
control sample is drawn from the population of firms with listed equity on a regulated 
German stock market, which is available at ESMA’s website.19 Apart from a small 
number of companies with listed debt only, this is the universe of companies which are 
subject to enforcement by FREP and BaFin.  
For the sake of comparability, the control firms must meet the following requirements: 
They must (1) not exhibit an error announcement during the investigation period, (2) 
apply the same accounting standards, (3) have the same industry classification accord-
ing to the ICB code, (4) be headquartered in Germany and (5) most similar in size, 
measured by total assets, with the error firm. We exclude 4 companies from the control 
sample since they do not provide sufficient auditor-related information. Since the 
matching procedure requires congruence of error and control sample, the subsequent 
analyses are based on a sample of 99 error and control firms, respectively. 
The ensuing analysis of earnings management activities is based on the error sample 
only, reduced by 28 companies of the financial sector. Since some observations lack 
data which is required for the calculation of discretionary accruals, this leaves us with 
45 companies (180 firm-year observations) in the final analysis.20  
                                                          
19  http://mifiddatabase.esma.europa.eu/Index.aspx?sectionlinks_id=14&language=0&pageName=MiFID 
Liquid Search (last retrieved: 12/13/2015). 
20  While we acknowledge that this sample size demarks the lower bound of what is reasonable when 
conducting statistical analyses, other studies on enforcement exhibit similar constraints (see Hitz et al., 
2012, Fn. 8). Nonetheless, we emphasize that our earnings management results can only serve as in-
dicative evidence. 
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5 Results 
5.1 Data, Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
We collect the data on auditor turnover from companies’ annual reports; all other data is 
obtained from Datastream. Table 3, Panels A and B, reports descriptive statistics for the 
control variables, partitioned in error and control firms. While the values of SIZE are 
pretty close for both subsamples, thereby hinting at a functioning matching process for 
the control sample, error firms exhibit lower proportions for the variable EXPERT, but 
higher values of LEV and LOSS. Smaller values of ROA and GROWTH additionally hint 
at the fact that error firms perform worse in economic terms than their non-error coun-
terparts, thereby confirming the findings of prior studies on the German enforcement 
system that apply a similar matching approach (see Strohmenger, 2014). Table 3, Panel 
C, shows the descriptive statistics of the error sample only, however for an investigation 
period of four years (one year prior to two years after the error announcement). The 
variables which are also comprised in Panel A exhibit similar values, suggesting that the 
small subsample of our additional analysis is representative for the error sample and not 
heavily distorted by a potential selection or survivorship bias.   
== Insert Table 3 here == 
Table 4, Panel A, depicts the Pearson and Spearman correlation matrix for both error 
and control firms. Apart from the variable combinations LTTNR/STTNR and SIZE/SEG, 
all correlation measures for the error sample do not clearly exceed the threshold of 0.40. 
The negative correlations of LEV/ROA and LOSS/ROA are the notable exception of oth-
erwise inconspicuous values (i.e. above -0.40). Table 4, Panel B, shows the correlations 
of variables used in the multivariate earnings management analysis. Except for the 
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combinations DISSUE/GROWTH and LEV/OCF, all values are below the 0.40/above 
the -0.40 threshold. The positive correlation of FIRMCHANGE[0;2] and TEAM-
CHANGE[0;2] is not relevant since we do not include both variables in the same re-
gression equations. In view of this, we do not regard multicollinearity as a matter for 
our dataset. 
== Insert Table 4 here == 
5.2 Univariate Results 
Univariate results on auditor turnover are shown in Table 5, which is partitioned in two 
panels according to the change of the audit firm or the audit team. Panel A, which co-
vers the change of the audit firm, shows that – contrary to prior beliefs – the error sam-
ple exhibits less audit firm turnover, compared with the control sample which lacks 
publically detected erroneous financial reporting. Turning the view to the fluctuation of 
the audit team (Table 5, Panel B) depicts a slightly different picture, with CHANGE-
TEAM[-1;0] indicating increased audit team turnover prior to error announcements 
(one-tailed p-value of 0.11). While the error sample still exhibits increased audit team 
turnover for the subsequent period, it lacks statistical significance. 
== Insert Table 5 here == 
We present the univariate results of changes in accounting quality in Table 6, paying 
special attention to the DiD of the error detection and the auditor change. With regard to 
a change of the audit firm (CHANGEFIRM[0;2]), we find strong evidence of decreased 
earnings management after the error announcement for non-signed discretionary accru-
als calculated according to the model of Kothari et al. (2005). In contrast, the analysis of 
signed discretionary accruals indicates increased downward earnings management (one-
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tailed p-value of 0.04 for the model of Dechow et al., 1995). Rebutting our presumption, 
the change of the audit firm does not yield a measurable impact on earnings manage-
ment in the subsequent year. 
Turning to the change of the audit team (CHANGETEAM[0;2]), we notice slight evi-
dence of decreased earnings management (absolute discretionary accruals) after a 
change of the audit team, with all other measures being clearly insignificant. Summing 
up, we find some evidence of increased accounting quality after the error announce-
ment, but non-consistent results for the effect of an auditor change. Consequently, the 
results hint at a ‘labeling effect’, which means that those firms with an auditor change 
improve their accounting quality already before this pivotal step. 
== Insert Table 6 here == 
5.3 Multivariate Results 
Table 7 presents results of multivariate logistic regressions of auditor change on varia-
bles of interest and control variables. The first set of analyses investigates the impact of 
error announcements (ERROR) on audit firm turnover (CHANGEFIRM[0;1] and 
CHANGEFIRM[0;2]) and examines both error and control firms. In contrast to H1a, the 
coefficient of ERROR clearly lacks statistical significance; the same holds for the role of 
error announcements on audit team turnover (CHANGETEAM[0;1] and CHANGE-
TEAM[0;2]), thereby lacking support of H1b. Only the coefficient of SIZE is signifi-
cantly negative, indicating that error announcements play a minor role in the auditor 
election of larger firms. However, we caution to blindly interpret these findings, since 
the estimated models are not statistically significant (Prob > Chi² above 0.10). Conse-
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quently, we refer to the robustness test section which comprises statistically significant 
models in most specifications for the alternative control samples. 
== Insert Table 7 here == 
Table 8 comprises the regression results for earnings management activities and their 
drivers for the subsample of 45 error firms. Being interested in the DiD, we focus on the 
interaction terms which are supposed to capture the effect of error announcements and 
auditor changes apart from sole changes of earnings management over time. Contrary to 
our hypotheses H2a and H2b, the results do not indicate significant associations of both 
interaction terms with the earnings management metrics employed. Thus, we cannot 
find evidence of error announcements or auditor changes having an impact on earnings 
management metrics, being our proxy for accounting quality. 
== Insert Table 8 here == 
6 Robustness Tests 
Our robustness test section is twofold, given the structure of this paper. With regard to 
the analysis of increased auditor turnover due to error announcements, we notice that 
the results of our study crucially depend on the comparability of error and control firms. 
Consequently, we additionally employ different matching procedures and rerun the 
analyses outlined above with alternative control samples in order to validate our results 
(see Table 9). While the initial control sample is matched according to ICB industry 
classification and total assets as firm size proxy, we also conduct matching procedures 
with market capitalization (Control sample 2) or Fama-French 12-industry classification 
(Control sample 3) instead. Furthermore, we construct control sample 4 by matching 
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firms according to their Fama-French 12-industry classification and market capitaliza-
tion. With regard to the univariate results, we find counterintuitive increased audit firm 
turnover for the control samples, sometimes even being clearly statistically significant 
(CHANGEFIRM[-1;0] for control sample 3 and CHANGEFIRM[0;2] for control sam-
ple 4). In contrast, the error firms exhibit consistently higher audit team turnover, which 
mostly is quite close to conventional levels of statistical significance. 
== Insert Table 9 here == 
Turning to the multivariate analyses based on the alternative control samples, we find 
evidence of decreased audit firm turnover (Control sample 4) and increased audit team 
turnover (Control sample 2), thereby confirming the univariate findings. In summary, 
our robustness tests tend to reject the null hypothesis of H1b, while we find rather coun-
terintuitive results for H1a in terms of decreased audit firm turnover. 
== Insert Table 10 here == 
Given the difficulty to capture the construct ‘accounting quality’, proxied via earnings 
management, we provide additional analyses for alternative earnings management diag-
nostics. Specifically, we use the metrics of Dechow and Dichev (2002) and McNichols 
(2002), which are conceptually similar to the discretionary accruals models used before, 
while paying more emphasis on working-capital accruals and their explanation by cash 
flows from past, current and future periods (see Gros and Worret, 2014, for a detailed 
explanation). The results display significantly decreasing discretionary accruals in the 
year after the error announcement for those firms that subsequently change their auditor; 
however, the year after the audit firm change is characterized by significantly increasing 
discretionary accruals. 
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== Insert Table 11 here == 
Our multivariate robustness tests can basically confirm these findings: The interaction 
term POST_DETECTxFIRMCHANGE[0;2] yields a significantly negative coefficient, 
while the coefficient of the interaction term POST_CHANGExFIRMCHANGE[0;2] is 
significantly positive. The respective coefficients of TEAMCHANGE[0;2] are insignifi-
cant. Consequently, our findings suggest a pure ‘labeling effect’ with even decreasing 
accounting quality after the auditor change. 
== Insert Table 12 here == 
7 Conclusion 
In this study we investigate the association between error announcements in the German 
enforcement setting and subsequent turnover of the employed audit firm or audit team; 
furthermore, we enhance this picture by shedding light on the effect of the named 
changes on accounting quality. Consequently, we regard our study as further indicative 
evidence on the unique German enforcement system and particularly its proclaimed 
preventive and sanctioning function. In line with previous findings of Brocard et al. 
(2015), we cannot provide evidence of increased audit firm turnover due to error an-
nouncements; however, the results hint at a higher likelihood of audit team changes, 
arguably serving as a substitute for the complete breaking-off of auditor-client relations. 
Additionally, we find less earnings management following error announcements for 
those companies that subsequently change their audit firm, while the latter does not 
yield improved accounting quality. Thus, we consider audit firm changes to fulfil a ‘la-
beling effect’, supposed to serving as a signal of restored accounting quality to stake-
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holders. In contrast, changes of the audit team seem to result in less earnings manage-
ment and thus higher accounting quality. 
Our study contributes to existing literature by extending scarce evidence of personal 
consequences due to financial misreporting in the German setting. Moreover, we aim to 
shed light on the interaction of the sanctioning and the preventive function of enforce-
ment by additionally examining the impact on accounting quality. Nonetheless, our 
study is subject to various limitations: First, the auditor turnover results hinge upon the 
comparability of the chosen control samples. Though we arranged the latter according 
to well-established and objective criteria from prior research, we acknowledge that this 
rigid procedure might not always provide the best fit in terms of companies’ compara-
bility. Second, the analyses of changes in accounting quality depend on the validity and 
reliability of the earnings management metrics used. While we follow prior research by 
employing a set of discretionary accruals measures, we cannot completely rule out 
methodological concerns. Third, we admit that the sample size of the earnings manage-
ment analyses represents the lower bound of what is acceptable for an empirical study in 
order to obtain reasonable statistical results. This shortcoming is driven by the exclusion 
of financial companies and restricted data availability for some observations. Since the 
alternative of handling this restricted data set is to refrain from corresponding analyses, 
we rather felt encouraged to provide a first indication on this topic, motivating future 
research to pursue our analyses on the basis of larger investigation periods and sample 
sizes. 
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Panel A: Auditor turnover
Natural logarithm of total assets in the year of the error
announcement.
Number of business segments the firm reports for.
Negative income
Firm growth GROWTH
LOSS
Business segments SEG
handcollected
handcollected
Datastream
Datastream
Datastream
Datastream
Datastream
Percentage change in sales in the year of the error
announcement.
Binary variable that is coded as one if the company reports
negative net income in the year of the error announcement.
Firm size
Financial leverage
Return on assets ROA
LEV
SIZE
Ratio of net income over lagged total assets in the year of
the error announcement.
Ratio of total liabililies over total assets in the year of the
error announcement.
Datastream
Long-term auditor 
tenure
Short-term auditor 
tenure
Auditor's industry 
expertise
Datastream
Binary variable that is coded as one if there is a change of a
company's audit firm (CHANGEFIRM) or personally
responsible auditors (CHANGETEAM) within the calendar
years [0;1], [0;2] and [-1;0] with regard to the error
announcement, according to the auditor election in
shareholders' meeting.
LTTNR
STTNR
EXPERT
Binary variable that is coded as one if the audit firm or audit
team has been employed for five or more years at the date of
the error announcement.
Binary variable that is coded as one if the audit firm or audit
team has been employed for less than three years at the date
of the error announcement.
Binary variable that is coded as one if the audit firm is
accountable for most of the audits in the relevant industry,
according to the ICB industry classification. The calculation
is based on the sample of companies with listed equity in the
regulated market in Germany.
Control variables
Error announcement
Table 2. Variable definitions and data sources
ERROR Binary variable that is coded as one if the company is
subject to an error announcement.
handcollected
Variable of interest
Dependent variable
CHANGE handcollected
Variable Abbreviation Definition Data Source
Change of audit firm or 
audit team
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Panel B: Earnings management
Earnings management
Interaction term II
Firm size
Firm growth
Financial leverage
Equity issue
Debt issue
Operating cash flow
Asset turnover Datastream
Datastream
DISSUE Percentage change in total liabilities in the year of the error
announcement.
Datastream
OCF Operating cashflow scaled by total assets in the year of the
error announcement.
Datastream
POST_CHANGE Binary variable that is coded as one for the year of the
change of the audit firm or the audit team (i.e., affects
financial statements for the year after the change of the audit
firm or the audit team), and zero otherwise.
POST_CHANGExCHANGE Interaction term that captures the difference-in-differences,
i.e. the effect of error announcements for those firms that will
subsequently change their audit firm or audit team.
handcollected
handcollected
Percentage change in common stock in the year of the error
announcement.
TURN Sales over total assets in the year of the error
announcement.
Datastream
GROWTH
Dependent variable
EM Earnings management measure, comprising non-signed and
signed values of the following discretionary accrual models:
Jones (1991), Dechow et al. (1995), and Kothari et al. (2005).
Datastream
Variables of interest
Change of audit firm or 
audit team
CHANGE Binary variable that is coded as one for those companies that 
change their audit firm or audit team. Partitions the error
sample in two subsamples.
handcollected
Time indicator of error 
announcement
POST_DETECT Binary variable that is coded as one for the year of the error
announcement (i.e., affects financial statements for the year
after the error announcement), and zero otherwise.
Control variables
SIZE Natural logarithm of total assets in the year of the error
announcement.
EISSUE
Percentage change in sales in the year of the error
announcement.
Datastream
LEV Total liabilities over total assets in the year of the error
announcement.
Datastream
Table 2. Variable definitions and data sources
Variable Abbreviation Definition Data Source
Time indicator of 
change of audit firm or 
audit team
handcollected
Interaction term I POST_DETECTxCHANGE Interaction term that captures the difference-in-differences,
i.e. the effect of error announcements for those firms that will
subsequently change their audit firm or audit team.
handcollected
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Panel A: Error Sample
Mean Std. Deviation Lower quartile Median Upper quartile N
EXPERT 0.19 0.40 99
LTTNR 0.51 0.50 69
STTNR 0.79 0.41 92
SEG 2.71 1.58 1 2 4 94
SIZE [Mio.] 6,961.03 34,103.97 51.93 196.48 1,035.73 99
LEV 0.68 0.65 0.47 0.63 0.74 99
ROA -0.03 0.21 -0.04 0.02 0.06 99
LOSS 0.37 0.49 99
GROWTH 0.10 0.63 -0.06 0.05 0.14 97
Panel B: Control Sample
Mean Std. Deviation Lower quartile Median Upper quartile N
EXPERT 0.25 0.44 99
LTTNR 0.62 0.49 76
STTNR 0.79 0.41 92
SEG 2.61 1.56 1 2 4 99
SIZE [Mio.] 4,755.61 23,548.39 49.41 205.87 945.42 99
LEV 0.56 0.29 0.36 0.53 0.70 99
ROA 0.00 0.32 0.00 0.03 0.07 99
LOSS 0.24 0.43 99
GROWTH 0.61 3.98 -0.10 0.04 0.17 97
Panel C: Error sample for earnings management analyses
Mean Std. Deviation Lower quartile Median Upper quartile N
SIZE [Mio.] 5,323.20 26,614.10 52.70 222.52 1,140.97 180
GROWTH 0.13 0.46 -0.06 0.05 0.17 180
LEV 0.65 0.43 0.51 0.61 0.76 180
EISSUE 0.16 1.06 0.00 0.00 0.00 180
DISSUE 0.11 0.63 -0.08 0.02 0.14 180
OCF 0.03 0.12 0.00 0.06 0.09 180
TURN 1.38 0.98 0.71 1.14 1.76 180
Table 3. Descriptive statistics
Notes: Panels A and B depict the descriptive statistics for the control variables of the multivariate analyses of auditor
change, separately for the error and control sample in the year of the error announcement. Panel C shows the descriptive
statistics for the control variables of the multivariate analyses of earnings management activities, covering 4 years per
error company (1 year prior to two years after the error announcement). Since data availability is required for all variables,
Panel C exhibits comparatively few firm-year observations due to restricted data coverage.
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CHANGEFIRM[0;1] CHANGEFIRM[0;2] CHANGETEAM[0;1] CHANGETEAM[0;2]
Intercept -0.97 1.55 0.35 0.83
(-0.77) (1.33) (0.27) (0.76)
ERROR 0.23 -0.15 0.63 0.05
(0.37) (-0.29) (1.08) (0.12)
EXPERT 0.16 0.29 0.41 0.31
(0.20) (0.48) (0.68) (0.66)
LTTNR -0.83 -0.48 -0.07 0.23
(-1.10) (-0.76) (-0.10) (0.39)
STTNR 0.95 0.58 0.77 0.57
(1.11) (0.84) (0.99) (0.89)
SEG 0.31 0.23 0.17 0.18
(1.54) (1.61) (1.10) (1.36)
SIZE -0.19 -0.31*** -0.30** -0.21**
(-1.37) (-2.92) (-2.40) (-2.22)
LEV -0.58 -0.24 0.03 -0.27
(-0.93) (-0.48) (0.06) (-0.61)
ROA -3.17 -1.40 0.36 -1.87
(-1.04) (-0.67) (0.17) (-1.09)
LOSS 0.18 0.36 0.62 0.07
(0.23) (0.54) (0.97) (0.12)
GROWTH 0.01 -0.04 -0.03 -0.13
(0.15) (-0.53) (-0.32) (-0.90)
Pseudo-R² 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.06
Chi² 7.42 13.73 7.23 9.94
Prob > Chi² 0.69 0.19 0.70 0.45
N 139 135 130 124
Table 7. Multivariate results - drivers of auditor turnover
Notes: This table shows results from logistic regressions of auditor change in one and two subsequent years
after an error announcement on the variable of interest and control variables. *, ** and *** denote two-tailed
statistical significance on the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
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Panel A: Impact of CHANGEFIRM[0;2] on earnings management
Non-signed DA Non-signed DA Non-signed DA Non-signed DA Non-signed DA Non-signed DA
(Jones 1991) (Dechow et al. 1995) (Kothari et al. 2005) (Jones 1991) (Dechow et al. 1995) (Kothari et al. 2005)
Intercept 0.02 0.07 -0.00 0.28** 0.27** 0.17**
(0.17) (0.80) (-0.05) (2.62) (2.54) (2.42)
CHANGEFIRM[0;2] 0.01 -0.00 0.02 -0.04* -0.04 -0.02
(0.14) (-0.08) (0.67) (-1.74) (-1.50) (-0.72)
POST_DETECT -0.01 -0.02 -0.01
(-0.40) (-1.13) (-0.70)
-0.02 -0.01 -0.03
(-0.42) (-0.15) (-0.71)
POST_CHANGE 0.01 0.02 0.00
(0.81) (1.13) (0.19)
0.03 0.03 -0.00
(1.08) (0.86) (-0.18)
SIZE -0.01** -0.01** -0.00 -0.01* -0.01* -0.01**
(-2.05) (-2.42) (-1.43) (-1.95) (-1.93) (-2.58)
GROWTH -0.00 -0.01 0.01 0.06** 0.01 0.02
(-0.04) (-0.37) (0.31) (2.28) (0.30) (0.83)
LEV 0.06 0.04 0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01
(1.64) (1.31) (0.89) (-1.11) (-1.36) (-0.63)
EISSUE 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02*** 0.02***
(0.57) (0.73) (1.19) (1.27) (5.84) (4.13)
DISSUE 0.03* 0.03* 0.01 0.00 -0.02 0.00
(1.79) (1.77) (1.10) (0.01) (-0.45) (0.14)
OCF -0.11 -0.08 -0.07 -0.20 -0.19 -0.10
(-1.03) (-0.81) (-1.02) (-1.60) (-1.53) (-0.99)
TURN -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
(-0.02) (-0.06) (-0.05) (-0.81) (-0.58) (-1.47)
Industry fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
R² 0.29 0.26 0.26 0.23 0.28 0.27
Adj. R² 0.14 0.11 0.12 0.08 0.14 0.13
F-statistic 1.77 1.75 1.81 3.55 8.61 14.29
Prob > F 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00
N 90 90 90 90 90 90
Table 8. Multivariate results - drivers of earnings management
POST_DETECTx
CHANGEFIRM[0;2]
POST_CHANGEx
CHANGEFIRM[0;2]
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Panel B: Impact of CHANGETEAM[0;2] on earnings management
Non-signed DA Non-signed DA Non-signed DA Non-signed DA Non-signed DA Non-signed DA
(Jones 1991) (Dechow et al. 1995) (Kothari et al. 2005) (Jones 1991) (Dechow et al. 1995) (Kothari et al. 2005)
Intercept 0.00 0.05 0.02 0.27** 0.25** 0.15**
(0.03) (0.84) (0.39) (2.54) (2.39) (2.42)
CHANGETEAM[0;2] 0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 0.00
(0.45) (0.07) (-0.49) (-1.07) (-0.73) (0.17)
POST_DETECT -0.00 -0.02 -0.02
(-0.10) (-1.00) (-1.52)
-0.02 -0.00 0.02
(-0.64) (-0.14) (0.70)
POST_CHANGE 0.03 0.03 0.01
(1.40) (1.66) (0.87)
-0.02 -0.02 -0.03
(-0.78) (-0.85) (-1.43)
SIZE -0.01** -0.01*** -0.00 -0.01** -0.01* -0.01**
(-2.30) (-2.67) (-1.63) (-2.01) (-1.94) (-2.62)
GROWTH -0.00 -0.01 0.01 0.05** 0.01 0.02
(-0.06) (-0.36) (0.37) (2.26) (0.21) (0.87)
LEV 0.05 0.04 0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.00
(1.57) (1.28) (0.75) (-0.71) (-0.99) (-0.27)
EISSUE 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02*** 0.02***
(0.54) (0.71) (1.56) (1.19) (5.76) (4.14)
DISSUE 0.03* 0.03* 0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.01
(1.83) (1.79) (1.16) (0.15) (-0.29) (0.21)
OCF -0.10 -0.08 -0.08 -0.18* -0.17 -0.08
(-1.07) (-0.79) (-1.02) (-1.70) (-1.54) (-0.85)
TURN 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
(0.02) (-0.07) (-0.21) (-1.00) (-0.74) (-1.55)
Industry fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
R² 0.29 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.29 0.29
Adj. R² 0.15 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.15 0.14
F-statistic 1.71 1.71 2.02 3.21 7.02 8.17
Prob > F 0.07 0.07 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00
N 90 90 90 90 90 90
Notes: This table shows OLS regression results of earnings management measures on the variables of interest and control variables. All
earnings management metrics are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile. The regressions are estimated using White
heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors. *, ** and *** denote two-tailed statistical significance on the 10%, 5% and 1% level,
respectively.
Table 8. Multivariate results - drivers of earnings management
POST_DETECTx
CHANGETEAM[0;2]
POST_CHANGEx
CHANGETEAM[0;2]
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Panel A: Change of audit firm - Control sample 2
N Mean Std. Err. N Mean Std. Err. N Mean Std. Err.
Error Sample 94 0.074 0.264 94 0.128 0.335 91 0.209 0.409
Control Sample 94 0.085 0.281 94 0.106 0.310 90 0.244 0.432
Difference -0.011 0.021 -0.036
p-value (2-tailed) 0.789 0.652 0.569
p-value (1-tailed) 0.605 0.326 0.715
Panel B: Change of audit team - Control sample 2
N Mean Std. Err. N Mean Std. Err. N Mean Std. Err.
Error Sample 92 0.196 0.399 92 0.196 0.399 90 0.344 0.478
Control Sample 93 0.118 0.325 93 0.129 0.337 86 0.267 0.445
Difference 0.077 0.067 0.077
p-value (2-tailed) 0.149 0.221 0.271
p-value (1-tailed) 0.075 0.111 0.135
Panel C: Change of audit firm - Control sample 3
N Mean Std. Err. N Mean Std. Err. N Mean Std. Err.
Error Sample 93 0.065 0.247 93 0.129 0.337 90 0.211 0.410
Control Sample 93 0.151 0.360 93 0.183 0.389 92 0.272 0.447
Difference -0.086 -0.054 -0.061
p-value (2-tailed) 0.059 0.315 0.342
p-value (1-tailed) 0.971 0.843 0.829
Panel D: Change of audit team - Control sample 3
N Mean Std. Err. N Mean Std. Err. N Mean Std. Err.
Error Sample 91 0.187 0.392 91 0.209 0.409 89 0.360 0.483
Control Sample 92 0.130 0.339 92 0.185 0.390 91 0.319 0.469
Difference 0.056 0.024 0.041
p-value (2-tailed) 0.299 0.685 0.565
p-value (1-tailed) 0.149 0.342 0.283
Table 9. Robustness test - univariate results of auditor turnover
CHANGEFIRM[-1;0] CHANGEFIRM[0;1] CHANGEFIRM[0;2]
CHANGETEAM[-1;0] CHANGETEAM[0;1] CHANGETEAM[0;2]
CHANGEFIRM[-1;0] CHANGEFIRM[0;1] CHANGEFIRM[0;2]
CHANGETEAM[-1;0] CHANGETEAM[0;1] CHANGETEAM[0;2]
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Panel E: Change of audit firm - Control sample 4
N Mean Std. Err. N Mean Std. Err. N Mean Std. Err.
Error Sample 93 0.075 0.265 93 0.129 0.337 91 0.209 0.409
Control Sample 93 0.108 0.311 93 0.183 0.389 92 0.315 0.467
Difference -0.032 -0.054 -0.106
p-value (2-tailed) 0.448 0.315 0.103
p-value (1-tailed) 0.776 0.843 0.949
Panel F: Change of audit team - Control sample 4
N Mean Std. Err. N Mean Std. Err. N Mean Std. Err.
Error Sample 91 0.209 0.409 91 0.198 0.401 90 0.344 0.478
Control Sample 92 0.174 0.381 92 0.141 0.350 90 0.289 0.456
Difference 0.035 0.056 0.056
p-value (2-tailed) 0.551 0.311 0.426
p-value (1-tailed) 0.276 0.155 0.213
Notes: Compared with the error sample, control sample 2 exhibits the best match in terms of ICB industry classification and
market capitalization, control sample 3 exhibits the best match in terms of Fama-French 12-industry classification and total
assets, and control sample 4 exhibits the best match in terms of Fama-French 12-industry classification and market
capitalization.
Table 9. Robustness test - univariate results of auditor turnover
CHANGEFIRM[-1;0] CHANGEFIRM[0;1] CHANGEFIRM[0;2]
CHANGETEAM[-1;0] CHANGETEAM[0;1] CHANGETEAM[0;2]
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Panel A: Error sample and control sample 2
CHANGEFIRM[0;1] CHANGEFIRM[0;2] CHANGETEAM[0;1] CHANGETEAM[0;2]
Intercept 1.54 2.30* 1.11 0.01
(1.03) (1.68) (0.63) (0.01)
ERROR -0.17 -0.76 1.01* 0.44
(-0.23) (-1.46) (1.75) (0.91)
EXPERT 1.29** 0.81 1.65** 1.01**
(1.98) (1.52) (2.48) (2.03)
LTTNR -0.86 -0.79 0.32 0.32
(-0.83) (-1.08) (0.38) (0.48)
STTNR 1.50 1.85** 0.94 1.61**
(1.51) (2.24) (1.03) (2.09)
SEG 0.42** 0.17 0.30 0.20
(1.96) (1.01) (1.62) (1.19)
SIZE -0.43*** -0.40*** -0.51*** -0.28**
(-2.80) (-3.27) (-2.63) (-2.18)
LEV -0.41 -0.31 0.33 -0.31
(-0.57) (-0.58) (0.62) (-0.67)
ROA -2.68 -0.94 1.64 -1.57
(-0.94) (-0.48) (0.85) (-0.90)
LOSS -1.39 0.19 0.64 0.56
(-1.25) (0.29) (0.94) (1.00)
GROWTH 0.49 0.68 0.12 0.15
(0.58) (0.99) (0.16) (0.28)
Pseudo-R² 0.16 0.14 0.17 0.14
Chi² 13.65 19.60 12.26 15.66
Prob > Chi² 0.19 0.03 0.27 0.11
N 137 132 136 130
Table 10. Robustness test - multivariate results of auditor turnover
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Panel B: Error sample and control sample 3
CHANGEFIRM[0;1] CHANGEFIRM[0;2] CHANGETEAM[0;1] CHANGETEAM[0;2]
Intercept 0.30 1.31 -0.35 0.46
(0.18) (1.00) (-0.25) (0.45)
ERROR -0.81 -0.50 -0.34 -0.13
(-1.51) (-1.09) (-0.69) (-0.32)
EXPERT -0.97 -0.71 0.02 0.06
(-0.93) (-0.84) (0.03) (0.10)
LTTNR 0.75 0.60 0.71 0.60
(0.99) (0.89) (1.11) (1.09)
STTNR 1.35 0.35 1.91** 1.21*
(1.38) (0.47) (2.18) (1.96)
SEG 0.20 0.23 0.13 0.15
(1.07) (1.54) (0.82) (1.13)
SIZE -0.29** -0.29** -0.32** -0.25**
(-1.96) (-2.43) (-2.56) (-2.47)
LEV -0.38 -0.32 0.65 0.06
(-0.46) (-0.48) (1.02) (0.10)
ROA 1.22 0.37 3.72 0.95
(0.35) (0.12) (1.25) (0.32)
LOSS 0.58 0.60 1.13* 1.00*
(0.76) (0.90) (1.71) (1.76)
GROWTH 0.04 -0.03 0.06 0.00
(0.45) (-0.38) (0.78) (0.03)
Pseudo-R² 0.14 0.11 0.14 0.11
Chi² 14.83 16.77 21.01 17.32
Prob > Chi² 0.14 0.08 0.02 0.07
N 130 129 129 129
Table 10. Robustness test - multivariate results of auditor turnover
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Panel C: Error sample and control sample 4
CHANGEFIRM[0;1] CHANGEFIRM[0;2] CHANGETEAM[0;1] CHANGETEAM[0;2]
Intercept 1.08 0.76 0.14 -0.44
(0.52) (0.49) (0.07) (-0.34)
ERROR -1.06* -1.19** 0.52 0.14
(-1.89) (-2.45) (0.95) (0.31)
EXPERT -0.42 0.10 0.72 0.55
(-0.58) (0.17) (1.05) (1.09)
LTTNR -0.25 -0.71 0.86 0.72
(-0.30) (-1.12) (1.10) (1.19)
STTNR 1.38 1.97** 0.81 1.03
(1.37) (2.47) (0.83) (1.43)
SEG 0.13 -0.08 -0.01 -0.03
(0.54) (-0.42) (-0.03) (-0.15)
SIZE -0.19 -0.18 -0.30* -0.15
(-1.09) (-1.41) (-1.74) (-1.32)
LEV -1.63** -0.56 0.04 -0.33
(-2.30) (-0.83) (0.06) (-0.62)
ROA -7.62*** -2.03 1.00 -1.00
(-2.63) (-0.68) (0.27) (-0.43)
LOSS -1.70* 0.33 0.59 0.68
(-1.88) (0.45) (0.73) (1.10)
GROWTH 1.46 1.15 0.78 0.65
(1.47) (1.58) (1.06) (1.15)
Pseudo-R² 0.16 0.14 0.12 0.11
Chi² 17.62 17.88 12.62 13.47
Prob > Chi² 0.06 0.06 0.25 0.20
N 133 131 132 131
Notes: This table shows results from logistic regressions of auditor change in one and two subsequent years
after an error announcement on the variables of interest and control variables. *, ** and *** denote two-tailed
statistical significance on the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
Table 10. Robustness test - multivariate results of auditor turnover
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Panel A: Impact of CHANGEFIRM[0;2] on earnings management
Non-signed DA Non-signed DA Non-signed DA Non-signed DA 
(Dechow/Dichev 2002) (McNichols 2002) (Dechow/Dichev 2002) (McNichols 2002)
Intercept -0.03 -0.05 0.10 0.11
(-0.29) (-0.48) (1.06) (1.17)
CHANGEFIRM[0;2] 0.04 0.04 -0.03 -0.04**
(1.04) (1.16) (-1.23) (-2.19)
POST_DETECT -0.02 0.01
(-1.11) (0.42)
-0.05 -0.07*
(-1.51) (-1.91)
POST_CHANGE 0.00 -0.01
(0.09) (-0.91)
0.06* 0.07**
(1.72) (2.49)
SIZE -0.00 -0.00 -0.01 -0.00
(-1.35) (-0.75) (-1.08) (-0.99)
GROWTH 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.05*
(1.00) (0.70) (0.94) (1.86)
LEV 0.08** 0.08** -0.02 -0.02
(2.34) (2.11) (-0.72) (-1.02)
EISSUE 0.01* 0.01*** 0.02*** 0.01
(1.91) (3.02) (4.90) (1.01)
DISSUE 0.00 0.01 -0.03 0.04
(0.24) (0.42) (-0.76) (0.90)
OCF -0.12 -0.04 -0.22* -0.17*
(-1.38) (-0.42) (-1.96) (-1.80)
TURN 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00
(0.43) (-0.34) (-0.36) (-0.29)
Industry fixed effects YES YES YES YES
R² 0.44 0.32 0.29 0.27
Adj. R² 0.32 0.18 0.15 0.12
F-statistic 2.62 3.42 8.22 6.55
Prob > F 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
N 90 90 90 90
Table 12. Robustness test - multivariate results of earnings management
POST_DETECTx
CHANGEFIRM[0;2]
POST_CHANGEx
CHANGEFIRM[0;2]
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Panel B: Impact of CHANGETEAM[0;2] on earnings management
Non-signed DA Non-signed DA Non-signed DA Non-signed DA 
(Dechow/Dichev 2002) (McNichols 2002) (Dechow/Dichev 2002) (McNichols 2002)
Intercept -0.02 -0.06 0.09 0.10
(-0.35) (-0.78) (0.99) (1.15)
CHANGETEAM[0;2] 0.01 0.04 0.00 -0.01
(0.48) (1.18) (0.20) (-0.67)
POST_DETECT -0.02 0.01
(-1.55) (0.74)
-0.00 -0.05
(-0.15) (-1.42)
POST_CHANGE 0.02 -0.00
(0.78) (-0.10)
-0.01 0.00
(-0.34) (0.03)
SIZE -0.01 -0.00 -0.01 -0.00
(-1.40) (-0.76) (-1.13) (-1.01)
GROWTH 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.04
(0.99) (0.62) (0.63) (1.53)
LEV 0.07** 0.08* -0.01 -0.01
(2.03) (1.87) (-0.57) (-0.59)
EISSUE 0.01** 0.01*** 0.02*** 0.01
(2.27) (3.53) (4.29) (0.86)
DISSUE 0.00 0.01 -0.02 0.05
(0.37) (0.57) (-0.51) (1.08)
OCF -0.13 -0.04 -0.21* -0.16*
(-1.40) (-0.45) (-1.89) (-1.71)
TURN 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00
(0.42) (-0.27) (-0.16) (-0.19)
Industry fixed effects YES YES YES YES
R² 0.43 0.31 0.27 0.24
Adj. R² 0.31 0.18 0.12 0.08
F-statistic 2.76 4.27 9.80 8.15
Prob > F 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
N 90 90 90 90
Table 12. Robustness test - multivariate results of earnings management
Notes: This table shows regression results of earnings management measures on the variables of interest and
control variables. All earnings management metrics are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile. The regressions
are estimated using White heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors. *, ** and *** denote two-tailed statistical
significance on the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
POST_DETECTx
CHANGETEAM[0;2]
POST_CHANGEx
CHANGETEAM[0;2]
237 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
238 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
239 
 
 
V. 
DOES ENFORCEMENT CHANGE EARNINGS MANAGEMENT  
BEHAVIOR? EVIDENCE FROM THE EU AFTER MANDATORY 
IFRS ADOPTION 
MANUSCRIPT D 
 
V. Does Enforcement Change Earnings Management Behavior? 
Evidence from the EU after Mandatory IFRS Adoption 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
240 
V. DOES ENFORCEMENT CHANGE EARNINGS MANAGEMENT  
BEHAVIOR? EVIDENCE FROM THE EU AFTER MANDATORY  
IFRS ADOPTION 
 
1  Introduction ........................................................................................................ 242 
2  The Development of National Enforcement Institutions in the EU .................. 245 
3  Related Literature and Hypothesis Development .............................................. 247 
4  Research Design and Data Description ............................................................. 254 
4.1    Measurement of Earnings Management ................................................ 254 
4.2    Measurement of Enforcement Changes ................................................. 258 
4.3    Research Approach ................................................................................ 261 
4.4    Sample and Data .................................................................................... 262 
5  Results ................................................................................................................ 264 
5.1    Descriptive Statistics and Correlations .................................................. 264 
5.2    Univariate Analyses ............................................................................... 265 
5.3    Multivariate Analyses ............................................................................ 266 
6  Additional Analyses and Robustness Tests ....................................................... 268 
7  Conclusion ......................................................................................................... 270 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
241 
Germar Ebner/Johannes Hottmann/Torben Teuteberg/Henning Zülch* 
DOES ENFORCEMENT CHANGE EARNINGS MANAGEMENT  
BEHAVIOR? EVIDENCE FROM THE EU AFTER  
MANDATORY IFRS ADOPTION 
 
Abstract 
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1 Introduction 
Since 2005, European listed companies are required to prepare their consolidated finan-
cial statements according to International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS).1 This 
is the result of the so-called ‘IAS Regulation’ (Regulation (EC) No. 1606/2002) which 
aimed to increase the comparability and transparency of financial statements. Although 
international accounting standards have been adopted in the European Union (EU) for 
some time, there is still no consensus about the economic consequences of mandatory 
IFRS adoption.2 
In addition to mandatory IFRS adoption and in accordance with European legislation 
(‘IAS Regulation’ and ‘Transparency Directive’ (Directive 2004/109/EC)), EU member 
states are required to ensure the proper application of IFRS via enforcement mecha-
nisms on a national level. These enforcement activities shall unfold a sanctioning func-
tion in case of error findings and are thereby supposed to yield a preventive function 
that deters financial statement preparers from committing accounting malfeasance (Ber-
ger, 2010). 
Despite harmonization activities on EU level (CESR, 2003 and 2004), national respon-
sibility of accounting enforcement results in a variety of enforcement systems among 
the EU member states. Moreover, the timing of national enforcement reforms varies. 
While some countries have established or reformed existing enforcement mechanisms 
simultaneously with the mandatory adoption of IFRS in 2005, other EU member states 
                                                          
1  In the following we only use the abbreviation IFRS when referring to the accounting standards that 
have been issued by the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) or its predecessor, the In-
ternational Accounting Standards Committee (IASC). Standards issued by the IASC are called Interna-
tional Accounting Standards (IAS). 
2  For an extensive, up-to-date review of the literature on mandatory IFRS adoption in the EU see Single-
ton-Green (2015). 
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have taken these measures some years later. Specifically, the countries in question are 
Latvia, Lithuania, Slovenia and Sweden with enforcement reforms in 2007, and Czech 
Republic, Hungary and Ireland with corresponding changes in 2008. This decoupling of 
IFRS adoption and enforcement reforms provides a setting that allows disentangling the 
effects of both regulatory events (Christensen et al., 2013). 
Apart from IFRS adoption studies which control for legal enforcement in general (e.g. 
Daske et al., 2008), only a few studies provide evidence on the expected preventive 
function of accounting enforcement: Hope (2003) and Preiato et al. (2013) show that 
stronger enforcement – proxied via qualitative and resource-based indicators – is posi-
tively associated with financial analysts’ forecast accuracy. Ernstberger et al. (2012) and 
Samarasekera et al. (2012) investigate the case of Germany and exploit company sam-
ples that have only been partially affected by the enforcement reform; they find less 
earnings management activities for those companies being subject to increased en-
forcement of financial reporting. Last, Christensen et al. (2013) exploit differences in 
time between IFRS adoption and enforcement reforms and propose that positive liquidi-
ty effects are mainly driven by the latter ones. While these studies hint at positive im-
pacts of enforcement of accounting standards, to date, there is no unambiguous evidence 
for the postulated preventive function, i.e. that accounting quality improved in the af-
termath of enforcement reforms. 
We examine this issue by investigating a cross-country sample of firms listed at a regu-
lated market in the EU, thereby generally being subject to enforcement of financial re-
porting. While 7 countries conducted enforcement reforms in the years 2007 and 2008, 
13 countries without substantive changes in enforcement intensity serve as control 
groups (partitioned in steadily strong and weak enforcement countries). We proxy ac-
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counting quality with various earnings management metrics which – by construct – cap-
ture earnings management activities both within and beyond the legal framework.3 In 
particular, the measures employed comprise discretionary accruals models according to 
Jones (1991), Dechow et al. (1995) and Kothari et al. (2005). Moreover, we use the fol-
lowing binary metrics: likelihood of small profits, likelihood of large losses, and earn-
ings management measures derived from the ATO/PM diagnostic of Jansen et al. 
(2012). 
In contrast to prior literature, we cannot find consistent evidence of less earnings man-
agement activities in univariate difference-in-differences analyses. In contrast, the re-
sults suggest increased downward earnings management activities, assessed via signed 
discretionary accruals, the likelihood of large losses and the ATO/PM measure. This 
may be interpreted as some evidence for managers reacting overcautiously to increases 
in financial reporting oversight. The multivariate analyses basically support our univari-
ate results, with the decrease of upward earnings management being the notable excep-
tion of otherwise mainly insignificant results for the coefficient of enforcement reforms. 
Consequently, our analyses do not provide unambiguous evidence for reduced earnings 
management activities and thus higher accounting quality due to stricter accounting 
enforcement in the EU. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the develop-
ment of national enforcement institutions in the EU. Section 3 reviews related literature 
and develops our hypothesis, while Section 4 depicts the research design. Section 5 pre-
                                                          
3  We note that accounting enforcement is supposed to reduce only earnings management activities be-
yond the legal framework; consequently, we expect enforcement reforms to reduce only that part of 
earnings management metrics which is attributable to improper application of accounting standards. 
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sents our data and results, followed by selected robustness checks in Section 6. Section 
7 discusses our results and concludes. 
2 The Development of National Enforcement Institutions in the 
EU 
A pivotal step in the development of financial reporting in the EU was the enactment of 
the ‘IAS Regulation’. It was driven by the intention to increase the degree of transpar-
ency and comparability of financial statements in order to ensure an efficient function-
ing of capital markets (Regulation (EC) No. 1606/2002, Art. 1). For this purpose, the 
‘IAS Regulation’ requires all companies whose securities are admitted to trading on a 
regulated market in the EU to prepare their consolidated financial statements for finan-
cial years starting on or after 1 January 2005 in accordance with IFRS.4 Irrespective of 
the regulation on EU level, several member states permitted or requested the application 
of IFRS already before 2005 for certain companies mainly due to stock listing require-
ments. 
Besides the adoption of IFRS itself, the ‘IAS Regulation’ requires the member states to 
ensure the appropriate application of IFRS by rigorous enforcement on a national basis 
(Regulation (EC) No. 1606/2002, recital 16). Since differences in competences and 
characteristics of national enforcement institutions might undermine the goal of an in-
ternationally consistent application of IFRS, the ‘IAS Regulation’ additionally proposes 
coordination measures performed by the Committee of European Securities Regulators 
                                                          
4  See Regulation (EC) No. 1606/2002, Art. 2 and 4. Art. 9 (b) of the ‘IAS Regulation’ states that com-
panies which have been preparing their consolidated financial statements according to internationally 
recognized accounting standards (e.g. US GAAP) already before 2005 were allowed to postpone adap-
tion of IFRS to 2007. 
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(CESR)5 (Regulation (EC) No. 1606/2002, recital 16). Amongst other things, CESR has 
published two legally non-binding documents, namely ‘Standard No. 1 on Financial 
Information – Enforcement of Standards of Financial Information in Europe’ (CESR, 
2003) and ‘Standard No. 2 on Financial Information – Coordination of Enforcement 
Activities’ (CESR, 2004). They contained basic requirements for the institutional design 
and cooperation on a European level that national enforcement bodies shall meet. In 
July 2014, however, these requirements were superseded by ESMA’s final guidelines 
on enforcement of financial information. 
These coordination measures are complemented by the so-called ‘Transparency Di-
rective’ (Directive 2004/109/EC) which, inter alia, stipulates the enforcement of finan-
cial reporting, too. While the remaining regulations of the Transparency Directive, as 
e.g. disclosure requirements or trading suspensions, have to be enforced by the national 
securities authorities, enforcement of financial reporting can be conducted by a separate 
enforcement institution which shall take appropriate measures in case of detected ac-
counting misstatements (Directive 2004/109/EC, Art. 24 (h)). The Transparency Di-
rective should have been transposed in national law until January 20, 2007.6 
Prior research illustrates that the implementation of the above-named European pieces 
of legislation differs among the EU member states. While Christensen et al. (2013) dis-
play the varying timing of enforcement set-ups or reforms that have been taken by the 
EU member states in order to comply with the legal framework, Berger (2010) names 
various dimensions that are likely to constitute significant cross-country differences in 
                                                          
5  Since 2011, this task is conducted by the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA), the 
successor of the CESR. 
6  The Transparency Directive has been revised in 2013; however, the provisions on enforcement re-
mained unchanged. 
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enforcement: These relate to the organizational form, i.e. whether the enforcement insti-
tution is privately organized, a public authority, or a combination of both; the tasks and 
legal authority, e.g. pre clearance, auditor supervision, and access to auditors’ working 
papers; and especially the examination approach (e.g. definition of material accounting 
errors and frequency of investigations) and its consequences (e.g. adverse publicity, 
correction of erroneous financial statements and/or fines). Since we focus on changes 
rather than the absolute strength of enforcement settings, these potential institutional 
cross-country differences do not cause a major concern for our study. 
3 Related Literature and Hypothesis Development 
With regard to financial reporting, the term ‘enforcement’7 covers several layers of im-
pact, i.e. enforcement by supervisory boards, auditors, and external, i.e. company-
independent, oversight mechanisms (Brown and Tarca, 2005). In this paper we focus on 
the third area, namely enforcement of accounting standards which is carried out by in-
dependent enforcement institutions that aim to prevent and detect erroneous financial 
reporting. 
Enforcement of accounting standards is regarded as one of several means to enhance the 
quality of financial reporting. This shall be achieved by both a preventive and a sanc-
tioning function of the enforcement system (Berger, 2010). The preventive function of 
enforcement can be understood as ex-ante deterrence against accounting malfeasance. It 
is not directly linked to a certain action of the enforcement institution, but rather arises 
from its pure existence and potential to act. By contrast, the sanctioning function of en-
                                                          
7  Unless specified differently, the term ‘enforcement’ refers to enforcement of accounting standards in 
the following. 
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forcement comprises all consequences of the detection of erroneous accounting. These 
can be measures of the enforcement institution itself (e.g. fines or disbarments), or re-
sults from information that has been disseminated by the enforcement institution (e.g. 
investor reactions in response to error announcements).8 However, it is noteworthy that 
the preventive and sanctioning functions of enforcement are not completely unrelated, 
but that individuals’ consciousness of the sanctioning function forms the basis of the 
preventive function.9 
There is a vast body of research that captures various facets of enforcement’s sanction-
ing function (see e.g. Feroz et al., 1991; Dechow et al., 1996; Hribar and Jenkins, 2004; 
Srinivasan, 2005; Desai et al., 2006; Hitz et al., 2012). These studies provide unequivo-
cal empirical evidence that error announcements and restatements have an impact on 
capital-market properties, financial analysts’ forecasts and the fluctuation of directors, 
to name but a few. Consequently, the sanctioning function of enforcement can be 
deemed well documented. 
While these results are encouraging, they are not sufficient to allow a holistic assess-
ment of the effectiveness of enforcement mechanisms. The sanctioning function of en-
forcement must not be an end in itself, but should also serve the purpose of preventing 
responsible individuals from fraudulent accounting activities. To put it another way: In 
the final analysis it is not the very sanction which is crucial, but whether this sanction is 
perceived in a deterrent manner by the companies that are subject to enforcement. 
                                                          
8  For the US enforcement setting, there is evidence that indirect sanctions resulting from adverse pub-
licity can outbalance direct sanctions settled by the enforcement institution, see Karpoff et al. (2008). 
9  See e.g. Hope (2003), p. 240, who uses a different terminology though. 
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This is in line with the aim of the ‘IAS Regulation’ to ensure the proper functioning of 
capital markets and to promote investors’ confidence (Regulation (EC) No. 1606/2002, 
recital 4 and Art. 1; ESMA, 2014). For the following reasons, this aim cannot be 
achieved by the sanctioning function alone: First, most enforcement institutions are not 
able to review companies’ financial statements on an annual basis (see Berger, 2010). 
This in turn means that several years can pass until the enforcement institution detects 
accounting malfeasance (if ever); consequently, many inappropriate accounting treat-
ments might never be detected. Second, even if there are annual reviews, there is an 
inevitable time lag between the issuance of financial statements and a potential public 
detection of accounting errors by the enforcement institution.10 Therefore, the ex-post 
detection and sanctioning of erroneous financial reporting need to be complemented by 
ex-ante incentives to comply with the legal provisions.11 
Hence, the crucial question is whether the implementation of enforcement systems per 
se yields a measurable impact, too; this would permit inferences on the preventive – i.e. 
ex-ante – function of enforcement of financial reporting. Two strands of research have 
evolved that examine this issue, differing in the way of capturing the effects of en-
forcement. One approach tries to examine the association between the strength of en-
forcement systems and financial reporting or capital market properties in cross-country 
settings. In case that enforcement actually entails a preventive function, one should ob-
serve differences depending on the strength of enforcement systems. 
                                                          
10  For example, for the German enforcement system which does not conduct annual reviews of compa-
nies’ financial statements, the median of this time lag is 630 days (see Hitz et al., 2012, p. 267). 
11  Further reasons for the importance of the preventive function are the facts that, even if financial state-
ments are reviewed by the enforcement institution, the scope of the review may be limited to specific 
areas of financial reporting as well as the opportunity that the enforcement institution does not detect 
an error. 
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Since the strength of enforcement systems is not directly observable, this construct is 
usually approximated via enforcement indices. These typically capture both qualitative 
(e.g. legal competences of enforcement institutions) and quantitative (e.g. total fees of a 
country’s largest audit firms) characteristics of enforcement systems (see Hope, 2003; 
Preiato et al., 2013). Although it must be kept in mind that the quality of the enforce-
ment proxies used is not beyond dispute,12 the studies in question provide highly signif-
icant results: They find a positive correlation between enforcement of accounting stand-
ards and forecast accuracy of financial analysts (Hope, 2003; Preiato et al., 2013), while 
the dispersion of analysts’ forecasts is negatively correlated with enforcement (Preiato 
et al., 2013). 
The scope of those studies which measure enforcement via indices can be extended by 
considering IFRS adoption studies that control for the effects of enforcement. Those 
studies provide empirical evidence that positive effects (e.g. decrease in the degree of 
earnings management and/or the extent of forecast errors, increase of liquidity and mar-
ket valuation) due to a change from local GAAP to IFRS are more pronounced for those 
countries with a strict enforcement environment (see Cai et al., 2008; Daske et al., 2008; 
Byard et al., 2011).13 However, it must be noted that these studies do not focus on en-
forcement of accounting standards, but rather on enforcement of law in general. 
The same holds for cross-sectional studies that detect a positive relation between the 
degree of investor protection – measured by legal origin, cross-listings, or enforcement 
                                                          
12  Already the first study of its kind states that ‘[t]here is no straightforward and uncontroversial way to 
measure the strength of enforcement of accounting standards’ (Hope 2003, p. 242). For detailed critics 
of the measures used see Coffee (2007). 
13  To date, research did not reveal conclusive results on the consequences of IFRS adoption. For an over-
view of the literature see Soderstrom and Sun (2007), Brüggemann et al. (2013) and Singleton-Green 
(2015). 
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of securities laws – and earnings quality or capital-market properties (see Ball et al., 
2000; Lang et al., 2003; Leuz et al., 2003; Burgstahler et al., 2006; Jackson and Roe, 
2009). While these studies might capture some facets of the above-named indices that 
aim to proxy enforcement of accounting standards,14 it is noteworthy that they measure 
different theoretical constructs. 
The second strand of research comprises studies that aim to assess the effect of en-
forcement reforms.15 The underlying reasoning is as follows: If enforcement yields a 
preventive function, one should observe differences in financial reporting quality when 
comparing the pre- and post-reform periods; to our knowledge, solely the following 
three studies follow this approach.16 Christensen et al. (2013) exploit differences in time 
between IFRS adoption and enforcement reforms for the 56 countries of their sample. In 
contrast to prior belief, they find that the observed increase in stock liquidity must be 
attributed to enforcement reforms in the respective countries, rather than to a change 
from local GAAP to IFRS. 
Ernstberger et al. (2012) examine the impact of the German enforcement reform in 2005 
by investigating a sample of 366 German companies in the period from 2003 to 2006. 
The authors suppose that – based on a shift in managers’ reporting incentives, the effort 
                                                          
14  For example, the quantitative indicator ‘staffing level’ is used both by Jackson and Roe (2009), p. 211, 
and Preiato et al. (2013), p. 55. 
15  In the following, the term ‘enforcement reform’ does not only cover the initial setup of enforcement 
institutions, but also substantive changes with regard to qualitative and resource-based characteristics; 
see Section 4.2 for a detailed definition. 
16  We do not shortlist studies that measure the impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act since the observed ef-
fects cannot be solely attributed to those measures that strengthen the US enforcement institution SEC, 
but may be confounded by several other measures of this legislative bundle, as e.g. amendments of in-
ternal control systems, establishment of the Public Company Accountant Oversight Board (PCAOB) or 
increased litigation risk for managers (see Coates, 2007, for an overview). Nevertheless, some studies 
provide evidence of an increase in accounting quality following SOX, see e.g. Bartov and Cohen 
(2007), Cohen et al. (2008) and Iliev (2010). 
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of other enforcement institutions (as e.g. supervisory boards), and auditors’ bargaining 
power – the degree of earnings management decreases in the post-reform period. Sup-
ported by prior studies, they find some evidence for a decrease in earnings management 
and an increase in stock liquidity and market valuation measures. Yet the results must 
be interpreted with caution since in Germany both enforcement reform and IFRS adop-
tion took place in the same year. Consequently, the authors warn from a naïve interpre-
tation of their findings.  
Samarasekera et al. (2012) investigate the same issue by using a different perspective: 
Their study is based on a sample of British firms which are partially cross-listed at for-
eign stock exchanges, mostly in Germany and the US. While all companies under con-
sideration had to adopt IFRS, only the cross-listed subsample was affected by the re-
form of the German enforcement system. Following a similar line of argumentation as 
Ernstberger et al. (2012), Samarasekera et al. (2012) find support for their presumption 
of increased accounting quality since they observe these effects only for the cross-listed 
subsample. Therefore, they infer an association with the enforcement reform in Germa-
ny. 
In conclusion, research apparently provides some empirical evidence that enforcement 
of financial reporting yields a preventive function. However, it is noteworthy that most 
of the effects investigated do not directly measure the intended goal of enforcement, i.e. 
increase in financial reporting quality, but mostly constructs as information environment 
and investor perception. While the latter are related to accounting quality, they are nev-
ertheless only a reflection of how corporate outsiders perceive the quality of financial 
reporting.  
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Ernstberger et al. (2012) and Samarasekera et al. (2012) provide first evidence for the 
preventive effects of the German enforcement system, both for German firms that to a 
large extent have simultaneously adopted IFRS, and for a specific subsample of British 
firms which are cross-listed in Germany. Both studies suggest an increase in financial 
reporting quality due to the enforcement reform in Germany. These initial results that 
pioneered the empirical evidence of enforcement’s preventive function motivate broad-
er, i.e. transnational, research. Since the legal bases of the recent enforcement reforms 
apply to the EU as a whole, this begs the question whether the goal of enhancing finan-
cial reporting quality has been achieved in other EU member states as well. Not least 
because of the fact that national enforcement institutions materially vary in several di-
mensions, this cannot be taken for granted by solely examining the effect in the German 
institutional setting. Consequently, in this paper, we investigate this issue in an EU con-
text. 
Regulators’ intended effect of enforcement reforms, namely enhancing accounting qual-
ity, provides the basis for our hypothesis. This goal is supported by the empirical evi-
dence described above regarding enforcement of law in general and of accounting 
standards in particular. Following this line of reasoning and especially considering the 
findings of Ernstberger et al. (2012) and Samarasekera et al. (2012), we expect in-
creased accounting quality in those EU member states that have tightened enforcement 
of accounting standards. 
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While there is no consensus on what constitutes accounting quality, we follow prior 
literature17 and use the degree of earnings management to capture this issue. Enforce-
ment by construct is expected to deter managers from committing fraudulent financial 
reporting beyond the legal framework; additionally, it can be argued that it might miti-
gate managers’ incentives for aggressive reporting choices even within the legal frame-
work. Since earnings management captures both effects (Dechow et al., 1996; Böcking 
et al., 2015), one should observe a lower level of earnings management in the presence 
of enforcement.18 Thus, we state our hypothesis as follows: 
H1: Earnings management decreases in the aftermath of reforms that 
strengthen the enforcement of accounting standards in the EU. 
4 Research Design and Data Description 
4.1 Measurement of Earnings Management 
To test our hypothesis, we use several earnings management metrics based on prior lit-
erature. Since the construct earnings management is difficult to capture, we employ a 
range of different measures in order to enhance both validity and reliability of our find-
ings. Thus, consistent results across a set of different proxies may provide more con-
vincing evidence on the effects of enforcement changes on accounting decisions, alt-
hough alternative explanations cannot be ruled out entirely (see Lang et al., 2003). First, 
we use the widely-used approach to measure the extent of earnings management by the 
                                                          
17  In addition to the presented literature that deals with the impact of enforcement, the approach of ap-
proximating accounting quality via earnings management measures is also widely used in the strand of 
IFRS adoption literature, see e.g. Barth et al. (2008). 
18  This is also supported by the studies of Dechow et al. (1996) and Böcking et al. (2015) who show that 
firms with detected accounting errors exhibit higher earnings management metrics than non-error 
companies. 
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magnitude of discretionary accruals. We then employ the alternative earnings manage-
ment diagnostic developed by Jansen et al. (2012) which relies on contemporaneous 
changes in asset turnover and profit margin. Finally, we use proxies for specific incen-
tives to avoid a loss or to recognize as many expenses as possible in years in which 
earnings are extraordinary low. 
With regard to the accruals-based earnings management measures, we rely on different 
modifications of the Jones (1991) model in order to estimate the extent of non-
discretionary accruals and, accordingly, the extent of discretionary accruals. Besides the 
Jones (1991) model, we estimate discretionary accruals according to the models by 
Dechow et al. (1995) and Kothari et al. (2005). For all of these models, total accruals 
(TA) are calculated according to the cashflow-based approach:19 
ܶܣ௜,௧ ൌ ܰ݁ݐ	ܫ݊ܿ݋݉݁௜,௧ െ ܱ݌݁ݎܽݐ݅݊݃	ܥܽݏ݄݂݈݋ݓ௜,௧                                              ሺ1ሻ 
Having calculated total accruals for each firm-year combination with sufficient data, we 
use TAit scaled by total assets (A) as dependent variable for the following regression 
models in order to determine the extent of discretionary accruals for each firm-year ob-
servation:20 
Jones (1991): 
்஺೔,೟
஺೔,೟షభ ൌ ߙ଴ ൅ ߚଵ
ଵ
஺೔,೟షభ ൅ ߚଶ
∆ௌ௔௟௘௦೔,೟
஺೔,೟షభ ൅ ߚଷ
௉௉ா೔,೟
஺೔,೟షభ ൅ ߝ௜,௧                                                     	ሺ2ሻ 
                                                          
19  Rephrased in Worldscope items, total accruals are calculated as [WC01551-WC04860]. 
20  The corresponding Datastream items are as follows: ܣ௜,௧= Total assets [WC02999]; ݈ܵܽ݁ݏ௜,௧= Net sales 
or revenues [WC01001]; ܲܲܧ௜,௧= Property, plant & equipment - net [WC02501]; ܴ݁ܿ݁݅ݒܾ݈ܽ݁ݏ௜,௧= Re-
ceivables (net) [WC02051]; ܴܱܣ௜,௧= (net income before extraordinary items/preferred dividends / total 
assets) [WC01551 / WC02999]. 
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Dechow et al. (1995): 
்஺೔,೟
஺೔,೟షభ ൌ ߙ଴ ൅ ߚଵ
ଵ
஺೔,೟షభ ൅ ߚଶ
∆ௌ௔௟௘௦೔,೟ି∆ோ௘௖௘௜௩௔௕௟௘௦೔,೟
஺೔,೟షభ ൅ ߚଷ
௉௉ா೔,೟
஺೔,೟షభ ൅ ߝ௜,௧                             			ሺ3ሻ 
Kothari et al. (2005): 
்஺೔,೟
஺೔,೟షభ ൌ ߙ଴ ൅ ߚଵ
ଵ
஺೔,೟షభ ൅ ߚଶ
∆ௌ௔௟௘௦೔,೟ି∆ோ௘௖௘௜௩௔௕௟௘௦೔,೟
஺೔,೟షభ ൅ ߚଷ
௉௉ா೔,೟
஺೔,೟షభ ൅ ߚସܴܱܣ௜,௧ ൅ ߝ௜,௧            ሺ4ሻ              
We run the models above separately for our sample as defined in Section 4.4. Using a 
one-digit standard industry classification (SIC), we separately estimate the models for 
each industry-year cross-section with at least 20 observations.21 The residuals obtained 
from the separate regressions serve as firm-year specific estimators for the extent of 
earnings management. In a first step, we analyze the absolute value of discretionary 
accruals since earnings management can be income-increasing or income-decreasing. A 
higher value of absolute discretionary accruals indicates a higher level of earnings man-
agement in the respective year which is interpreted as lower accounting quality.22 In a 
second step, however, we also consider the sign of the discretionary accruals to examine 
                                                          
21  We do not require the industry-year groupings to belong to the same country and view – for the pur-
pose of estimating discretionary accruals – all EU countries in our sample as a single economic entity 
(see Chen et al., 2008; Doukakis, 2014). There is no consensus on how many observations should be 
required to estimate accruals. For example, Doukakis (2014) requires 8, Chen et al. (2010) require 20 
(10 in robustness tests), and Ernstberger et al. (2012) require only five observations to run a Jones 
model type cross-sectional regression. 
22  Earnings management describes the phenomenon that managers use discretion over recognition and 
measurement or disclosure or that they structure real transactions to influence the outcomes of finan-
cial reporting (see e.g. Healy and Wahlen, 1999; Roychowdhury, 2006; Ronen and Yaari, 2008). Their 
incentives in doing so may be to achieve specific contractual outcomes which depend on accounting 
data or to mislead financial reporting users about the underlying economics (Healy and Wahlen, 1999). 
However, managers may also use discretion to signal private information to external parties (Watts and 
Zimmermann, 1986; Healy and Wahlen, 1999). In line with the majority of studies, we interpret earn-
ings management opportunistically and assume higher quality earnings to exhibit less earnings man-
agement. 
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the (potentially different) effects of enforcement changes on income-increasing and in-
come-decreasing earnings management more deeply.23 
In addition, we use the ATO/PM diagnostic of Jansen et al. (2012). According to the 
rationale of this approach, contemporaneous changes of a firm’s profit margin (PM) and 
asset turnover (ATO) in opposite directions indicate earnings management behavior in 
the respective year. The logic is illustrated by the following example: If a firm under-
states (overstates) bad debt allowance in order to manage earning upward (downward), 
not only net income but also accounts receivable on the balance sheet are increased (de-
creased). Assuming a constant level of sales, this leads to a decrease (increase) in asset 
turnover and an increase (decrease) in profit margin. Accordingly, we create an indica-
tor variable ATO/PM which equals 1 if ΔATO < 0 and ΔPM > 0 or ΔATO > 0 and ΔPM 
< 0, and 0 otherwise.24 Moreover, we construct two separate indicator variables on this 
basis which specifically proxy for either upward management (ATO/PM_UP) or down-
ward management (ATO/PM_DN) of earnings, respectively. 
In addition to the above proxies, we employ two further earnings management metrics 
that capture specific management incentives in relation to the amount of net income in 
the respective period. Prior research provides evidence for managers engaging in earn-
ings management to avoid losses (e.g. Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997; Burgstahler et al., 
2006) and to recognize as many expenses as possible in years in which net income is 
extraordinary low (big bath accounting), respectively. SPOS is an indicator variable 
                                                          
23  By doing so, we follow selected prior literature which also accounts for the sign of discretionary ac-
cruals (see e.g. Ecker et al., 2013, and Owens et al., 2015). 
24  A further requirement is that upward management of earnings is not followed by downward manage-
ment of earnings in the subsequent period and vice versa. This is to ensure that our metric does not 
capture cases where the diagnostic is likely to detect the reversal of past earnings management only. 
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intended to capture incentives to achieve a small positive net income number rather than 
a loss in the respective period. Following Barth et al. (2008) and Lang et al. (2003), we 
define SPOS as equal to one if net income scaled by total assets is between 0 and 0.01, 
and zero otherwise. With regard to the incentive to recognize as many expenses as pos-
sible in periods with extraordinary low earnings, we follow Gros and Wallek (2015) and 
use the indicator variable LNEG which is equal to one if the firm incurs a large negative 
net income (i.e. net income scaled by total assets is less than -0.20) in the respective 
year, and zero otherwise.25 
4.2 Measurement of Enforcement Changes 
While Ernstberger et al. (2012) focus their analysis on the impact of a newly created 
enforcement institution, we follow Christensen et al. (2013) and measure the effect of 
‘substantive changes’26 in enforcement of accounting standards. There are powerful 
benefits to this approach: Our sample size is not solely restricted to those countries that 
set up a new enforcement institution, which in turn positively affects the statistical pow-
er of the tests conducted and the generalizability of the results. This particularly holds 
true in view of the fact that our study is designed to assess the effect of enforcement 
reforms on EU level.  
Besides, it appears questionable whether an enforcement institution that does not exhibit 
a minimum set of certain characteristics – e.g. conducting proactive reviews and impos-
ing sanctions in case of accounting errors – can perform its task as intended by the leg-
                                                          
25  For both SPOS and LNEG, we use the Datastream items WC01651 for net income and WC02999 for 
total assets, respectively. 
26  It goes without saying that we equate ‘substantive change’ with a tightening of enforcement of ac-
counting standards. Since the findings of Christensen et al. (2013) clearly meet this requirement, the 
coding of the variable is consistent, which in turn is expected to yield unambiguous results. 
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islator. As described above, managers could perceive the presence of such an enforce-
ment institution as harmless; consequently, the latter would probably not unfold deter-
rent effects with regard to earnings management. If so, the change from no enforcement 
to enforcement can be regarded as quite similar as the change from weak enforcement to 
proper enforcement. Consequently, we regard the measurement of substantive changes 
in enforcement regimes as appropriate means to capture the concept ‘enforcement re-
form’. 
In order to identify national enforcement reforms in the EU, we use the study of Chris-
tensen et al. (2013) as a starting point. The authors assess substantive changes in en-
forcement of financial reporting via publically available information (e.g. annual reports 
of enforcement institutions) and a questionnaire which was sent to enforcers, technical 
partners at PricewaterhouseCoopers, and academics in a number of jurisdictions. While 
admitting the subjective character that is inherent to the determination of substantive 
changes in enforcement, Christensen et al. (2013) regard the set-up of new enforcement 
institutions, the initiation of proactive reviews, more severe penalties, and increased 
resources of enforcement institutions as indicators of a substantive change in enforce-
ment. On this basis, they create an indicator variable which is equal to one for calendar 
quarters after the enforcement change and zero otherwise. 
Given the fact that our research question differs from the one of Christensen et al. 
(2013), we adjust their results since we are not interested in the point of time when capi-
tal market participants for the first time perceived these enforcement reforms as effec-
tive, but when corporate managers anticipated these institutional changes and may have 
changed their accounting behavior accordingly. Therefore, we are interested in the point 
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of time when the first annual reports were prepared that had to be assumed by the man-
agement to potentially being subject to enhanced enforcement activities. 
In order to achieve this goal, we slightly modified the questionnaire that was kindly 
provided to us by Luzi Hail and his co-authors Hans Christensen and Christian Leuz 
and sent it to national enforcement institutions in the EU and academics from partner 
universities of our institution. A review of the enforcers’ annual activity reports – where 
available in English – serves as additional back-up of the information gained. Based on 
these detailed insights, we are able to identify the financial years whose financial reports 
are likely to be first subject to the increased level of enforcement. Apart from sole ad-
justments of timing, we come up with slightly different results regarding the measure-
ment of enforcement changes compared to the study of Christensen et al. (2013). In the 
case of three countries, our analyses clearly hint at substantive changes in enforcement 
although Christensen et al. (2013) did not detect one. However, we acknowledge that 
this might be driven by semantic frictions in communication between the sender and 
receiver of this information. Despite our best efforts, we are only capable of adjusting 
the data for the time period 2005-2009 (the investigation period of Christensen et al., 
2013), while the return rate is not sufficient to cover the subsequent years for the whole 
sample. Therefore, the case of Austria, which implemented a two-tier enforcement 
mechanism in 2013, only serves as robustness check. 
Since all substantive changes affect financial statements published in 2007 and 2008, 
we create an indicator variable POSTENF which is coded one for the years after 2007 
and zero otherwise. In combination with the indicator variable TREATMENT that takes 
the value one for all observations of our treatment group (i.e. firms from countries with 
a substantive change in enforcement between 2005 and 2009), the interaction term 
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TREATMENTxPOSTENF condenses our definitions above by taking the value one only 
for observations in treatment countries in the aftermath of enforcement reforms. There-
by, we aim to isolate the impact of the enforcement reforms in question. 
Those countries without a substantive change in enforcement serve as controls in our 
analyses. Therefore, we partition those countries according to the strength of their na-
tional enforcement system into two control groups which contain either countries with a 
steadily high or steadily low level of enforcement. In order to determine the level of 
enforcement, we rely on the work of Brown et al. (2014) and their construction of coun-
try-level enforcement scores. All countries with enforcement scores above 12 for the 
years 2005 and 2008 are regarded as exhibiting a high level of enforcement, thereby 
constituting control group 1. In contrast, all countries with enforcement scores of 12 or 
lower exhibit a rather weak level of enforcement and constitute control group 2.27 
4.3 Research Approach 
We begin with univariate analyses in order to assess the effect of enforcement reforms 
on earnings management. Starting with the treatment group only, i.e. all countries with a 
substantive change in enforcement during the investigation period, we compare the level 
of earnings management two periods after the enforcement changes with the level in the 
two periods before the enforcement changes (ܱܲܵ ்ܶ௥௘௔௧௠௘௡௧ െ ܴܲܧ்௥௘௔௧௠௘௡௧). While 
this approach yields initial evidence on how the degree of earnings management devel-
oped, it does not control for several other determinants, e.g. factors on a macroeconomic 
level, such as the recent financial crisis. In order to rule out alternative explanations, we 
                                                          
27  We opt for this cut-off point since the enforcement scores of Brown et al. (2014) range from 0 to 24 
which results in 12 being the natural borderline between the two separated groups. 
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follow prior literature (e.g. Daske et al., 2008) and use a difference-in-differences (DiD) 
design, i.e. we compare the development of earnings management in the treatment 
group with the one of control groups. By doing so, underlying influences that affect 
both treatment and control groups are controlled for, which leaves us with a cleaner 
effect of enforcement changes. From a formal point of view, the DiD approach is a sim-
ple extension of the term stated above ሺሾܱܲܵ ்ܶ௥௘௔௧௠௘௡௧ െ ܴܲܧ்௥௘௔௧௠௘௡௧ሿ െ
ሾܱܲܵ ஼ܶ௢௡௧௥௢௟ െ ܴܲܧ஼௢௡௧௥௢௟ሿሻ. 
In the multivariate analyses, we regress each earnings management measure on a set of 
explaining variables. Besides the variables TREATMENT and POSTENF, which are 
defined above, the interaction term TREATMENTxPOSTENF is of particular importance 
for us, since it reflects the DiD approach in the multivariate setting. Apart from these 
variables of interest, we follow prior literature (see e.g. Barth et al., 2008; Ernstberger et 
al., 2012) and include the following well-established control variables which are defined 
in Table 1: SIZE, GROWTH, LEVERAGE, EISSUE, DISSUE, OCF, TURN, AUD. Fur-
thermore, all regressions include industry and country fixed effects. While the multivar-
iate analysis for the discretionary accrual metrics is performed via an OLS regression, 
the dichotomous dependent variables require the application of a logistic regression. All 
regressions are computed with heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors. 
== Insert Table 1 here == 
4.4 Sample and Data 
Since all companies that are listed on a regulated market in the EU are generally subject 
to enforcement of financial reporting (and required to prepare their consolidated finan-
cial statements according to IFRS), we start our sample construction with a list from 
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ESMA28 that comprises all companies whose shares are admitted to trading on EU regu-
lated markets. The earliest composition of shares available is dated on 1 July 2007; giv-
en the fact that the ‘IAS Regulation’ already went into effect in 2005, this leaves us with 
a gap of two years (2005 and 2006) for which we cannot determine the exact composi-
tion of EU regulated markets. This means that companies listed on the regulated market 
in 2007 were not necessarily listed in the regulated market the years before and vice 
versa. However, given the small fluctuation in subsequent years, we do not regard this 
issue being critical. Thus, our sample period ranges from 2005 to 2009. By excluding 
the years prior to 2005, we avoid potentially confounding effects of changes from local 
GAAP to IFRS and therefore can purely focus on the impact of enforcement reforms. 
However, this also means that the enforcement reforms of our study are limited to years 
after 2005, thereby excluding prominent examples as, for example, Germany. 
Building on this, our sample adjustment is as follows: We delete redundant observations 
with multiple shares (e.g. common and preferred stocks), companies which are head-
quartered outside the EU and – in line with prior research (e.g. Doukakis, 2014) – fi-
nancial institutions.  
Furthermore, we delete observations from nine countries – mainly located in Eastern 
Europe – due to missing information on enforcement changes in the period 2005-2009. 
The remaining countries are classified as set out in Section 4.2. We identify seven coun-
tries with substantive changes in enforcement (treatment sample) between 2005 and 
2009: Four in 2007 (Latvia, Lithuania, Slovenia, and Sweden) and three in 2008 (Czech 
                                                          
28  The list can be obtained from the following website: 
http://mifiddatabase.esma.europa.eu/Index.aspx?sectionlinks_id=14&language=0&pageName=MiFID
LiquidSearch (last retrieved: 12/13/2015). 
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Republic, Hungary, and Ireland).29 We use the remaining countries as control groups in 
order to isolate the effect of enforcement reforms from confounding factors, especially 
macroeconomic developments. According to Section 4.2, we classify Belgium, Den-
mark, France, Germany, Italy, Norway and the United Kingdom as control-1 sample 
(steadily strong enforcement since 2005), and Austria, Finland, Greece, Poland, Portu-
gal and Romania as control-2 sample (steadily weak enforcement). 
== Insert Table 2 here == 
In addition, we require full data availability for the calculation of the specific earnings 
management metrics employed as well as other explaining variables used in our regres-
sions. Thus, the final sample size differs depending on the respective analysis and earn-
ings management metric used: It ranges from 12,604 firm-year observations for the uni-
variate difference-in-differences analysis of the treatment and control-1 sample (see 
Table 5, Panels C and D) to 768 firm-year observations for the multivariate analysis of 
discretionary accruals for the treatment and control-2 sample (see Table 6, Panels A and 
B). 
5 Results 
5.1 Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
Table 3 presents descriptive statistics for the treatment, control-1 and control-2 sample. 
While the three subsamples are quite similar especially considering the medians which 
are less affected by outliers, the following exceptions are notable: Control sample 1 ex-
hibits higher values for SIZE, which is quite intuitive since it comprises economically 
                                                          
29  We provide detailed information on each of the substantive changes in the appendix in Table 9. 
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well-developed countries as France, Germany and the United Kingdom. The same holds 
for LEVERAGE, which might be driven by better access to bond markets in the respec-
tive countries. Finally, it is noteworthy that firms from control sample 2 exhibit less 
audits by Big 4 auditors. 
== Insert Table 3 here == 
Table 4 depicts the correlation coefficients for the explaining variables. Apart from the 
spearman correlations of SIZE with AUD and GROWTH with DISSUE, all remaining 
values are far below the 0.40 threshold. With regard to Pearson correlations, the pair 
SIZE and AUD is the only combination which exceeds this level. Consequently, we do 
not regard multicollinearity being an issue for our dataset and the subsequent multivari-
ate analyses. 
== Insert Table 4 here == 
5.2 Univariate Analyses 
To test our hypothesis, we start with conducting several t-tests in order to assess differ-
ences in means for the pre- and post-enforcement period for the treatment sample only. 
As can be seen in Table 5, Panels A and B, both absolute and signed discretionary ac-
cruals decrease (partially statistically significant) in the aftermath of enforcement 
changes. Since these results might also be driven by events that are not related to ac-
counting enforcement, we conduct a DiD analysis to rule out other explanations. Specif-
ically, a negative DiD indicates a higher decrease/smaller increase of the respective 
metric for the treatment sample, compared with the control group, which would support 
our hypothesis. 
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With regard to the control-1 sample, we recognize negative DiDs, which however are 
only close to statistical significance for signed discretionary accruals calculated accord-
ing to the models of Dechow et al. (1995) and Kothari et al. (2005). A corresponding 
analysis with the control-2 sample exclusively yields insignificant results. Turning the 
view to the dichotomous earnings management metrics (Table 5, Panels C and D) indi-
cates increased likelihood of large losses (LNEG) and earnings management activities 
according to the metrics ATO/PM and ATO/PM_UP for the treatment sample, compared 
with control sample 1. In comparison with control sample 2, the findings of LNEG are 
robust and moreover indicate increased downward earnings management 
(ATO/PM_DN) for the treatment sample. 
In conclusion, besides few exceptions, the univariate results do not support our hypoth-
esis of less earnings management in the aftermath of enforcement reforms, rather hint-
ing at the opposite. However, it must be noted that several potential alternative drivers 
of earnings management behavior – e.g. other country-specific factors, reporting incen-
tives, and firm characteristics – are not captured by the univariate approach. Therefore, 
we conduct several multivariate analyses in the next subsection. 
== Insert Table 5 here == 
5.3 Multivariate Analyses 
Our first set of multivariate analyses examines the effect of enforcement changes on 
non-signed discretionary accruals. We limit the regressions on the treatment and con-
trol-2 sample only to ensure an intuitive explanation of the interaction term TREAT-
MENTxPOSTENF. Going in line with our expectations, companies from the treatment 
sample exhibit significantly smaller absolute discretionary accruals (t-statistics of 2.91 
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to 3.37); moreover, it is noteworthy that, on average, earnings management activities 
decreased over time. As stated in Section 4.3, we are particularly interested in the inter-
action term TREATMENTxPOSTENF, which captures the DiD in the multivariate anal-
yses. However, after controlling for alternative explanatory factors, we cannot provide 
evidence for a decrease in discretionary accruals due to enforcement reforms. The same 
holds for regressions with signed discretionary accruals, which even lack statistically 
significant coefficients of TREATMENT and POSTENF. 
Regressions of the dichotomous dependent variables on the variables of interest present 
a slightly different picture: While the likelihood of small profits (large losses) is lower 
(higher) for the treatment sample, POSTENF hints at decreasing upward (ATO/PM_UP) 
and slightly increasing downward (ATO/PM_DN) earnings management in later years 
for both the treatment and control-2 sample, which might be driven by the contempora-
neous financial crisis, serving as a potential trigger event for asset impairments. Similar 
results hold for the interaction term TREATMENTxPOSTENF, being statistically signif-
icant for the ATO/PM_UP (z-statistic of -1.75) and ATO/PM_DN measure (z-statistic of 
2.15). This indicates that firms from the treatment sample conduct less upward earnings 
management after the tightening of accounting enforcement, thereby supporting our 
hypothesis. Moreover, firms in the treatment sample appear to increasingly engage in 
downward earnings management after the enforcement reforms. Taken together, these 
results suggest that firms in countries with a strengthening of accounting enforcement 
report less aggressively and even more cautiously with regard to potential overstate-
ments of earnings after the regulatory change. The overall earnings management meas-
ure (ATO/PM) veils these differentiations and is statistically insignificant.  
268 
We caution that these results are based on comparably few observations, arguably as a 
result of requested data availability; this holds true especially for the discretionary ac-
crual proxies. Keeping this caveat in mind, we cannot provide unambiguous evidence of 
less earnings management due to enforcement reforms; however, we come up with 
some indicators of less upward earnings management and increased downward earnings 
management. Therefore, we argue that managers might have become overcautious and 
therefore deliberately present the economic constitution of their companies worse than 
justified in order to not attract the enforcers’ attention. 
== Insert Table 6 here == 
6 Additional Analyses and Robustness Tests 
We acknowledge that the results presented above are subject to inevitable methodologi-
cal choices. Therefore, we conduct the following robustness tests in order to assess po-
tential sensitivities of the gained results. 
Our first set of robustness tests deals with a different investigation period: While we opt 
for the years [2005, 2006; 2008, 2009] in our main analysis, we conduct an additional 
analysis for the period [2005, 2006; 2009, 2010] in order to mitigate confounding ef-
fects of the financial crisis in the years 2007 and 2008. Table 7, Panels A-D, presents 
the corresponding univariate results: Starting with the discretionary accruals proxies, we 
notice that the DiDs of absolute values remain insignificant, both with regard to control 
sample 1 and 2. Nonetheless, the DiDs of signed discretionary accruals are highly sig-
nificant when comparing the treatment and control-1 sample, thereby indicating that 
enforcement might have set incentives for increased downward earnings management.  
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Turning to the dichotomous dependent variables, the likelihood of large losses has sub-
stantially increased for the treatment sample, compared to the control-1 and control-2 
samples. Moreover, the results suggest increased upward earnings management for the 
treatment sample, arguably affecting ATO/PM as well. 
Turning the view to the multivariate analysis, the results basically remain the same for 
the absolute discretionary accrual metrics, while the interaction term for signed discre-
tionary accruals takes negative values, hinting at an impact of the enforcement reforms 
in question. Although we also find evidence of decreased likelihood of small profits, 
TREATMENTxPOSTENF does not seem to have an effect on the ATO/PM measures for 
the alternative estimation period. 
== Insert Table 7 here == 
In the second set of robustness tests, we exploit a completely different setting to rule out 
possible confounding events which are difficult to control for. Given the fact that Aus-
tria is the last EU country that implemented an enforcement mechanism in 2013, we 
compare the level of earnings management conducted by firms from Germany and Aus-
tria in the period [2012; 2013]. Both countries exhibit very similar national accounting 
rules and traditions, legal principles, and rule of law; therefore, we regard this exoge-
nous shock (i.e. the set-up of the two-tier Austrian enforcement system in July 2013)30 
as an ideal setting in order to assess the impact of enforcement reforms on earnings 
management activities.  
                                                          
30  Financial statements of financial years ending after 30 December 2013 were the first being subject to 
enforcement in Austria (AFREP, 2013). Consequently, we identify a substantive change in enforce-
ment for the year 2013.  
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While absolute discretionary accruals indicate increased earnings management activities 
(Table 8, Panel A), signed discretionary accruals of Austrian firms decreased compared 
to their German peers, being close to statistical significance (1-tailed p-values of 0.10 
and 0.12 for the Dechow et al. (1995) and Kothari et al. (2005) measure, respectively). 
With regard to dichotomous univariate evidence, Panel B strongly hints at a decreased 
likelihood of small profits and increased likelihood of large losses following the en-
forcement reform in Austria, compared to Germany. However, the DiDs of all other 
variables are statistically insignificant.  
The multivariate analysis with absolute discretionary accruals confirms the univariate 
results of increasing earnings management activities given the positive coefficients of 
TREATMENTxPOST, being statistically significant with t-statistics of 1.80. Turning to 
the dichotomous metrics (Table 8, Panel E), the sharp increase of large losses (z-statistic 
of 16.99 for the interaction term) is noteworthy; this goes in line with our reasoning that 
financial statement preparers become overcautious after enforcement reforms. However, 
for the remaining earnings management measures the results do not suggest a signifi-
cant impact of the enforcement reform in question. 
== Insert Table 8 here == 
7 Conclusion 
Our paper aims to investigate the impact of recent enforcement reforms in EU member 
states on accounting quality, thereby evaluating the proclaimed preventive function of 
enforcement of accounting standards. We proxy accounting quality via multiple earn-
ings management metrics and calculate them for a treatment sample with enforcement 
reforms after mandatory IFRS adoption, and two control samples without corresponding 
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substantive changes in enforcement. In contrast to prior literature, we cannot provide 
consistent evidence of a decrease in earnings management; however, we find some evi-
dence of less upward and more downward earnings management, potentially hinting at 
an overcautious counter reaction of managers in response to the depicted enforcement 
reforms. 
While, to the best of our knowledge, our study is the first of its kind that directly inves-
tigates the role of enforcement reforms in shaping financial reporting behavior in a 
cross-country EU setting, several caveats remain that are worth to keep in mind when 
interpreting our findings. First, the validity of our results crucially depends on our prox-
ies of the constructs ‘substantive change in enforcement’ and ‘accounting quality’: Alt-
hough we partially relied on the analysis of Christensen et al. (2013) and additionally 
added our information on institutional changes in accounting enforcement, we cannot 
entirely rule out the possibility of misunderstandings in the communication with Euro-
pean enforcers and academics which might affect the quality of questionnaire responses. 
With regard to accounting quality, we rely on well-established proxies for earnings 
management, which should capture both legal and illegal earnings management activi-
ties. Nonetheless, we notice that enforcement by definition should only affect the latter, 
thereby arguably only partially affecting earnings management activities. Furthermore, 
both the sole proxies and also the computation include noise which is not related to the 
concept we are looking for. Our approach of employing different and unrelated metrics 
can be seen as attempt to mitigate these concerns, while we cannot entirely rule them 
out. 
Second, it is possible that other factors apart from the detected enforcement changes 
might drive the results. Though we try to control for such potential omitted variable 
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biases by comparing the treatment sample with two control groups, we caution to solely 
attribute the gained results to enforcement reforms. 
Third, the comparably small number of observations certainly affects the generalizabil-
ity of our results, especially with regard to the discretionary accrual metrics. While this 
is owed to our sample adjustment process in general and data availability constraints in 
particular, it is noteworthy that most of the countries in the treatment sample are located 
in Eastern Europe, thereby exhibiting smaller and less developed capital markets due to 
historical reasons. However, we do not see reasonable alternatives to our approach 
without affecting the reliability of the presented numbers. 
We regard our study as pioneering work that does not come up with irrefutable results, 
but rather aims at encouraging both academics and practitioners to join the discussion in 
order to evaluate recent enforcement reforms in the EU. This holds especially for those 
countries with changes after the mandatory adoption of IFRS that are typically not often 
covered in empirical studies due to the lack of sufficient data. 
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Subsample Country Enforcement Change 
[2005-2009]
Firm-Year 
Observations
Treatment Sample Czech Republic 2008 92
Hungary 2008 152
Ireland 2008 124
Latvia 2007 124
Lithuania 2007 156
Slovenia 2007 176
Sweden 2007 1,192
Treatment Sample Total 2,016
Control Sample 1 Belgium --- 436
Denmark --- 524
France --- 2,236
Germany --- 2,772
Italy --- 1,036
Norway --- 944
United Kingdom --- 2,640
Control Sample 1 Total 10,588
Control Sample 2 Austria --- 340
Finland --- 516
Greece --- 1,072
Poland --- 1,484
Portugal --- 200
Romania --- 272
Control Sample 2 Total 3,884
Total sample size 16,488
Table 2. Sample composition
Notes: The coding of enforcement changes is based on the study of Christensen et
al. (2013) and our own research results. Table 9 provides detailed information on
each enforcement change. The denoted sample size holds for the univariate
analyses for dichotomous metrics, while univariate analyses with discretionary
accrual metrics or multivariate analyses yield smaller sample sizes.
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N Mean Median Lower Quartile Upper Quartile Std. Deviation
SIZE [Mio.] 1,100 851.31 54.85 11.90 329.06 3,178.37
GROWTH 1,100 0.69 0.04 -0.09 0.18 15.11
LEVERAGE 1,100 1.68 0.92 0.43 1.69 6.74
EISSUE 1,100 0.08 -0.95 -1.00 -0.67 10.22
DISSUE 1,100 0.20 0.02 -0.14 0.22 1.42
OCF 1,100 0.06 0.07 0.01 0.13 0.17
TURN 1,100 1.09 1.00 0.64 1.45 0.69
AUD 1,100 0.82 0.38
N Mean Median Lower Quartile Upper Quartile Std. Deviation
SIZE [Mio.] 6,301 2,017.70 140.73 36.41 643.96 8,353.36
GROWTH 6,301 0.75 0.05 -0.07 0.17 21.50
LEVERAGE 6,301 2.03 1.39 0.69 2.44 26.17
EISSUE 6,301 29.45 -0.87 -0.98 -0.13 2,177.95
DISSUE 6,301 0.86 0.03 -0.10 0.20 40.54
OCF [Mio.] 6,301 0.05 0.07 0.02 0.12 0.38
TURN 6,301 1.10 0.98 0.61 1.39 0.76
AUD 6,301 0.74 0.44
N Mean Median Lower Quartile Upper Quartile Std. Deviation
SIZE [Mio.] 2,320 531.99 43.65 15.21 194.58 2,585.28
GROWTH 2,320 0.11 0.03 -0.10 0.18 1.04
LEVERAGE 2,320 1.82 1.13 0.59 2.00 15.47
EISSUE 2,320 -11.53 -0.96 -0.99 -0.66 2,516.24
DISSUE 2,320 0.45 0.04 -0.10 0.23 13.55
OCF [Mio.] 2,320 0.05 0.05 0.00 0.11 0.14
TURN 2,320 1.02 0.88 0.54 1.31 0.78
AUD 2,320 0.47 0.50
Table 3. Descriptive statistics
Panel A: Treatment sample
Panel B: Control sample 1
Panel C: Control sample 2
Notes: The table displays the descriptive statistics for the investigation period [2005, 2006; 2008, 2009] for the
treatment, control-1 and control-2 sample, respectively. It contains those observations which are also
comprised in the multivariate analyses (since control sample 1 is not part of the multivariate analyses, it solely
serves as a comparison scale for the denoted descriptive statistics of the treatment and control-2 sample).
Please note that the slightly deviating sample size compared to the univariate analyses is due to less restrictive
data requirements in the multivariate analyses. Specifically, we do not require data coverage of all years for each 
observation.
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Panel A: Continuous dependent variables - OLS regression
Non-signed DA Non-signed DA Non-signed DA
(Jones 1991) (Dechow et al. 1995) (Kothari et al. 2005)
Intercept 0.20*** 0.22*** 0.18***
(6.31) (6.82) (5.30)
TREATMENT -0.06*** -0.08*** -0.07***
(-2.91) (-3.37) (-3.36)
POSTENF -0.01* -0.01 -0.01*
(-1.78) (-1.10) (-1.91)
TREATMENTxPOSTENF 0.00 -0.00 -0.00
(0.22) (-0.16) (-0.28)
SIZE -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01***
(-4.93) (-5.45) (-3.50)
GROWTH 0.01 0.02 0.02
(0.75) (1.33) (1.22)
LEVERAGE -0.00 -0.00 -0.00
(-0.91) (-0.64) (-0.68)
EISSUE 0.00 0.00 0.00
(1.51) (1.21) (1.45)
DISSUE 0.01 0.01 0.01
(1.18) (1.33) (0.98)
OCF -0.01 -0.01 -0.00
(-0.32) (-0.18) (-0.12)
TURN -0.00 -0.00 0.00
(-0.14) (-0.28) (0.96)
AUD 0.00 0.01 0.01
(0.64) (1.18) (0.76)
Industry fixed effects YES YES YES
Country fixed effects YES YES YES
R² 0.16 0.18 0.21
Adj. R² 0.13 0.15 0.18
F-statistic 4.69 5.78 5.81
Prob > F 0.00 0.00 0.00
N 768 768 768
Table 6. Multivariate results
288 
Panel B: Continuous dependent variables - OLS regression
Signed DA Signed DA Signed DA
(Jones 1991) (Dechow et al. 1995) (Kothari et al. 2005)
Intercept -0.09** -0.08* 0.01
(-2.04) (-1.67) (0.27)
TREATMENT 0.01 0.00 0.00
(0.41) (0.08) (0.09)
POSTENF -0.00 -0.00 -0.00
(-0.50) (-0.27) (-0.56)
TREATMENTxPOSTENF -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
(-0.56) (-0.91) (-0.89)
SIZE 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.00**
(4.02) (4.24) (2.12)
GROWTH 0.00 0.02 0.02
(0.11) (1.16) (1.03)
LEVERAGE 0.00 0.00 0.00*
(0.29) (0.34) (1.77)
EISSUE -0.00 0.00 0.00
(-0.22) (0.43) (0.43)
DISSUE -0.02 -0.02* -0.03**
(-1.56) (-1.90) (-2.15)
OCF -0.38*** -0.38*** -0.47***
(-5.94) (-5.63) (-6.41)
TURN 0.01 0.01 -0.00
(1.64) (1.26) (-0.46)
AUD -0.01 -0.01 -0.02**
(-0.92) (-1.34) (-2.07)
Industry fixed effects YES YES YES
Country fixed effects YES YES YES
R² 0.29 0.30 0.47
Adj. R² 0.27 0.28 0.45
F-statistic 3.06 3.12 5.92
Prob > F 0.00 0.00 0.00
N 768 768 768
Table 6. Multivariate results
289 
Panel C: Dichotomous dependent variables - logistic regression
SPOS LNEG ATO/PM_UP ATO/PM_DN ATO/PM
Intercept -0.03 3.73** -1.38* -1.06* -0.21
(-0.05) (5.19) (-2.55) (-2.18) (-0.53)
TREATMENT -1.73** 1.08*** -0.22 -0.69** -0.51**
(-2.32) (2.73) (-0.76) (-2.28) (-2.13)
POSTENF 0.08 0.18 -0.59*** 0.19 -0.20**
(0.46) (0.94) (-4.62) (1.64) (-2.09)
TREATMENTxPOSTENF -0.76 0.34 -0.38* 0.46** 0.04
(-1.29) (1.29) (-1.75) (2.15) (0.25)
SIZE -0.15*** -0.49*** 0.03 -0.03 -0.00
(-3.05) (-9.52) (1.13) (-1.16) (-0.10)
GROWTH -0.04 0.01** -0.04 -0.02 -0.03
(-0.42) (2.32) (-0.44) (-0.92) (-0.85)
LEVERAGE -0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.00
(-0.43) (0.43) (-1.48) (0.34) (-0.41)
EISSUE 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.78) (-0.55) (-0.59) (1.12) (0.92)
DISSUE -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.01 -0.00
(-0.45) (-0.35) (-0.43) (-0.65) (-1.15)
OCF -0.19 -7.24*** 1.21*** -0.12 0.49*
(-0.50) (-7.76) (3.12) (-0.34) (1.68)
TURN -0.39** -0.31*** -0.17** 0.25*** 0.12**
(-2.34) (-2.68) (-2.13) (4.14) (2.23)
AUD -0.30 0.43** 0.13 0.10 0.13
(-1.28) (2.44) (0.94) (0.81) (1.29)
Industry fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES
Country fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES
Pseudo R² 0.17 0.33 0.03 0.02 0.01
Chi² 171.70 419.00 85.30 66.09 32.85
Prob > Chi² 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.28
N 3,129 3,420 3,420 3,420 3,420
Table 6. Multivariate results
Notes: This table shows regression results which are based on observations from the treatment and
control-2 sample. All continuous dependent variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile.
The levels of significance have been calculated using White heteroscedasticity-robust standard
errors. *, ** and *** denote two-tailed statistical significance on the 10%, 5% and 1% level,
respectively.
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Panel E: Multivariate analysis with non-signed continuous dependent variables - OLS regression
Non-signed DA Non-signed DA Non-signed DA
(Jones 1991) (Dechow et al. 1995) (Kothari et al. 2005)
Intercept 0.24*** 0.25*** 0.19***
(7.29) (7.17) (6.01)
TREATMENT -0.09*** -0.10*** -0.09***
(-4.52) (-4.56) (-4.57)
POSTENF -0.01*** -0.01 -0.01
(-2.69) (-1.63) (-1.50)
TREATMENTxPOSTENF 0.01 0.01 0.00
(1.61) (0.70) (0.46)
SIZE -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.00***
(-4.40) (-4.86) (-2.98)
GROWTH 0.00 0.00** 0.00**
(0.52) (2.30) (2.20)
LEVERAGE -0.00 -0.00 -0.00
(-0.12) (-0.61) (-0.59)
EISSUE 0.00*** 0.00* 0.00*
(3.01) (1.96) (1.85)
DISSUE 0.00 0.00 0.01
(0.37) (0.52) (1.01)
OCF 0.02 0.04 0.04
(0.50) (0.84) (0.82)
TURN -0.00 -0.00 0.00
(-0.48) (-0.46) (1.27)
AUD -0.00 0.00 -0.00
(-0.63) (0.05) (-0.43)
Industry fixed effects YES YES YES
Country fixed effects YES YES YES
R2 0.16 0.17 0.17
Adj. R² 0.13 0.14 0.14
F-statistic 6.02 9.18 12.02
Prob > F 0.00 0.00 0.00
N 682 682 682
Table 7. Robustness test - alternative sample period [2005, 2006 vs. 2009, 2010]
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Panel F: Multivariate analysis with signed continuous dependent variables - OLS regression
Signed DA Signed DA Signed DA
(Jones 1991) (Dechow et al. 1995) (Kothari et al. 2005)
Intercept -0.12** -0.12** -0.03
(-2.37) (-2.31) (-0.69)
TREATMENT 0.05* 0.05 0.03
(1.73) (1.41) (1.22)
POSTENF 0.00 -0.00 -0.00
(0.41) (-0.11) (-0.42)
TREATMENTxPOSTENF -0.02* -0.02* -0.01
(-1.96) (-1.65) (-1.61)
SIZE 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01**
(3.55) (3.89) (1.99)
GROWTH -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00***
(-2.86) (-3.06) (-4.84)
LEVERAGE 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.41) (0.33) (0.73)
EISSUE -0.00 0.00 0.00
(-0.43) (0.05) (0.01)
DISSUE -0.01 -0.00 -0.01*
(-1.04) (-0.37) (-1.78)
OCF -0.48*** -0.49*** -0.60***
(-7.36) (-7.08) (-7.09)
TURN 0.01** 0.01** 0.00
(2.30) (2.01) (1.31)
AUD 0.00 0.01 -0.00
(0.28) (0.59) (-0.74)
Industry fixed effects YES YES YES
Country fixed effects YES YES YES
R2 0.38 0.38 0.63
Adj. R² 0.36 0.36 0.62
F-statistic 14.10 7.59 22.89
Prob > F 0.00 0.00 0.00
N 682 682 682
Table 7. Robustness test - alternative sample period [2005, 2006 vs. 2009, 2010]
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Panel G: Multivariate analysis with dichotomous dependent variables - logistic regression
SPOS LNEG ATO/PM_UP ATO/PM_DN ATO/PM
Intercept -0.08 3.76*** -1.66*** -0.95* -0.39
(-0.12) (4.70) (-3.16) (-1.82) (-0.95)
TREATMENT -1.77** 1.50*** -0.23 -0.34 -0.31
(-2.48) (3.74) (-0.78) (-1.06) (-1.29)
POSTENF 0.10 0.24 -0.58*** -0.04 -0.34***
(0.56) (1.26) (-4.65) (-0.31) (-3.59)
TREATMENTxPOSTENF -1.11* 0.34 0.13 0.28 0.19
(-1.76) (1.29) (0.65) (1.24) (1.14)
SIZE -0.17*** -0.57*** 0.08*** -0.06* 0.02
(-3.51) (-10.61) (2.75) (-1.91) (0.76)
GROWTH -0.02 0.00 -0.29*** -0.03* -0.12***
(-0.77) (1.24) (-2.65) (-1.86) (-2.89)
LEVERAGE -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00
(-0.86) (-0.63) (-0.63) (-0.82) (-1.07)
EISSUE 0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00
(1.23) (0.06) (-0.59) (1.20) (0.61)
DISSUE 0.02 0.01 0.02 -0.01 0.01
(0.53) (0.26) (0.67) (-0.25) (0.52)
OCF 0.04 -6.67*** 0.96*** -0.19 0.22
(0.24) (-6.01) (2.81) (-0.84) (0.89)
TURN -0.42*** -0.30** -0.13* 0.16*** 0.05
(-2.85) (-2.57) (-1.69) (2.80) (0.97)
AUD 0.04 0.34* 0.06 -0.01 0.02
(0.15) (1.86) (0.41) (-0.10) (0.21)
Industry fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES
Country fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES
Pseudo R2 0.16 0.33 0.03 0.01 0.01
Chi² 188.10 385.40 72.35 38.08 36.48
Prob > Chi² 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.12 0.16
N 3.138 3.438 3.438 3.438 3.438
Table 7. Robustness test - alternative sample period [2005, 2006 vs. 2009, 2010]
Notes: Panels E, F and G show regression results which are based on observations from the
treatment and control-2 sample. All continuous dependent variables are winsorized at the 1st and
99th percentile. The levels of significance have been calculated using White heteroscedasticity-
robust standard errors. *, ** and *** denote two-tailed statistical significance on the 10%, 5% and
1% level, respectively.
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Panel C: Multivariate analysis with non-signed continuous dependent variables - OLS regression
Non-signed DA Non-signed DA Non-signed DA
(Jones 1991) (Dechow et al. 1995) (Kothari et al. 2005)
Intercept 0.13*** 0.13*** 0.13***
(6.09) (6.36) (7.33)
TREATMENT -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.01*
(-2.91) (-2.84) (-1.81)
POSTENF -0.01 -0.01** -0.01
(-1.21) (-2.14) (-1.40)
TREATMENTxPOSTENF 0.01 0.02* 0.02*
(1.17) (1.80) (1.68)
SIZE -0.01*** -0.00*** -0.00***
(-3.87) (-3.49) (-4.40)
GROWTH -0.02 -0.02 -0.00
(-1.31) (-1.32) (-0.17)
LEVERAGE 0.00 -0.00 -0.00
(0.13) (-1.20) (-1.29)
EISSUE 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00***
(3.22) (3.40) (3.46)
DISSUE 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.02***
(4.43) (4.60) (3.98)
OCF -0.00 -0.02 -0.03
(-0.17) (-0.61) (-1.23)
TURN -0.00 0.00 0.00
(-0.05) (0.35) (0.83)
AUD 0.00 0.00 -0.00
(0.25) (0.00) (-0.22)
Industry fixed effects YES YES YES
R2 0.14 0.14 0.14
Adj. R² 0.10 0.11 0.11
F-statistic 3.68 3.90 4.76
Prob > F 0.00 0.00 0.00
N 449 449 449
Table 8. Robustness test - Germany vs. Austria
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Panel D: Multivariate analysis with signed continuous dependent variables - OLS regression
Signed DA Signed DA Signed DA
(Jones 1991) (Dechow et al. 1995) (Kothari et al. 2005)
Intercept -0.04 -0.03 -0.01
(-1.54) (-1.17) (-0.50)
TREATMENT 0.00 0.01 0.00
(0.43) (0.69) (0.59)
POSTENF -0.01 -0.01 -0.00
(-1.11) (-0.77) (-0.50)
TREATMENTxPOSTENF -0.01 -0.02 -0.01
(-0.83) (-1.40) (-1.33)
SIZE 0.01*** 0.00*** 0.00
(3.36) (2.69) (1.49)
GROWTH 0.05** 0.11*** 0.05***
(2.30) (3.53) (3.59)
LEVERAGE -0.00 0.00 0.00
(-0.57) (0.10) (1.10)
EISSUE 0.00** 0.00** 0.00**
(2.14) (2.30) (2.44)
DISSUE -0.04*** -0.04*** -0.03***
(-5.63) (-3.47) (-3.63)
OCF -0.23** -0.22** -0.37***
(-2.22) (-2.27) (-3.39)
TURN 0.01 0.01 0.01
(1.65) (1.27) (1.45)
AUD -0.01* -0.01 0.00
(-1.73) (-1.08) (0.03)
Industry fixed effects YES YES YES
R2 0.23 0.22 0.49
Adj. R² 0.20 0.19 0.47
F-statistic 6.35 5.67 6.87
Prob > F 0.00 0.00 0.00
N 449 449 449
Table 8. Robustness test - Germany vs. Austria
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Panel E: Multivariate analysis with dichotomous dependent variables - logistic regression
SPOS LNEG ATO/PM_UP ATO/PM_DN ATO/PM
Intercept -15.71*** 5.19*** -1.16 -2.45** -1.09
(-17.68) (3.16) (-0.84) (-2.13) (-1.12)
TREATMENT 0.63 -15.79*** 0.26 -0.08 0.03
(1.31) (-30.75) (0.49) (-0.21) (0.10)
POSTENF 0.43 -0.00 0.38 -0.10 0.09
(1.35) (-0.01) (1.44) (-0.50) (0.51)
TREATMENTxPOSTENF -1.08 15.72*** -0.77 0.38 0.01
(-1.29) (16.99) (-0.94) (0.70) (0.03)
SIZE -0.07 -0.63*** -0.04 0.01 -0.01
(-1.05) (-4.68) (-0.65) (0.24) (-0.29)
GROWTH 0.00 -0.32 -0.05 -0.24 -0.12
(0.00) (-0.97) (-0.48) (-1.37) (-0.84)
LEVERAGE 0.07*** 0.02 -0.01 0.00 -0.00
(3.20) (0.48) (-0.95) (0.25) (-0.13)
EISSUE -0.00 0.00** -0.00 0.00 0.00
(-0.19) (2.32) (-0.25) (1.63) (1.42)
DISSUE 0.02 -0.29 -0.00 0.11** 0.08*
(0.42) (-1.60) (-0.01) (2.33) (1.81)
OCF 0.70 -7.17* -0.09 0.31 0.12
(1.02) (-1.70) (-0.11) (0.39) (0.20)
TURN -0.43* -0.17 -0.26 0.11 -0.03
(-1.84) (-0.73) (-1.25) (0.86) (-0.22)
AUD 0.44 0.87** -0.22 0.23 0.09
(1.28) (2.13) (-0.77) (1.04) (0.48)
Industry fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES
Pseudo R² 0.06 0.39 0.03 0.02 0.02
Chi² 1,027.00 1,519.00 17.63 21.12 19.00
Prob > Chi² 0.00 0.00 0.48 0.27 0.39
N 732 732 732 732 732
Table 8. Robustness test - Germany vs. Austria
Notes: Panels C, D and E show regression results which are based on observations from Germany and
Austria for the years 2012 and 2013. All continuous dependent variables are winsorized at the 1st and
99th percentile. The levels of significance have been calculated using White heteroscedasticity-robust
standard errors. *, ** and *** denote two-tailed statistical significance on the 10%, 5% and 1% level,
respectively.
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Czech Republic (2008): While there was historically some legal uncertainty about which authority (Ministry of
Finance or Czech National Bank) is responsible for enforcement of accounting standards,
the Czech National Bank has finally undertaken that role. The first financial statements that
were subject to the monitoring process are dated on the fiscal year ending on December 31,
2008. The same holds for sanctions in case of misreporting, which comprise issuance of a
corrective note and new financial statements, corrections in future financial statements, and
monetary penalty.
Hungary (2008): In Hungary, enforcement is carried out by the Hungarian Financial Supervisory Authority
and is legally based on the Capital Market Act of 2001 and a Ministry of Finance Decree
from 2008. While financial reports with balance sheet date 31 December 2008 have been first
subject to enforcement, the first sanctions (error announcements and restatements) haven
taken place in 2009.
Ireland (2008): The Irish Audit and Accounting Supervisory Authority performs its reviewing activities
since H2/2007 for semi-annual reports, however the first affected annual reports are those
with a financial year starting after 20 January 2007. This in turn means that annuals reports
ending in 2008 have first been subject to enforcement activities.
Latvia (2007): The Financial and Capital Market Commission enforces compliance with accounting
standards beginning with financial statements dated of 31 December 2007, while the first
sanction was imposed in 2008.
Lithuania (2007): The Securities Commission of the Republic of Lithuania was established in February 2007,
but started its reviewing activities not before November 2007. While we do not have explicit
information which financial statements have been first subject to enforcement, both 2006
(for annual reports) and 2007 (for semi-annual reports) appear possible. One argument
against 2006 is that managers might not have been aware of the upcoming enforcement
reforms, given the fact that the enforcement institution was not even set-up at this date.
Therefore, we opt for the financial years ending in 2007 of being first subject of
enforcement.
Slovenia (2007): The Securities Market Agency was established in March 1994, however the first reviewed
financial reports are dated on 31 December 2007. The first sanction in form of an error
announcement was taken in June 2008.
Sweden (2007): In Sweden, enforcement is carried out both by stock exchanges (NGM and NASDAQ
Stockholm) and the Finansinspektionen, which has the ultimate responsibility of
enforcement of financial reporting. The NGM, which is in charge of enforcement accounting
standards in the regulated market (i.e., NGM Equity and NDX), started to review semi-
annual reports dated on 30 June 2007. Thenceforward, annual reports must be surveyed at
least once in five years.
Table 9. Information on enforcement changes in the European Union
Notes: The following information is based both on the study of Christensen et al. (2013) and our own research
activities, which comprise the analysis of publically available information (e.g., enforcers’ annual activity reports) and
answers from a questionnaire which we sent to enforcement institutions of all EU member states and academics from
partner universities of our institution. The questionnaire asks whether the respective country has an enforcement
institution, when it was established and started monitoring compliance with accounting standards, and whether there
was a substantive change in enforcement during 2005-2014. In case of a substantive change in enforcement, we ask
which financial statements have been first subject to the increased level of enforcement. Given the fact that we
ensured anonymity to the respondents, we only briefly depict the situation in those countries with substantive
changes in enforcement.
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